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War veterans have long been seen as natural subjects for oral history, and the task of 
collecting their reminiscences has been the focus of substantial attention by 
institutions such as the Imperial War Museum. Military historians often draw upon 
such interviews in their research; however, their handling of this evidence remains 
hesitant and largely divorced from the substantial theory which has been developed 
by academic oral historians. Oral historians have themselves devoted little attention 
to the particular problems posed by the use of veterans’ testimony. This thesis applies 
oral history theory to the testimony of thirty-three British Army veterans of the 1944-
5 campaign in Northwest Europe, in order to explore the unique features of veterans’ 
oral history and assess its usefulness in military history. This involves firstly 
establishing the basic reliability of oral evidence, and then considering the effects of 
popular memory, the individual circumstances of the interviewees, and trauma, in 
order to gain a well-rounded understanding of the distortions that can arise in 
veterans’ testimony. The interview evidence is then applied to three key issues of the 
1944-5 campaign, combat experience, morale, and doctrine, to assess the contribution 
it can make to key issues in military history. The thesis outlines a more complex 
understanding of veteran’s testimony than has previously been put forward, and 
contends that when subjected to an appropriate research methodology interview 
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‘Oral history goes naturally with military history. After all, veterans have told their war 
stories since time immemorial’.1 Eyewitness evidence has long been a tool employed 
by military historians aware of its potential to reveal aspects of combat, morale and 
the experience of war which are poorly recorded in written documentation. Since the 
early a 1970s a vast literature on war experience has been produced,2 and this has 
been paralleled by the creation of substantial military oral history archives across the 
Anglophone world. The Imperial War Museum’s Department of Sound Records, now 
the Sound Archive, was established in 1972 and holds over 33,000 recordings;3 it has 
since been joined by archives such as the Liddle Collection, with over 4,000 
biographical interviews, and the Second World War Experience Centre, which 
preserves material relating to around 8,700 individuals.4 Specialised military collections 
also exist in the United States: The National World War II Museum holds nearly 7000 
oral histories, the Rutgers Oral History Archives 871, and the Wisconsin Veterans 
Museum over 2000.5 Yet despite the evident interest in collecting personal accounts 
1 Edward M. Coffman, ‘Talking About War: Reflections on Doing Oral History and Military History’, 
Journal of American History, 87 (September, 2000), p. 582. 
2 The refocussing from generalship to the experience of the man on the ground was inaugurated by 
John Keegan’s The Face of Battle (London, 1976) and applied most prominently to the Second World 
War by John Ellis, The Sharp End of War (Newton Abbot, 1980). See also John Ellis, ‘Reflections on 
the Sharp End of War’, in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.), Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience 
of War in the West 1939-1945 (London, 1997), pp. 12-13. 
3 ‘Imperial War Museum’, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/sound> [accessed December 2017]. 
4  Peter H. Liddle and Matthew J. Richardson, ‘Voices from the Past: An Evaluation of Oral History as 
a Source for Research into the Western Front Experience of the British Soldier, 1914-18’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 31/4 (October, 1996), p. 655; ‘Second World War Experience Centre Trustees’ 
Report’ (2016), 
<https://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Accounts/Ends65/0001072965_AC_20161231_E_C.pdf> 
[accessed December 2017], p. 4. 
5 ‘The National WWII Museum’, <http://www.ww2online.org/content/faqs> [accessed December 
2017]; ‘Rutgers Oral History Archives’, <http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/> [accessed December 2017]; 
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of war, such sources remain under-analysed and their uses under-theorised. There 
still exists a certain reticence among military historians about using oral testimony: it 
is suspected of being inherently unreliable due to the limitations of human memory 
and the doubtful representativeness of individual experiences. Meanwhile, since the 
1960s oral history has developed into ‘a sophisticated theoretical field in its own right’,6 
whose practitioners have produced theoretical and methodological principles to enable 
them to handle their idiosyncratic sources. Few of these advancements, however, have 
been applied to the unique context of military history. For instance, it is well 
understood that culture causes retrospective distortions in the way the past is 
remembered, but this consideration is absent from most assessments of veterans’ 
testimony, which appear well-intentioned but simplistic in the light of current oral 
history theory. 
This thesis aims to answer the broad question: ‘What can soldiers tell us about their 
war experiences which is of genuine worth in historical research?’. It primarily analyses 
thirty-three interviews with British Army veterans of the 1944-5 Northwest European 
campaign. It will consider oral sources as peculiar in the way they must be analysed, 
requiring a particular and specialised set of theoretical and methodological tools. 
Unique considerations are presented by the particular military context, which have 
been neglected to date, and so issues arising from the popular memory of the Second 
World War, narrative trends in accounts of war, and discourses around wartime 
trauma and veterancy,7 are explored. In contrast to these unique approaches required 
‘Wisconsin Veterans Museum’, <https://www.wisvetsmuseum.com/oral-histories/> [accessed 
December 2017]. 
6 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (Abingdon, 2010), p. 8. 
7 Defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘The state or condition of being a veteran’. 
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when analysing military testimony, it will be argued that oral testimony is not peculiar 
in its interpretative usage, as the information it provides is not inherently different to 
that contained in any other source. In this way the thesis will propose how the 
distinctive fields of oral history and military history might more fruitfully be combined 
and suggest new approaches to the use of veterans’ testimony. As a foundation, this 
introduction will constitute a critique of the current research aims of oral history and 
call for greater rigour in the handling of oral sources in military history. 
The term ‘oral history’ can refer to ‘the process of conducting and recording interviews 
with people in order to elicit information from them about the past’ as well as ‘the 
product of that interview’;8 however, this basic definition has been subject to a vast 
range of different research aims and methodologies, resulting in an extremely varied 
field of study which is truly interdisciplinary, drawing on approaches from social 
science, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, and literary criticism as well as history.9 
It may therefore immediately be asked why oral historians cannot be trusted to turn 
their attentions in one more direction, towards military matters. Indeed, war and oral 
history have always been closely interlinked, and many of the most influential texts in 
the field focus on the subject of war.10 Nonetheless, oral history approaches generally 
have little in common with those in military history, and the two fields remain largely 
incompatible. 
8 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 2. 
9 Alistair Thomson, ‘Four Paradigm Transformations in Oral History’, Oral History Review, 34/1 (2007), 
pp. 62-4. 
10 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend (Oxford, 1994); Graham Dawson, 
Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities (London, 1994); 
Alessandro Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory and Meaning of a Nazi 
Massacre in Rome (Basingstoke, 2007); Penny Summerfield, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives: 
Discourse and Subjectivity in Oral Histories of the Second World War (Manchester, 1998). 
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Oral History and Military Testimony 
Part of the problem arises from the context of British academic discourse. This is one 
of many cases in which the peculiarities of British oral history can be illustrated by 
reference to the situation in the United States, where oral history has been an 
accepted tool of historical research for far longer, and, moreover, has received greater 
official validation. The first large-scale American oral history projects were 
government-backed, while the first oral history archives were designed to record the 
histories of ‘great men’, rather than reveal the hidden lives of the marginalised11—
although the latter aim was more than fulfilled by the work of figures such as Studs 
Terkel and Alex Haley.12 The US military has been a keen proponent of oral history 
since the Second World War13—related to a general interest in official history-writing 
and innovative methods of statistical monitoring14—and all branches of the US military 
now conduct oral history for historical, doctrinal and training purposes.15 
Such official support for oral history has not been the norm in the United Kingdom. 
There the field grew out of radical political roots outside the academy, intended not 
11 Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History, Third Edition (New York, 2015), pp. 5-6. Subsequent 
references are to this edition unless otherwise stated. See also Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 
4; Thomson, ‘Four Paradigm Transformations’, pp. 51-2. 
12 See also Michael Frisch, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public 
History (Albany, 1980), and Ronald Grele, Envelopes of Sound: The Art of Oral History (New York, 
1991), for two influential espousals of oral history by American scholars. 
13 By the end of the war US Army historians had conducted over 7000 interviews in Europe alone. 
Stephen E. Everett, Oral History: Techniques and Procedures (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 7. See also 
Stephen J. Lofgren, U.S. Army Guide to Oral History (Washington, D.C., 2006); Maurice Maryanow, 
‘Oral History and the Vietnam War: The Air Force Experience, International Journal of Oral History, 
7/2 (1986). 
14 J.W. Ryan, and D.R. Segal, Samuel Stouffer and the GI Survey: Sociologists and Soldiers During 
The Second World War (Knoxville, TN, 2013); G. Kurt Piehler, ‘Veterans Tell Their Stories and Why 
Historians and Others Listened’, in G. Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash (eds.), The United States and the 
Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War and the Home Front (New York, 2010), pp. 
216-235. 
15 Ibid., p. 223. 
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to support but to contest traditional and official history work.16 This led to a particular 
focus on labour, class, gender and minority history, particularly where previously 
marginalised experiences could be revealed. A seminal article published by the Popular 
Memory Group in 1982, for instance, set out one of its political goals as revealing 
narratives which had been neglected in the dominant interpretations of history: ‘It is 
this hand of recovery that has become the mission of the radical and democratic 
currents in oral history’.17  This is an attitude which has not conformed easily with the 
conservative nature of the British armed forces and military historians. The British 
Army has never enacted an internal oral history programme on the American model.18 
Soldiers have been a valid subject for oral history, but usually in a way which 
characterises them as exploited victims of a military institution which is regarded with 
suspicion. Assessing such prominent institutions as militaries seems antithetical to the 
‘recovery’ role of oral history. Military historians tend to be viewed by outside 
academics as conservative, overly interested in distasteful military matters, and 
intellectually underdeveloped in their methodologies. Oral historians have therefore 
demonstrated more interest in revealing individual stories of war than examining the 
16 Thomson, ‘Four Paradigm Transformations’, pp. 51-2. 
17 Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method’, in Robert Perks and Alistair 
Thomson (eds.), The Oral History Reader, Second Edition (Abingdon, 2006), pp. 45-46. Subsequent 
references are to this edition unless otherwise stated. See also Thomson, ‘Four Paradigm 
Transformations’, pp. 52-3; Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 29; Penny Summerfield, ‘Culture and 
Composure: Creating Narratives of the Gendered Self in Oral History Interviews’, Cultural and Social 
History, 1/1 (2004), p. 66. 
18 Some questionnaires and interviews were conducted among British troops during the Second World 
War by the Weapons Technical Staff Field Forces and Directorate of Tactical Investigation, but these 
‘give only scattered, incidental reports on specific actions that officers were involved in, and thus do 
not contribute to the temporal focus that narrative military histories would find most useful’; see 
Robert Engen, Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War (Montreal, 
2009), pp. 29, 32; Engen, ‘S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire: History, Interpretation and the 
Canadian Experience’, Canadian Military History, 20/4 (2012), p. 47. 
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Army as an institution or in terms of its military effectiveness.19 To an extent, the fact 
historians in the two fields are largely unaware of those in the other means these 
differences are rarely articulated, but the attitude is summed up by Megan Hutching: 
My own background is as a social historian, and while it was possible 
that the project I was involved with could have been done by a military 
historian, I was eager to do it because I thought that I would approach 
it in a different way. I wanted to examine the effect of taking part in war 
on the individuals concerned, instead of concentrating on military 
strategy, accounts of battles, advances and retreats, and technical 
information about military materiel, which are the focus of standard 
accounts of war, intended as omniscient overviews of the military 
action.20 
While Hutching’s commitment to articulating the experience of individual soldiers is 
admirable, she appears to possess a rather outmoded and oversimplified idea of what 
military historians actually do. With the advent of ‘war and society’ approaches and 
‘the new military history’,21 and increasing numbers adopting the broader title of 
‘historians of war’ rather than military historians,22 most would certainly be interested 
in the effect of war on the individual participants. Hutching moreover fails to conceive 
of the possibilities for oral testimony to help inform the ‘omniscient overviews of the 
military action’ which she so derides, and conversely for traditional campaign histories 
to provide the essential background information for oral history projects involving war 
veterans. The result of such attitudes is that oral historians’ work with veterans is 
19 Thomson, Anzac Memories; Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories Revisited: Trauma, Memory and Oral 
History’, Oral History Review, 42/1 (2015), pp. 1-29; Sean Field, ‘“Shooting at Shadows”: Private Ian 
Field, War Stories and Why He Would not be Interviewed’, Oral History, 41/2 (Autumn, 2013), pp. 75-
86; Bill Nasson, ‘Springbok on the Somme: Joe Samuels, A South African Veteran of the Great War’, 
Oral History, 25/2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 31-38. 
20 Megan Hutching, ‘After Action: Oral History and War’, in Donald A. Ritchie (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Oral History (Oxford, 2011), pp. 233-4. 
21 Stephen Morillo and Michael F. Pavkovic, What is Military History? (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 37-43. 
22 This view was in evidence at the conference entitled ‘War in Contemporary and Historical Perspective’ 
which took place at King’s College London on 5th June 2017. 
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usually limited to informing narrow assessments of personal experience, not broad 
studies which consider war at all its varying levels of complexity. 
This divide parallels Yuval Noah Harari’s view that there exist two competing 
approaches to first-hand accounts in the study of war. Military historians by and large 
continue to view veterans as ‘eye-witnesses’ who can report objective facts about their 
experiences; facts which the historian can amass and use to make judgements about 
the past. Oral historians, by contrast, are far more likely to view their interviewees as 
‘flesh-witnesses’, who have gained through their experiences holistic, sensory and 
experiential knowledge which cannot truly be transferred to others who have not had 
the same experiences.23 Since in this conception personal accounts cannot transmit 
objective knowledge, it is unsurprising that oral historians make relatively little effort 
to amass such knowledge, and instead focus on expounding individual life 
experiences. 
A reluctance to engage with the nuts-and-bolts practicalities of warfare has restricted 
the interpretative impact of oral history in concert with a broader shift in that field 
towards a preoccupation with subjectivity. It has long been acknowledged that one of 
the distinctive features of oral history is that it encapsulates individual subjectivity—
factors such as memory, self-perception, norms of narrative form and performance, 
collective understandings of history and the interviewer-interviewee relationship. As 
Luisa Passerini states, ‘the raw material of oral history consists not just in factual 
statements, but is pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture, and 
23 Yuval Noah Harari, ‘Armchairs, Coffee and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about 
War, 1100-2000’, Journal of Military History, 74/1 (Jan., 2010), pp. 53-78. 
8 
 
therefore includes not only literal narrations but also the dimensions of memory, 
ideology and subconscious desires’.24 This seemed to provide one of its great 
advantages, being a window into personal experience, but also one of its greatest 
flaws—how could fact be determined from subjective sources? Early practitioners 
attempted to solve this problem by producing elaborate sampling techniques,25 but 
with this approach seeming ultimately unconvincing, oral historians began to regard 
subjectivity not as a problem to be overcome but as an area of research to be 
embraced in its own right.26 Passerini was responsible for inaugurating subjectivity as 
a subject of scholarship, which ‘heralded the move of oral history from social science 
to cultural history’;27 however, it was Alessandro Portelli who turned subjectivity into 
‘a resource as much as a problem’,28 influentially arguing that ‘Oral sources tell us not 
just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing 
and what they now think they did’.29 He maintained that subjectivity was also a fact 
of history, and that assessing subjective distortions can tell historians a great deal 
about what an event meant in the minds of the witnesses, so that ‘the discrepancy 
between fact and memory ultimately enhances the value of the oral source’.30 
24 Luisa Passerini, ‘Work Ideology and Consensus Under Italian Fascism’, History Workshop Journal, 8 
(1979), p. 84. 
25 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 80; Trevor Lummis, ‘Structure and Validity in Oral Evidence’, in 
Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, pp. 255-60; William Moss, ‘Oral History: An 
Appreciation’, in David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum (eds.), Oral History: An Interdisciplinary 
Anthology (London, 1996), p. 111; John Murphy, ‘The Voice of Memory: History, Autobiography and 
Oral Memory’, Historical Studies, 22/87 (1986), pp. 158, 171, 175. 
26 Thomson, ‘Four Paradigm Transformations’, p. 55. 
27 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 7. 
28 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 228. 
29 Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History (Albany, 1991), p. 50. 
30 Ibid., pp. 26, 50-1. 
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In this argument Portelli was undeniably convincing. However, it was as a result of 
this shift, along with the rise of postmodernist approaches to history,31 that the oral 
history field has allowed the issue of interpreting past events to fall by the wayside. 
Portelli himself was careful to note that if oral history ‘tells us less about events than 
about their meaning, this does not imply that oral history has no factual validity’, and 
that acknowledging subjectivity does not permit total interpretative freedom for the 
researcher.32 Likewise, Paul Thompson reminded readers that historical interpretation 
remains the ultimate goal, and warned against ‘a merely self-stimulating circular 
process, through which we become more and more involved with the linguistic or 
interactional structure of the memory we are examining, and less and less concerned 
about the message which is actually there in the memory.’33 
However, this appears to be exactly what has happened. In oral history, and related 
fields which have arisen alongside it such as memory studies, exploring human 
subjectivity has become the main aim of research, so that ‘it is precisely that interplay 
31 Abrams, Oral history Theory, p. 57; Daniel James, Doña Maria’s Story: Life History, Memory, and 
Political Identity (London, 2000), p. 123; James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, The Active 
Interview (London, 1995), p. 3. See Katherine Borland, ‘“That’s not what I said”: Interpretative 
Conflict in Oral Narrative Research’, in Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, pp. 310-321 
for an example of a prominent article which draws on postmodernist approaches; for critiques of such 
approaches see Anna Green, ‘Can Memory be Collective?’ in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Oral 
History, p. 101; J.P. Roos, ‘“Reality or Nothing”: False and Repressed Memories and Autobiography’, 
in Kim Lacy Rogers and Selma Leydesdorff (eds.), Trauma: Life Stories of Survivors (London, 2004), 
p. 213; Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London, 1997). 
32 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, pp. xi, 50. 
33 Paul Thompson, ‘Believe it or not: Rethinking the Historical Interpretation of Memory’, in Jaclyn 
Jeffrey and Glenace Edwall (eds.), Memory and History: Essays on Recalling and Interpreting 
Experience (Lanham, 1994), pp. 3, 8-11; Paul Thompson, ‘The Voice of the Past: Oral History’, in 
Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, p. 31. Numerous other scholars have remarked on 
the same problem: see also Patrick O’Farrell, ‘Oral History: Facts and Fiction’, Quadrant, 23 
(November, 1979), p. 5; Roos, ‘“Reality or Nothing”’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff (eds.), Trauma, p. 
213; Green, ‘Can Memory be Collective?’, p. 97; Trevor Lummis, Listening to History: The Authenticity 
of Oral Evidence (London, 1987), p. 123; Louise A. Tilly, ‘People’s History and Social Science History’, 
International Journal of Oral History, 7/4 (1983), pp. 462-3, 468, 472; Raphael Samuel, ‘History and 
Theory’, in Samuel (ed.), People’s History and Socialist Theory (London, 1981), p. xlviii; Renato 
Rosaldo, ‘Doing Oral History’, Social Analysis, 4 (September, 1980), p. 89. 
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between what we remember, how we remember and why we remember that is of 
such interest to oral historians’.34 This approach incentivises working with sources 
which are as problematic as possible, in order to make theoretical advancements; yet 
the results of such analyses are only rarely incorporated into interpretations of past 
events. As well as exacerbating a level of theoretical impenetrability which is off-
putting to those outside the field, this means oral history all too often deals 
disproportionately with the contemporaneous. Practitioners are preoccupied with the 
way the past is remembered and described in the present, rather than with the matter 
of interpreting what took place in the past. As the Popular Memory Group noted, ‘What 
is interesting about the forms of oral-historical witness or autobiography are not just 
the nuggets of ‘facts’ about the past, but the whole way in which popular memories 
are constructed and reconstructed as part of a contemporary consciousness.’35 There 
are theoretical distinctions between memory studies and oral history, but these are 
often nominal at best. According to Donald Ritchie: 
[they] differ but are compatible. Oral history relies on people’s testimony 
to understand the past, while memory studies concentrate on the 
process of remembering and how that shapes people’s understanding of 
the past. Memory studies are often more interested in how facts are 
remembered and in distortion of facts than the facts themselves. But 
since oral historians deal so directly with long-term memory, they have 
incorporated memory studies into their own methodological 
discussions.36 
34 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 81; Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 228; James, Doña Maria’s Story, 
pp. 123-4; Murphy, ‘The Voice of Memory’, p. 174. 
35 Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory’, in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), Oral History 
Reader, p. 51. 
36 Donald A. Ritchie, ‘Introduction: The Evolution of Oral History’, in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of 
Oral History, p. 12. 
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In reality, however, the overlaps between the two are substantial, since ‘there has 
been a tendency to slide—often in under-acknowledged ways—between approaching 
[memory] as a source of raw material about the past, and as a subject for historical 
inquiry in its own right’.37 Alistair Thomson, for instance, recommends ‘adopt[ing] a 
“double-take” approach to memory, and [using] it to explore both the past (history) 
and the past in the present (memory)’.38 In this wholehearted adoption of memory as 
subject as well as source, the goals as well as the methods of oral history have 
diverged from those of history in general. 
When oral historians do make historical judgements, the preoccupation with 
subjectivity and an over-reliance on oral sources can be extremely restrictive. Gabriele 
Rosenthal’s work interviewing German First and Second World War veterans 
demonstrates this clearly. She argues that differences in narrative style are ‘connected 
to differences in the conditions for experience of the wars, and above all to the 
contrast between a war of immobility and a war of mobility’:39 
The war of mobility between 1939-1945 was an experience of non-
routine situations in different places with various people, and of 
confrontations with living persons, including both civilians and the 
enemy. In the trenches of the First World War it was impossible to orient 
oneself according to time, or to structure the days according to the 
sequences of an ordinary day. The veteran of World War I did not know 
when there would be breaks in fighting, or when he could eat or 
sleep...The difficulty of narrating about the First World War is a result of 
37 Joan Tumblety, ‘Introduction: Working with Memory as Source and Subject’, in Joan Tumblety 
(ed.), Memory and History: Understanding Memory as Source and Subject (Abingdon, 2013), p. 1. 
38 Alistair Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of 
Oral History, p. 91. 
39 Gabriele Rosenthal, ‘German War Memories: Narrability and the Biographical and Social Functions 
of Remembering’, Oral History, 19/2 (Autumn, 1991), p. 34. 
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the difficulty of putting into some sort of sequential order the diffuse and 
chaotic experiences of trench warfare.40 
These differences in experience, it is argued, resulted in different patterns in the 
testimony, with narratives of the First World War demonstrating more generalisations 
and euphemisms and a weaker chronological structure. This is a plausible conclusion, 
and indeed similar to some of the judgements made later in this study; unfortunately, 
to determine the underlying causes of these patterns Rosenthal merely utilises the 
testimony itself, rather than any external evidence, and consequently her resulting 
explanation for differences in the war experience threatens to contradict some 
interpretations which are well-supported by broad empirical research. Multiple scholars 
have stressed that the similarities between First and Second World War battles far 
outweighed the differences.41 Battles in both wars produced similar numbers of 
casualties, were fought with similar weapons, and for the infantryman were 
characterised primarily by entrenchment and immobility with no enemy visible; both 
were liable to produce confusing and disorientating battle conditions. Both also 
provided ample opportunity for encounters with civilians or prisoners of war outside 
battle.  
In some respects, furthermore, the evidence would seem to indicate the opposite 
conclusion to that reached by Rosenthal. Trench warfare provided the opportunity for 
highly structured living routines, and it is known that during trench-holding, which was 
40 Ibid., p. 36. 
41 Brian Bond, Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of 
Hindsight (Cambridge, 2014), p. 86; John Ellis, ‘Reflections on the “Sharp End” of War’, in Addison 
and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, pp. 14-16; Ellis, The Sharp End, pp. 35-7, 74; Gary Sheffield, ‘The 
Shadow of the Somme: The Influence of the First World War on British Soldiers’ Perceptions and 
Behaviour in the Second World War’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, pp. 29, 35-6; Terry 
Copp, ‘“If this war isn’t over, And pretty damn soon, There’ll be nobody left, In this old platoon…”: 
First Canadian Army, February-March 1945’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, pp. 148-9. 
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the primary activity of most soldiers while in the front lines, routines were usually 
adhered to quite closely, particularly where tacit truces prevailed.42 The more mobile 
operations of the Second World War, far from upholding routine, were if anything 
more likely to cause disruption. Evidently the two wars are perceived differently later 
in participants’ lives, but by neglecting to consider wider scholarship Rosenthal is 
unable to determine whether or not this perception reflects retrospective subjectivity 
or experiential reality; this article shows clearly the misjudgements which can arise 
when oral sources are not properly corroborated. It is, furthermore, unusual in being 
susceptible to this sort of critique, because it is one of the rare studies from oral 
historians which does relate veterans’ oral history to an interpretation of the events 
they experienced. Most restrict themselves to assessing individual subjectivity, and 
little more. 
Military History and Oral Testimony 
In military history, by contrast, enthusiasm for oral history is high but appreciation of 
aspects such as subjectivity has remained underdeveloped. Some articles and chapters 
have provided good overviews of the main issues but are necessarily unable to assess 
them in their full depth, and draw some questionable judgements (discussed in the 
next chapter).43 On the rare occasion oral history theory is acknowledged, it is in a 
42 Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare: The Live-and-Let-Live System (London, 1980). 
43 Nigel de Lee, ‘Oral History and British Soldiers’ Experience of Battle in the Second World War’, in 
Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, pp. 359-368; Peter Simkins, ‘Everyman at War: Recent 
Interpretations of the Front Line Experience’, in Brian Bond (ed.), The First World War and British 
Military History (Oxford, 1991), pp. 289-313; Liddle and Richardson, ‘Voices from the Past’, pp. 651-
674; Rodney Earl Walton, ‘Memories from the Edge of the Abyss: Evaluating the Oral Accounts of 
World War II Veterans’, Oral History Review, 37/1 (2010), pp. 18-34. 
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relatively scant manner;44 the field as a whole is characterised by a consistent failure 
to consider the nuances of oral sources in any real depth. As Donald Ritchie remarks: 
Of all the academic disciplines engaged in interviewing as a research 
tool, professional historians have devoted the least amount of 
methodological attention to its problems and potentials. This laxity 
contrasts sharply with the intense seriousness historians bring to written 
sources. Authors dutifully list every manuscript collection, book, and 
article consulted, and then limit the bibliography of oral source to a few 
lines acknowledging those who “shared their knowledge” in 
“conversations” with the author…It remains puzzling why professional 
historians have accepted on faith the author’s reliability in note taking, 
transcribing, and even interpreting oral information.45 
While Paul Budra here discusses oral histories of the Vietnam War, it can in fact be 
seen that the same tendencies are apparent throughout military history writing: 
some of the most popular of these histories eschew the generally 
acknowledged protocols and formats of oral history itself as they have 
been defined by theorists…The interview processes in these books tend 
not to be documented; the names of the witnesses may not be given 
nor the questions asked of them; they contain no record of attendant 
document research.46 
This is not only a problem where oral history is concerned: others have noted that in 
military scholarship in general ‘most published research has been “cleaned up” for 
analytical closure in the sense of the messy processes of research having been swept 
away’,47 and often ‘one can only distil [historians’] frame of reference, or the theory 
they subscribe to, from the way they construct their narrative and from their 
44 Peter Johnston, ‘Culture, Combat and Killing: A Comparative Study of the British Armed Forces at 
War in the Falklands’, PhD thesis (University of Kent, 2013), pp. 335-343. 
45 Ritchie, Doing Oral History. pp. 133-4. 
46 Paul Budra, ‘Concatenation and History in Nam’, in Paul Budra and Michael Zeitlin (eds.), Soldier 
Talk: The Vietnam War in Oral Narrative (Bloomington, IN, 2004), p. 53. 
47 Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘Reflexivity’, in Joseph Soeters, Patricia M. Shields and Sebastian Rietjens (eds.), 
Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies (Abingdon, 2014), p. 31. 
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conclusions…in most cases historians do not make their assumptions explicit’.48 A 
variety of deficiencies have arisen from this general methodological laxity; approaches 
in academic and popular history-writing can broadly be differentiated, but there are 
overlaps and similarities between the two. 
Academic Military History 
Among academics, the absence of theoretical tools for understanding oral history has 
led to hesitance, a reluctance to afford testimony too much authority. With 
documentary evidence still very much the mainstay of academic military history, 
university historians tend to use oral testimony as second-rate supplementary 
evidence providing anecdotal support to interpretations based primarily on written 
sources. A. J. P. Taylor’s much-quoted assessment remains the dominant view: ‘In 
this matter I am almost a total sceptic...Memoirs of years ago are useless except for 
atmosphere...diaries, when not rewritten, are useful. But old men drooling about their 
youth—no.’49 It is common to see interview evidence disregarded out of hand on the 
basis that memory is fundamentally unreliable, a fact which oral historians would 
dispute.50 The value of eyewitness testimony for revealing human experience and 
emotion is undeniable, but in an interpretative sense oral sources certainly play a 
secondary and supplementary role compared with more conventional and more 
trusted written and archival material. Oral history is used more often to add colour, 
authenticity or variety to a formulaic piece of writing, than as a source of the kind of 
48 Floribert Baudet and Eric A. Sibul, ‘Historical Research in the Military Domain’, in Soeters, Shields 
and Rietjens (eds.), Research Methods in Military Studies, pp. 71, 73. 
49 Brian Harrison, ‘Oral History and Recent Political History’, Oral History, 1 (1972), p. 46. 




solid factual evidence an interpretation can be based on. The amount of time and 
labour required to collect oral history can also be a factor here. It is easy for historians, 
having completed the hard work required to collect the testimony, to neglect the 
equally pressing matter of analysing it in the best possible manner and fall back on 
simpler approaches: as Lynn Abrams notes, ‘Most commonly the oral source is 
embedded into a text as selected extracts, either used as illustrative material or what 
is described as “textual verifications of a historical interpretation”’.51 In the process 
oral sources’ distinctive features, such as orality, tend to be lost. Admittedly military 
historians do show themselves to be far more willing to incorporate oral history as 
‘just another source’ than oral historians are to utilise official military documentation, 
and they are thus far more likely to synthesise oral and written sources. Yet, while it 
is rare to find any academic study which does not include oral evidence in some form, 
it is equally rare to find one which employs oral testimony as evidence of critical 
importance for the interpretation where documentary sources are available. 
Popular Military History 
Another feature of military history, however, is that it holds immense popular interest, 
and among the popular writers who feed the demand for all things military, attitudes 
to oral history are anything but reticent; their use of testimony is characterised by an 
impetuous disregard for the methodological issues. As John Tosh opines: 
Professional historians insist on a lengthy immersion in the primary 
sources, a deliberate shedding of present-day assumptions, and a rare 
51 Alessandro Portelli, ‘Oral History as Genre’, in Mary Chamberlain and Paul Thompson (eds.), 
Narrative and Genre: Contexts and Types of Communication (London, 2004), p. 35, cited in Abrams, 
Oral History Theory, p. 30. This is not to suggest that military historians are ‘lazy’; only to 
acknowledge that all research must take account of time and resource limitations. 
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degree of empathy and imagination. Popular historical knowledge, on 
the other hand, tends to a highly reflective interest in the remains of the 
past, is shot through with present day assumptions, and is only 
incidentally concerned to understand the past on its own terms.52 
In 1972 Michael Frisch, concerned that oral testimony seemed to be widely viewed as 
indistinguishable from fact, noted that oral history ‘seem[s] to exhibit self-evident and 
unequivocal significance. More careful work in most areas, however, quickly shows 
that the questions to be asked are by no means obvious, the uses of the materials by 
no means self-evident, and the results to be obtained by no means necessarily 
meaningful’.53 Oral historians have since heeded Frisch’s concerns and done much to 
expound the analytical complexity of their sources, but popular military historians 
continue to display just this tendency: the apparent value of history ‘straight from the 
horse’s mouth’ is simply too enticing to resist. True, it has long been acknowledged 
that ‘One needs to apply the same care in the evaluation of oral evidence that one 
must to its written counterpart’;54 however, in practice critical approaches are given 
lip service but invariably quickly abandoned. Russell Miller’s promisingly titled Nothing 
Less Than Victory: The Oral History of D-Day, for instance, claims to tell ‘the authentic 
story of D-Day as it has never been told before—entirely by those who took part, on 
both sides’, yet belies its title by apparently failing to deploy any sort of oral history 
methodology whatsoever to determine which of the included accounts—some of which 
are written rather than oral—tell the ‘authentic story’.55 
52 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, Fifth Edition (Harlow, 2010), p. 13. 
53 Michael Frisch, ‘Oral History and Hard Times: A Review Essay’, in Robert Perks and Alistair 
Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, First Edition (London, 1998), p. 36. 
54 Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle (New York, 1985), p. 10. 
55 Russell Miller, Nothing Less than Victory: The Oral History of D-Day (London, 1993), p. xiii. 
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The infuriating aspect of this methodological imprecision is not that it often results in 
incorrect judgements, but that these historians are so often correct for the wrong 
reasons. Popular historians recognise the individual’s inability to observe the big 
picture,56 the tendency to play up positive actions and downplay embarrassing ones,57 
and the fact that oral testimony’s most unique feature is what it tells us about feelings 
and emotions.58 It is well understood that the researcher has a vital role to play in 
eliciting oral testimony, the process known by oral historians as ‘intersubjectivity’, and 
that experience, practice, and background knowledge all help the interviewer to elicit 
useful testimony: Miller’s point that ‘with time it was possible to break through the 
barriers of natural modesty and reserve and gently tap the reservoir of rarely aired 
inner reminiscences’ would be familiar to most with interviewing experience.59 They 
note too that, as important life events, war experiences are well remembered: Martin 
Middlebrook acknowledges in The Kaiser’s Battle that ‘The sceptical reader will, with 
some justification, query the value of old men’s memories. But it was a day that most 
of the survivors would never forget.’60 Yet rarely is evidence provided to support these 
beliefs; given the flimsiness of these historians’ methodologies, such assertions appear 
more likely to be the result of blind optimism than considered epistemological 
deliberation. 
56 Ibid., p. xiii; Hugh McManners, The Scars of War (London, 1993), p. 8. 
57 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle: 21 March 1918, The First Day of the German Spring Offensive 
(London, 1978), p. 11. 
58 Ibid., pp. 9, 12; Miller, The Oral History of D-Day, p. xiv. 
59 Miller, The Oral History of D-Day, p. xv. 
60 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, p. 11. It is perhaps notable that Middlebrook devotes scant 
attention to methodology in his first work, The First Day on the Somme: 1 July 1916 (London, 1971), 
but is more forthcoming in his later works. 
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The reluctance of popular writers to grapple with methodology can lead to 
questionable ideas. Take, for example, Middlebrook’s belief that his interviewing 
experience gave an edge in determining the truthfulness of testimony—that there is a 
‘sixth sense that one develops on reading so many accounts or after so many hours’ 
interviewing; this soon tells when a man is going astray’.61 Middlebrook did, to his 
credit, employ more conventional methods, establishing a framework of official written 
accounts against which to compare the testimony he collected; if any inconsistencies 
were found within an individual’s account or between it and Middlebrook’s established 
historical framework, no other part of it was used. But he neglected to record his 
interviews, claiming that a tape-recorder would inhibit the testimony, thereby ensuring 
that his quotes are unverifiable and precluding any chance of narrative or linguistic 
analysis; this would be regarded as a fatal flaw to any modern piece of oral history.62 
Similarly, Hugh McManners claims that ‘As a combat veteran myself...I was able to 
ask the right questions and avoid the stupid ones that would cause the shutters to 
come down abruptly. (I was also able to identify and challenge when, on a very few 
occasions, I was spun a yarn, or when something unpleasant was glossed over).’63 
Personal experience is useful, but it is scarcely an adequate substitute for external 
corroboration and tried-and-tested theory. Popular military historians generally either 
base their methodologies on intuition and the vague benefits of experience, or use 
hidden methodologies which they are reluctant to acknowledge—given the theoretical 
61 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, p. 11; Middlebrook, The Argentine Fight for the Falklands 
(Barnsley, 1989), p. ix. 
62 Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, pp. 10-11; Martin Middlebrook, ‘An Interview with Martin 
Middlebrook: Reflections on Fifty Years of Researching and Writing on the First World War’, Public 
Lecture, University of Kent, 14th October 2015. 
63 McManners, Scars of War, p. 1. 
20 
 
tools provided by the oral history field, neither of these approaches can be condoned 
as sufficiently rigorous. Some even relinquish the attempt entirely. Russell Miller 
admits that ‘I took all their accounts on trust; if memories are faulty or time has 
embroidered reality, so be it. They were indisputably there, and that was enough for 
me’.64  
Sometimes historians are more concerned with amassing a wealth of testimony—
admittedly a considerable enough task on its own—than verifying it as factually 
accurate. Lyn Macdonald falls victim to this pitfall when recounting the testimony of 
Fred Beadle, who witnessed the charge of the Deccan Horse and 7th Dragoon Guards 
at High Wood on the Somme on 14 July 1916: 
It was an incredible sight, an unbelievable sight, they galloped up with 
their lances and with pennants flying up the slope to High Wood and 
straight into it. Of course they were falling all the way…I’ve never seen 
anything like it! They simply galloped on through all that and horses and 
men dropping on the ground, with no hope against the machine-guns…It 
was an absolute rout. A magnificent sight. Tragic.65 
Richard Holmes has conclusively refuted this account, pointing out that it is clear that 
Beadle embellished his account with elements the audience would expect to hear—
the cavalry charge dramatically into the wood, not up to the edge of it as they really 
did; they carry pennants, which were not actually flown in battle; and they flounder 
against the killing power of the machine-gun, something of a cliché in popular 
representations of the First World War. Holmes concludes that ‘it is perfectly clear that 
the cavalry killed more, probably many more, of the enemy than the enemy killed of 
it’—the charge was certainly not a massacre—and thus ‘this vivid and compelling 
64 Miller, Nothing Less than Victory, p. xv. 
65 Lyn Macdonald, Somme (London, 1984), pp. 137-8. 
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quotation illustrates the dangers of relying on uncorroborated oral history. Although 
Second Lieutenant Beadle tells us precisely what we expect to hear, it is something 
that did not actually take place’. 66 It also illustrates the problems that arise when 
expansive oral history projects outstrip the ability or inclination of researchers to 
corroborate the testimony they reproduce. This particular example is one of the better-
known, but it cannot be reasonably assumed that it is unique. 
The presentation of testimony in this sort of history is often deeply problematic too. 
The belief in eyewitness evidence as direct evidence of historical reality is regularly 
taken to preclude the necessity for contextualisation and analysis. The result is 
anthologies of personal accounts in the most literal sense, with extracts reproduced 
in succession with no semblance of establishing context or attempting analysis—‘what 
John Keegan calls “the historian as copy-typist”, when there is little attempt to do 
more than collate personal accounts and string them together with bluff assertions 
that the evidence speaks for itself’.67 Sometimes this results in what Paul Budra calls 
the “exemplary mode”, ‘the collection of short, illustrative non-fiction examples into 
compendia…the exemplary mode uses short, usually historical narratives to illustrate 
a sententia or moral, often concatenating many…exempla to prove the point…It is 
aggregative rather than analytic.’68 By breaking interviews up and rearranging them 
along thematic lines, this approach aims to present a collective, anonymous 
experience; it can also encourage the ‘emphasis on orality, on passive attendance to 
memory rather than analytic engagement with history’ familiar from oral history 
66 Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (London, 2004), pp. 
440-1. 
67 Richard Holmes, Acts of War, p. 11. 
68 Budra, ‘Concatenation and History in Nam’, in Budra and Zeitlin, Soldier Talk, p. 54. 
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work.69 In other instances, even illustrating broad generalisations is not attempted. 
The well-known Forgotten Voices series falls into this category; these books are 
undeniably interesting, and successful as an exercise in public history for having 
brought the Imperial War Museum’s holdings to a wider audience, but the general 
absence of contextualisation prevents anything that might be called a historical 
interpretation being derived from the interviews. Moreover, the purported absence of 
the researcher in this approach—encapsulated in Max Arthur’s claim that ‘These are 
their words—I have been but a catalyst’70—may with great justification be seen as 
intellectually dishonest, as Donald Ritchie points out: 
The very act of editing and arranging interviews shows that the author 
has not simply allowed interviewees to speak for themselves…Even if 
the editor refrains from adding an overt interpretation, he or she is still 
deciding which interviews are most worthy of being recorded and 
published. Having gone that far then, the editor owes something more 
to readers.71 
Such ‘collages’ lack contextualisation and interpretation and as a result can no more 
be considered useful oral history than anthologies of treaties can be considered useful 
diplomatic history. 
An additional problem is that the research aims of academic and popular military 
historians tend to differ from those of oral historians. John Tosh has pointed out that 
there are two possible ways to plan historical projects: one which allows the focus to 
be determined by the sources and the information they contain, and one which asks 
pre-determined questions and aims to answer them using any sources which are 
69 Ibid., pp. 54, 59; Portelli, ‘Oral History as Genre’, in Chamberlain and Thompson (eds.), Narrative 
and Genre, p. 35. 
70 Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War (London, 2002), p. xii. 
71 Ritchie, Doing Oral History, p. 131. 
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relevant.72 In practice most studies fall somewhere in between, but oral historians 
evidently tend towards the former, and military historians towards the latter. Oral 
history projects usually involve collecting testimonies from a particular group—ideally 
one which has been marginalised in society and neglected by historians, in line with 
oral history’s ‘recovery’ role—and reporting the results.73 In the highly contested 
territory of military history, by contrast, the historiographical battle-lines are usually 
well-defined, but the types of source historians draw upon are not. This accounts for 
the willingness of military historians to use oral history, but, paradoxically, also 
explains why they do not explore its methodological ramifications in depth. 
Interviewing techniques differ along similar lines: oral historians usually conduct ‘life 
story’ interviews—‘full-scale autobiographical accounts that allow interviewees to 
relate their entire life’74—whereas interviews for military history projects tend to focus 
on the short period of their life the interviewee spent at war.  The broadness of the 
life story approach means that when applied to military history it often fails to develop 
any particular area of the historiography; conversely, more focussed interviewing will 
tend to iron out much of the wider context of the interviewee’s life which is essential 
for understanding oral testimony.75 
There are thus clear ideological, methodological and practical reasons why oral history 
and military history remain largely distinct fields. If oral historians have validated their 
field by shifting their focus onto subjectivity, this has failed to ensure that oral sources 
are recognised as a legitimate form of evidence in mainstream academic history, and 
72 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, pp. 120-2. 
73 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 29. 
74 Ritchie, Doing Oral History, p. 27. 
75 James, Doña Maria’s Story, p. 124; Holstein and Gubrium, The Active Interview, pp. 76-7. 
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had little influence on the non-experts who actually make most use of oral sources for 
the interpretative objectives which are the fundamental goal of history. These 
problems are, however, far from insurmountable, and it is entirely conceivable that 
historians of war can take account of both the theoretical achievements of oral history 
as well as the historiographical context provided by military history. This study 
advocates for a return to the empirical research objectives which have fallen by the 
wayside during oral history’s realignment. Ultimately, ‘the world is knowable...however 
feeble our current efforts, it is possible to improve the reliability of our knowledge of 
the world and even to recognize improvements in that knowledge.’76 Oral history may 
have shifted towards embracing rather than overcoming subjectivity, but this in itself 
is does not prove that distortions arising from subjectivity are impossible to evaluate 
and account for, and Paul Thompson is correct to argue that ‘Through all these new 
approaches we need to keep always in mind our ultimate objective, which is to use 
personal memory...to interpret change over time.’77 Once oral sources are analysed in 
the correct manner, they yield information which is no more subjectively biased than 
that provided by letters, written memoirs, or official documents; this evidence can be 
employed in interpretations of past history, not just contemporary subjectivity. 
Approaching the Interviews 
The material for this study is a collection of thirty-three interviews conducted by 
Matthew Lucas and held by the University of Wolverhampton. Although this may 
appear a rather threadbare primary source base compared to many works of military 
76 Tilly, ‘People’s History and Social Science History’, pp. 462-3. See also Portelli, The Death of Luigi 
Trastulli, pp. viii-ix; de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, pp. 361, 365. 
77 Thompson, ‘Believe it or not’, in Jeffrey and Edwall (eds.), Memory and History, p. 11. 
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history, it is not unusual in oral history to see articles based on a single interview, and 
full-length comparative works using twenty to thirty. For his well-regarded study of 
Anzac memory Alastair Thomson talked to twenty-one veterans, but much of his 
analysis focussed on only three.78 This standard is a consequence of the labour-
intensive nature of conducting and handling interviews, the large amount of 
information contained in even a relatively short interview, and the extreme depth of 
analysis expected in modern oral history practice. Most of the interviews used in this 
study last around ninety minutes; the shortest is just shy of fourteen minutes, the 
longest almost ten hours. In all, over 58 hours of audio were analysed.  
All of the interviewees served in the British Army during the Second World War and 
were involved in ‘the campaign to victory’ between D-Day on 6th June 1944 and the 
German surrender on 5th May 1945. The interviews were conducted between 2011 
and 2013. Although sometimes divided into multiple recording sessions, all but one of 
the interviews were recorded in the course of one day. They took place in the veterans’ 
homes, or in some cases in retirement homes. All lived in central and southern 
England, with the Wiltshire, Worcestershire and Somerset Regiments being particularly 
well represented due to connections between members of their regimental 
associations. Due to this selection bias the testimony is focussed on certain operations, 
such as EPSOM, JUPITER and BLUECOAT during the Battle of Normandy, and 
NEPTUNE, the crossing of the Seine at Vernon in August 1944. 
78 Thomson, Anzac Memories. 
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Reflecting the balance of fighting troops in the army itself, most were infantrymen; 
seven were tank crewmen, two each were engineers, medics and glider pilots, and 
one was a paratrooper. The only major ‘teeth’ arm not represented is the Royal 
Artillery.79 Almost all were (or at least perceived themselves as being) under some 
degree of danger, ranging from sporadic long-range artillery or air attack to intense 
close-range combat. There are a range of private soldiers, NCOs, officers, and some 
who served as all three. Therefore, the interviewees represent a broad, if not 
proportional, cross-section of the fighting personnel involved in the campaign. They 
are not representative of the British Army as a whole due to the high number of men 
who served in logistical and support units, who are not widely represented here. 
Popular and academic focus has tended to be on combatants, both due to the evident 
importance of the fighting itself, and the prestige invested in combatants due to 
discourses around veterans, issues which will be discussed throughout the thesis. The 
interviewees are also unrepresentative of the Army as a whole because they were 
deployed to Northwest Europe, and their experiences were therefore substantially 
different to those who fought in North Africa and the Far East earlier in the war or in 
Italy and Burma in 1944-5. Aside from the obvious differences in the terrain over 
which the fighting took place, most of the troops who opened the ‘Second Front’ had 
been retained in England to prepare.80 Most of the interviewees were therefore 
79 An interview conducted shortly after the completion of this research with Victor Syborn, formerly of 
5 Royal Horse Artillery, suggests that even their relatively short remove from the front line provided a 
high degree of insulation from the violence of combat as experienced up close by infantrymen and 
tankers; there is substantial scope here for further research. 
80 J. A. Crang, ‘The British Soldier on the Home Front: Army Morale Reports, 1940-45’, in Addison and 
Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 60; Alan Allport, Browned Off and Bloody-Minded: The British Soldier 
Goes to War, 1939-1945 (New Haven, 2015), p. 181. 
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younger men who were conscripted in 1941 or 1942 and who had not seen any active 
service before they arrived in Normandy, although there are some exceptions. 
The interviews were not conducted by the current writer. Arguably there is something 
of a stigma attached to using archived interviews, somewhat contradictory to the 
principle of oral history serving as an enduring record of life experience. Oral historians 
usually prefer to conduct their own interviews for practical reasons too, as this allows 
them to direct the questioning according to their research focus. However, using 
archived interviews need not be a disadvantage. The historian can be sure that their 
own preconceptions have not influenced the testimony—relevant themes ‘emerge 
within the interview outside of any specific prompting from the framing of questions 
by the interviewers’81—and if distortions are bound to emerge in some form, it ought 
to be easier to impartially assess the influence of another’s interview technique than 
one’s own.  
Additionally, the interviews were not transcribed in full, and instead were handled in 
audio form using a computer program called Stories Matter.82 Whereas full 
transcription obliterates the source’s orality—'the shape and rhythm of the speech 
act’83—usually before any analysis takes place, this program fulfils many of the 
organisational functions of a transcript while maintaining the orality of the source. 
Here, instead, the interviews were analysed in their original oral form, and only once 
certain extracts were selected for quotation did transcription take place. It has been 
81 Tim Cole, ‘(Re)Placing the Past: Spatial Strategies of Retelling Difficult Stories’, The Oral History 
Review, 42/1 (2015), p. 33. 
82 Stories Matter website, <http://storytelling.concordia.ca/storiesmatter/> [accessed September 
2017]. 
83 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 19. 
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widely noted that mass digitalisation has the potential to restore the orality of oral 
sources, and a better understanding of orality is likely to be one of the next big 
developments in oral history;84 this study therefore aims to take full advantage of 
analysing the original audio. 
The term interviewee has been used throughout, as analogous to alternative terms 
such as ‘narrator’, ‘respondent’ and ‘informant’. These alternatives purport to rectify 
unequal power dynamics in the interview, whereby ‘interviewee’ is seen to imply an 
inferior, passive role compared with the interviewer.85 However, while acknowledging 
that an unequal balance of power can be problematic, ‘interviewee’ does accurately 
reflect the situation in which the testimony was elicited, as the veterans were 
questioned, rather than proffering their opinions on their own initiative, and therefore 
did take up a reactive position in the interviews; however, the term is in no way 
intended to imply a lesser status for the veterans, and indeed any such concerns are 
belied by the style of interviewing.  
The interviews were conducted according to the ‘life story’ approach, which permits 
the interviewee as much freedom as possible to dictate the topics under discussion. 
As Donald Ritchie argues, ‘Broader questioning establishes links that neither the 
interviewer nor the interviewee may have considered in a more narrowly focused 
interview session.’86 This openness is necessary to allow the interviewee freedom to 
84 Alistair Thomson and Robert Perks, ‘Transformations in Oral History Theory and Practice: Editing 
the Oral History Reader over Two Decades’, Public Lecture, Institute of Historical Research, London, 
14th December 2015; Ritchie, Doing Oral History, p. 52. 
85 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 176. 
86 Ritchie, Doing Oral History, p. 27. See also Charlotte Linde, Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence 
(Oxford, 1993); Holstein and Gubrium, The Active Interview. 
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relate their testimony in relation to their entire life course and their sense of self; there 
is also some evidence that forceful questioning can disrupt the (usually chronological) 
organisation of testimony and result in a loss of information.87 The downside is that 
opportunities to take a more interrogative stance, and delve deeper into particular 
parts of an interviewee’s account, like a key battle, are more limited. The ideal project 
structure, especially when researching a specific event, is probably to begin with an 
unstructured life story interview and, having analysed it, return on a later occasion for 
a more probing, interrogative interview; however, only the former has been possible 
here. The testimony is richly informative nonetheless. Most interviews begin with the 
question ‘How did you come to join the army in the first place?’, and continue from 
that point in a broadly chronological progression through the veteran’s time in the 
army. Few require more than infrequent prompting to move the interview forward. 
Questions are open-ended and do not lead the interviewer towards particular 
responses. The interviews cover the same core themes such as training, combat 
experience, and encounters with civilians and the enemy, whether on the interviewee’s 
own initiative or due to questioning, so there is a great deal of readily comparable 
information. 
In this thesis, interview extracts are interlinked with analysis. The focus is not on 
presenting a narrative, or simply telling the interviewees’ stories, interesting as they 
are. The aim is to use their recollections to make broader points about the British 
Army in 1944-5, its characteristics as an institution, and the experiences of the men 
87 Alice M. Hoffman and Howard S. Hoffman, ‘Reliability and Validity in Oral History: The Case for 
Memory’, in Jeffrey and Edwall (eds.), Memory and History, pp. 120-1, 126. 
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who fought in it. The study is an analytical one, and the analysis is informed by the 
testimony, but the testimony does not dictate the themes or the structure of the study, 
as has so often been the case elsewhere. Many of the interviewees provide information 
that is beyond the broad remit of this study but would be of value in specialist histories: 
for example, Edwin Hunt’s memories of planning amphibious operations at Second 
Army Headquarters, Ray Gordon’s description of 1940s burn treatments, Ian 
Hammerton’s recollections of developing equipment and doctrine for flail tanks, Reg 
Spittles’ explanation of tank commanders’ procedures for using map and radio, Stan 
Procter’s discussion of signalling procedures, and Bill Edwardes’ in-depth accounts of 
stretcher-bearing.88 However these lie outside the limits of this study and are therefore 
not discussed at length. 
The practical matter of presenting the testimony must be addressed, given the laxity 
with which this is usually approached. Spoken language rarely resembles written 
language, and therefore transcription is always a compromise to permit readability 
while preserving the orality of the spoken testimony. Military histories often ‘tidy up’ 
oral quotes to the extent that they appear as neatly composed as written language, 
and even in oral history this is advocated; Linda Shopes recommends a heavy process 
of editing including rearranging sections, cutting extraneous information, splicing 
words and phrases to aid comprehension, and inserting words that go unspoken 
without indicating such additions have been made.89 Although she rightly stresses that 
the process is a balancing act to ensure readability while maintaining the unique voice 
88 Hunt, 2, 05-07, 3, 00-39; Gordon, 3, 11-28; Hammerton, 1, 29-33; Spittles, 3, 03-11; Procter, 1, 
08-09, 14, 19-21; Edwardes, 1, 10-12, 16-20, 37-38, 41-46, 74-80. 
89 Linda Shopes, ‘Editing Oral History for Publication’, in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), 
Oral History Reader, Third Edition (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 470-9. 
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of the speaker, this seems altogether too heavy-handed an approach. Moreover, for 
Shopes editing has an interpretative role, allowing the speaker’s ‘hierarchy of thought’ 
to be explicated: ‘paradoxically, literal fidelity to the spoken word—or the transcript of 
the spoken word—can betray meaning, can obscure rather than clarify what the 
narrator is trying to get at, as she meanders or thrashes around, misspeaks, says 
things that make sense when spoken but lose meaning when rendered in print… Not 
to rework the transcript, often radically, can inadvertently render a narrator 
inarticulate in print.’90 Yet it appears highly condescending to rework the transcript to 
present what the researcher thinks the interviewee is trying to say—they are quite 
capable of explaining their point in the words they choose, while the reader is quite 
capable of understanding it. In a study such as this one, where testimony is not 
expected to stand on its own but is bracketed by analysis of its meaning and relevance, 
there seems no need for heavy editing—it is better to give the reader an accurate 
impression of the source being used, and explain any ambiguity in the accompanying 
analysis, than to alter what the interviewee is purported to have said. Accurate 
reproduction of transcriptions is also an important element of academic rigour; editing 
too liberally can easily distort and misrepresent the source in a way which is invisible 
to the reader, and such an approach seems altogether too reminiscent of the 
problematic methods seen in works such as the Forgotten Voices series. 
Heavy editing has therefore been avoided here; quotes are rendered readable but 
otherwise represent the spoken words as closely as possible. Information such as long 
pauses, which can provide useful indications of the speaker’s thought processes, has 
90 Ibid., pp. 476-477. 
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not been removed. Wording has not been altered for grammatical correctness. While 
most speech is rendered in standard British English spelling, common shortenings like 
‘‘cos’ are retained because this reflects the speech. Long continuous sentences have 
been allowed to run on, so that a comma indicates a slight pause for breath and a full 
stop indicates a longer, deliberate pause. Only common filler words—ums and ers, for 
example—have been removed. Such words, as well as unexpected or out-of-place 
pauses which often indicate contemplation or difficulty finding an appropriate phrase, 
are represented by ellipses; where these last for longer than three seconds the 
approximate duration of the pause in seconds is shown in square brackets. Inaudible 
speech is indicated in square brackets, along with the duration if longer than three 
seconds. Ellipses at the beginning or end of a quote indicate speech that runs on 
without stopping. Sudden digressions or self-interruptions without a pause are 
represented by dashes, and stressed words in italics. A word that goes unspoken or is 
swallowed, but is necessary for written comprehension, is included in square brackets. 
An ellipsis in square brackets indicates that part of a quote has been excluded, 
although wherever possible I have tried to avoid dividing the testimony up into 
quotable ‘sound-bites’ and instead kept longer sections together even where they 
cover diverse themes. This causes some difficulties for well-structured historical 
writing but serves to preserve the interviewee’s meaning and thought processes by 
not falsely dissociating ideas which are linked in the original testimony. Wherever 
relevant the questions are also quoted, in order to add context to the subsequent 




Oral extracts must also be rigorously cited, even though, as already noted, this 
practice is curiously uncommon even in academia. In the text, interviewees are 
referred to by the names, sometimes shortened, that they were happy with being used 
in the interview. In the footnotes, the system used here provides the surname of the 
interviewee, the recording session (in single digits), and the location of the extract in 
the recording (in double or triple digits).  The location of the extract is the time 
displayed when the recording is played; therefore the first minute of an interview is 
‘00’, the second is ‘01’, and the twenty-first is ‘20’. The bibliography lists the name of 
each interviewee, their former regiment(s), the date of the interview, the number of 
recording sessions and the total length of the interview. 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One will discuss the issues around the reliability and validity of oral testimony, 
and its value as a source of evidence compared with other typical categories of source. 
Once the basic reliability of oral history is established, the testimony is analysed in 
terms of what is here termed ‘retrospective subjectivity’, which describes those 
subjective distortions which take place at the time of the telling (as opposed to 
‘historical subjectivity’ which refers to perceptions at the time of the event). The 
Second World War represents perhaps the defining experience of the British nation in 
the twentieth century, and is invested with historical and cultural significance even for 
those living today who did not personally experience it. Likewise, D-Day is recognised 
as a crucial turning-point in the war, a landmark victory which paved the way for the 
capitulation of Nazi Germany. Meanwhile conceptions of soldiering and war experience 
have shifted over time. It has long been recognised that such shared meanings, 
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‘popular discourses’ as they are referred to here, are influential on oral testimony, and 
Chapter Two therefore explores the discourses likely to have influenced the interviews. 
Chapters Three and Four explore the narrative techniques used in the interviews, 
comparing the importance of popular memory and individual remembering on the 
process of ‘composure’ by which interviewees prepare a narrative of their lives which 
they are happy to relate. Chapter Five tackles an inescapable feature of military 
accounts, trauma, and asks how the lasting psychological effects of war service can 
be understood to influence testimony. These chapters thus lay the groundwork for the 
interpretative application of the testimony to more conventional military historical 
issues around the British Army and the 1944-5 campaign. To this end, Chapter Six 
assesses combat experience and morale, while Chapter Seven deals with doctrine and 
battlefield conduct. 
This structure may attract criticism as it suggests that the subjective influences on 
testimony can be dealt with separately from the historical interpretation. It requires 
some ground to be trodden more than once. Doubtless many oral historians would 
argue that these issues should be dealt with as a whole, that the subjective cannot be 
separated from the substantive. Yet the argument presented here is that such an 
approach has led directly to the current malaise of the unproductive and circular focus 
on interpreting subjectivity and developing theory, because this is often easier and 
more convenient. Retrospective subjectivity can be separated from useful historical 
evidence, however problematic and incomplete this process might be. Only then can 
the true promise of oral history be fulfilled, as it is employed as a different but equally 




Reliability and Validity: Assessing the Veracity of Veterans’ 
Testimony 
 
This chapter will deal with the basic difficulties of employing veterans’ oral history as 
a historical source. The veracity of oral evidence has frequently been brought into 
question, but this issue has been treated by military historians with a singular lack of 
nuance. The usual lack of methodological clarity is in evidence here—disapproval of 
oral sources is evident only from their omission, and examinations of the problems 
they pose are few and far between. However, virtually any actual mention of oral 
sources is accompanied by an acknowledgement of their deficiencies, which are 
apparently so plain as not to require any sort of detailed exploration. Robert Engen, 
for instance, asserts that, because memory is fallible, ‘interviews with soldiers carried 
out years or decades after the fact are of questionable value’, but does not elaborate.91 
Even defenders of oral history have tended to take its unreliability as a given, and 
champion it in spite of its apparent deficiencies, rather than examining whether or not 
these characteristics are really so problematic, or unpacking precisely in what ways 
testimony is or is not reliable.92 Mostly they labour the correct but basic point that 
testimony contains a great deal of valuable information, and neglect to delve much 
deeper than this; therefore some questionable judgements are in evidence. For 
instance, several assessments published in the 1990s make much of the vividness of 
oral testimony: Peter Liddle and Matthew Richardson cite the ‘remarkable level of 
detail with which some men and women can recall events of sixty or seventy years 
91 Engen, Canadians Under Fire, p. 32. 
92 Simkins, ‘Everyman at War’, in Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History, p. 292. 
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ago’; Peter Simkins contends that ‘Men can clearly recall going into battle for the first 
time, being wounded, or seeing a close comrade die beside them’; and Russell Miller 
opines that ‘It is extraordinary, given the passing of the years, how well the events of 
[D-Day] are remembered by the men who were there. Some can recall, almost minute-
by-minute, what happened, even to the extent of relating, word-for-word, exchanges 
under fire to their mates’.93 However, vividness does not itself indicate accuracy, and 
there is no reason given why these stories should be seen as fact rather than engaging 
fiction; these historians ultimately do not demonstrate that oral testimony is veridical. 
They may be partially excused this omission given the relative obscurity and scarcity 
of accessible oral history research in the 1990s, but unfortunately no equivalent 
studies have appeared to correct this deficiency, even though theoretical 
understandings of oral testimony have since developed greatly.94 These have laid out 
good reasons to believe in the usefulness of oral evidence in memory studies, but the 
consequences for historical research have rarely been explored due to the focus on 
subjectivity, which absolves researchers of producing conventional historical 
interpretations. 
What all these approaches lack is considered assessment of the various factors which 
affect oral sources’ veridical worth—even though this is quite possible to do. This 
chapter aims to consider the different criteria of oral testimony’s usefulness, which are 
93 Liddle and Richardson, ‘Voices from the Past’, p. 653; Simkins, ‘Everyman at War’, in Bond (ed.), 
The First World War and British Military History, p. 292; Miller, The Oral History of D-Day, p. xiv. 
94 There is apparently still a reluctance to embrace oral history theory in military research. One recent 
assessment claims that ‘The purpose of interviewing for oral history is to present an unadulterated 
view of respondents, without the researcher’s interpretation’—an opinion with which few oral 
historians would agree. Brenda L. Moore, ‘In-Depth Interviewing’, in Soeters, Shields, and Rietjens 
(eds.), Research Methods in Military Studies, p. 124. 
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rarely distinguished from one another, and add some clarity to issues which have 
become muddled and confused. By establishing the basic worth of oral testimony as 
a source which constitutes a reliable record, this is a vital preliminary to the rest of 
the thesis, which will explore in more depth the particular analytical tools necessary 
and the historical usefulness of oral testimony. 
An approach outlined by Alice Hoffmann is a useful one here. As she notes, the 
ultimate goal of history is to create an interpretation of the past which is as close to 
what really happened as possible; however, because there is no ‘true’ record of the 
past against which interpretations can be tested, the process is always an indirect one, 
reliant on the remnants which are left, the sources. The veracity of a source can best 
be measured by how it fulfils two criteria: ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’. Neither criterion 
measures the truthfulness of a source per se.95 
Reliability is simply a measure of the internal consistency of a source over time, or the 
ability of the same research processes to obtain the same results. ‘An oral history 
informant is reliable if his or her reports of a given event are consistent with each 
other’,96 whereas if an interviewee contradicts himself in the course of an interview, 
or tells a different tale each time he is interviewed, his testimony is unreliable, and 
this brings its meaning into doubt. Here reliability is an attribute of the testimony, not 
the interpretation of the researcher, as has been suggested by some97—an account 
95 Alice Hoffman, ‘The Case for Memory’, in Dunaway and Baum (eds.), Oral History: An 
Interdisciplinary Anthology, pp. 87-93. 
96 Ibid., p. 89. 
97 Eyan Ben-Ari, ‘Reflexivity’, in Soeters, Shields and Rietjens (eds.), Research Methods in Military 
Studies, p. 34. 
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might be subject to multiple interpretations as to its meaning, but there can only be 
minor disagreement over the interviewee’s words as they are recorded or transcribed.  
Validity, by contrast, means the level of similarity with other sources. ‘An informant 
can be reliable (the same story emerges each time it is called for), but the story may 
or may not be a valid representation of the original events as judged by comparison 
with other sources.’98 One source may be anomalous, but many sources which concur 
with each other indicate commonplace happenings. When applied to subjectivity the 
question of validity becomes somewhat more complex, as even descriptions of 
uncorroborated events can reveal attitudes and opinions which were widely shared, 
but the principle is the same. Reliability and validity provide a basis for teasing out the 
precise problems posed by veterans’ testimony. Although not all of the interviews used 
in this study can be verified in this way—this would require repeat interviews over an 
extended period of time—it is fair to assume that the findings of oral history theorists 
can be applied. The possible criticisms of oral history—which the above-quoted 
examples singularly fail to distinguish from one another—really comprise three main 
problems: the limitations of human perception; the fallibility of memory; and the 
(in)ability to narrative a coherent story. These will be considered in turn. 
The Limits of Perception 
Oral sources are not comprehensive. This is true of all sources, but particularly 
apparent in those which depend on nothing more than eyewitness experience. If this 
is a difference of degree, not in kind, it is recognisably a particularly large degree. 
98 Hoffman, ‘Reliability and Validity’, in Dunaway and Baum (eds.), Oral History: An Interdisciplinary 
Anthology, p. 90. 
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Whereas the author of a report on military operations would, it is presumed, make 
some effort to corroborate their assessment with whatever evidence of the broad 
situation they are able to obtain from discussions with the relevant personnel or 
reference to other reports, oral evidence is for the most part restricted by the bounds 
of personal perception. True, oral testimony can certainly contain assessments of 
broader events, but such knowledge will probably be retrospective and should be 
treated with a great deal of scepticism.99 Ultimately not every part of an event is 
witnessed by participants, and not everything witnessed is remembered. Experience, 
seniority, rank and the tactical role of the individual soldier in the operation will all 
influence his recollections of it.100 Throughout the interviews it is apparent that officers 
comment at much more length about the condition and morale of the men they 
commanded than those same men do: this reflects the officers’ concerns at the time. 
Hugh McManners also points out that ‘For the individual, war is a very parochial, 
localised experience, almost impossible to relate to a battle or campaign as a whole’.101 
An individual who spent a battle looking at the inside of a slit trench simply will not 
have much knowledge of the wider events they were involved in. 
The interpretative ramifications of this will be discussed in later chapters, but here it 
is necessary to note that the limitations of human perception have no bearing on 
reliability, because it only limits the scope of oral accounts, not their consistency over 
99 As oral evidence is collected mainly to reveal personal experience, historians would do well to 
disregard testimony which really constitutes historical interpretation, unless, of course, where it 
illustrates individual subjectivity. Victor Gregg is particularly demonstrative of this: his judgements 
about Market-Garden tell us little about the operation but a great deal about his disdain for the high 
command and belief in his own authority as a commentator. See Gregg, 2, 58-60. 
100 McManners, Scars of War, p. 136. 
101 Ibid., p. 8; Holmes, Acts of War, p. 10; de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time 
to Kill, p. 365; Fred H. Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight: Changing Perspectives over 
Time’, The Oral History Review, 31/2 (Summer-Autumn, 2004), p. 81. 
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time. It may have an impact on validity, if an account is so specific and focussed that 
it cannot be corroborated by other sources. However, this is not generally the case, 
particularly after the explosion of war experience work since the 1970s and the great 
variety of precise military studies which exist. That oral sources are never 
comprehensive is simply a basic limitation which must be recognised by historians who 
wish to use them. 
The Fallibility of Memory 
Once an event has been witnessed, the issue of memory arises—can one trust people’s 
recollections of events which occurred many decades ago? This is the most obvious 
problem with oral evidence, and probably the one cited most often. Memory presents 
what Alistair Thomson has called a paradox.102 Undeniably, memory is highly 
vulnerable to distortion. Rather than representing an exact record, not all that is 
witnessed is ‘encoded’ into memory.103 Moreover memories are actively reconstructed 
each time they are recalled; during this process, new information is combined with 
the ‘original’ memory.104 In spite of this, evidence shows that memory is extremely 
reliable, and ‘our memory systems do a remarkably good job of preserving the general 
contours of our pasts and of recording correctly many of the important things that 
have happened to us’.105 To explain this paradox, it is necessary to move beyond a 
102 Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories Revisited’, p. 26; Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering’, in Ritchie 
(ed.), Oxford Handbook of Oral History, p. 90. 
103 Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, The Mind and the Past (New York, 1996), 
pp. 42, 102-4. 
104 Ibid., p. 70; pp. 86-7. 
105 Ibid., p. 308. 
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one-dimensional understanding of memory, and consider what tends to be well-
remembered, and what tends not to be. 
Of relevance here is a long-term experiment in the reliability of war memory conducted 
by Alice Hoffman and her husband Howard, a US Army veteran of the Second World 
War. Howard was first interviewed about the war in an unstructured ‘life story’ style, 
only asked questions for the purposes of clarification and contextualisation. He then 
spent four years attempting to avoid situations which would cause him to recollect or 
rehearse his memories of the war. A second round of unstructured interviews was 
then conducted to test the reliability of his account, while a third attempted to cue 
memories using references to the documentary record.106 The overwhelming 
conclusion of the Hoffmans’ research was that Howard’s war memories were extremely 
durable: ‘so stable, they are reliable to the point of being set in concrete. They cannot 
be dislodged. It was virtually impossible to change, to enhance, or to stimulate new 
memories by any method that we could devise’.107 Such memories are likely to be 
deemed particularly important at the time of the event, or soon afterwards; they are 
also likely to be one-off events or a first occasion of an event which subsequently 
becomes routine. Memories are organised in an extremely consistent narrative, which 
in Howard’s case was chronological. Forcing Howard to depart from the chronology 
caused omissions, though ‘there seems to be a subset of organization’ so that each 
individual incident was described in the same way whether it was recalled in the course 
of the narrative or independently cued.108 The narrative structure was so well-
106 Hoffman and Hoffman, ‘The Case for Memory’, in Jeffrey and Edwall (eds.), Memory and History, 
p. 110. 
107 Ibid., p. 124. 
108 Ibid., p. 120-1. 
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rehearsed that Howard hesitated at the same point during both interviews, and here 
‘it is interesting to observe that what is stored contains the basis for the interruption 
as well as the story’.109 There were some gaps in Howard’s account where incidents 
evidenced by documents and photographs had apparently never been properly 
encoded, or had been encoded but never properly rehearsed. However, in only one 
case did Howard’s account actually contradict the documentary record.110 
The Hoffmans’ experiment accords with oral history theory in suggesting that veterans 
are likely to produce an account which contains the most important parts of their war. 
It has been noted that particularly emotional events are remembered well, and many 
war experiences certainly fit this criterion.111 Where experiences are not dramatic 
enough to stick in the memory in this way, then repetition becomes important, so 
routines are usually easily recalled compared with one-off events, unless the latter are 
of particular significance.112 It therefore seems usually more productive to ask 
veterans about general procedures than about particular incidents. Where emotional 
events become routine—such as repeated experiences of combat—the first such event 
will probably be remembered well, but the specifics of later ones may be lost to 
memory.113 That said, the general patterns of experience will be remembered: ‘people 
do not forget an entire set of repeated traumas’.114 
109 Ibid., p. 112. 
110 Ibid, pp. 118-24. 
111 Ibid., p. 125; Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford 
Handbook of Oral History, pp. 84-5; Abrams, Oral History Theory, pp. 81, 83. 
112 Ibid., p. 87. 
113 Hoffman and Hoffman, ‘The Case for Memory’, in Jeffrey and Edwall (eds.), Memory and History, 
p. 122; Walton, ‘Memories from the Edge of the Abyss’, pp. 27-9. 
114 Schacter, Searching for Memory, p. 68. 
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The Second World War was recognised by most at the time as of individual and 
historical importance, and this primed soldiers to pay attention during their 
participation and to reconsider the war in its aftermath. As Alessandro Portelli points 
out, ‘it is hard to keep any (male) informant from expounding about what he did in 
the war (or in the service). War embodies history in the most obvious school book 
sense of the word; having been in the war is the most immediately tangible claim for 
having been in history’.115 The result—and the answer to the paradox of oral history—
is that most veterans rehearse, fairly soon after the event, a workable account which 
can be deployed at will when required; this inevitably omits much information, but 
contains what the individual deems sufficiently important, and is generally extremely 
durable.116  
While it is true that influences like popular memory and intersubjectivity cause stories 
to be constantly re-composed and ensure no two oral retellings are the same, it is also 
the case that most accounts will have a core narrative and thematic structure which 
is durable and consistent over the long-term. Comparing multiple interviews conducted 
sometimes years apart,117 as well as comparing interviews with written memoirs,118 
makes this quite apparent.  Bill Nasson describes how ‘re-interviewing over several 
115 Portelli, ‘Oral History as Genre’, in Chamberlain and Thompson (eds.), Narrative and Genre, pp. 
26-7. 
116 Hoffman and Hoffman, ‘The Case for Memory’, in Jeffrey and Edwall (eds.), Memory and History, 
p. 125. 
117 Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (IWM) 21626, Ekins, Joseph William; IWM 8939, Hammerton, 
Ian; IWM 22925, Majendie, John Dering; IWM 22499, Procter, Stanley Cyril; IWM 16808, Spittles, 
Reginald; IWM 21286, Tout, Kenneth. 
118 S. C. Procter, A Quiet Little Boy Goes to War, IWM Documents 5636 1996/09/24; Hammerton, Ian, 
Achtung! Minen!: The Making of a Flail Tank Trooper (London, 1991); Gregg, Victor, Rifleman: A Front 
Line Life from Alamein and Dresden to the Fall of the Berlin Wall (London, 2011); ‘Private Luis DiMarco’, 




days, probing the same ground and checking incidental detail, produced stories and 
memories of events characterised by astonishingly consistent and precise 
construction. There was almost no descriptive variation across a number of repeated 
versions’.119 This tendency has been widely identified as problematic, perhaps most 
memorably by Richard Holmes: 
Sometimes survivors played their roles too well: they became Veterans, 
General Issue, neatly packed with what we wanted to hear, exploding 
at the touch of a tape-recorder button or the snap of a TV 
documentarist’s clapper-board. Up to my neck in muck and bullets; rats 
as big as footballs; the sergeant major was a right bastard; all my mates 
were killed. And sometimes, just sometimes, they tell us this because 
they have heard it themselves.120 
Certainly, an analyst should be aware of the possibility that a story is a well-worn work 
of fiction—over-rehearsed. Some of the interviews demonstrate this tendency to a 
small extent.121 Rehearsal is, however, by no means always a disadvantage; some 
prior contemplation is vital for any useful piece of testimony. If researchers desire 
accounts which are reliable, then this requires rehearsal—a non-rehearsed account 
might appear at first glance more ‘natural’ but if an interviewee includes whatever 
comes to mind at that particular moment without any sort of consistent thematic 
organisation this may result in stories which change with each telling, and are more 
susceptible to external influences at the time of the telling. Rehearsal ensures an 
account is more reflective of the individual’s view, and makes a point; interviews are 
conducted precisely because they elicit such thoughtful and reflective accounts. It is 
119 Nasson, ‘Springbok on the Somme’, p. 37. Nasson’s analysis of this is in a sense flawed, however: 
he assumes that consistency over a few days can be extrapolated to indicate consistency over many 
years, but this is not necessarily the case. 
120 Holmes, Tommy, p. xxiii. See also A.J.P. Taylor’s assessment in Harrison, ‘Oral History and Recent 
Political History’, p. 46; Hew Strachan, ‘Into History’, RUSI Journal, 154/4 (2009), pp. 4-5. 
121 See Hammerton, 1, 99-100; Spittles, 5, 54-56; Gregg, 2, 58-60; Young, 1, 62-63. 
45 
 
only with the passage of time that a participant can consider what an event meant, 
something Fred H. Allison remarks upon. He compared two interviews about a Vietnam 
veteran’s combat action, one conducted immediately after the combat in 1968, and 
one in 2002: 
these two interviews with Mike Nation indicate that he has taken his 
narrow, fragmented and personal view of a combat experience and 
made it into a comprehensive and understandable account...He has 
added context and justification to it to create a well-rounded story of 
much greater significance than it had when initially interviewed, and 
which did not exist in his mind two days after the battle.122 
Richard Wallace has recently argued that rehearsal enhances the authenticity of 
accounts ‘precisely because there is no intervention from a mediator’; ‘Ironically…in 
being liberated from the co-creative interview process, the well-rehearsed anecdotal 
performance offers up a version of a participant’s life history that is entirely their 
creation’.123 An unrehearsed account is also less likely to be coherent, so more 
problematic as evidence, whereas rehearsed ones, as Wallace also points out, will 
necessarily include the clear description which enables anecdotes to work when 
delivered to their intended (often non-specialist) audience.124 
The stilted veterans’ stories which are all too common come about because of cultural 
expectations, an over-credulous audience, and a lack of scrutiny, not because any 
process of rehearsal inevitably results in a clichéd and predictable story. It is a central 
argument of this thesis that it is more fruitful to understand such processes and 
employ critical approaches than to damn oral history entirely. Moreover, most veterans 
122 Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight’, p. 81. 
123 Richard Wallace, ‘“We might go into double act mode”: “Professional Recollectors”, Rehearsed 
Memory and its Uses, Oral History, 45/1 (Spring, 2017), pp. 56-7. 
124 Ibid., p. 65. 
46 
 
do a far better job of balancing rehearsal and rumination than the stereotype assumes. 
It cannot be said that there is an ‘ideal’ level of rehearsal, but there is a balance to be 
struck by interviewees, and a judgement to be made by the historian as to the impact 
on the usefulness of the testimony. All this supports the idea that the best approach 
for a first interview is an unstructured one which elicits the individual’s pre-rehearsed 
life story—as the example of Howard Hoffman shows, a more interrogative approach 
is likely to not only be unnecessary but actually inhibit the testimony by disrupting the 
account’s rehearsed organisational structure.125 
To conclude the discussion of memory it is also important to consider the effects of 
ageing. Contrary to popular belief, the notion that memory inevitably declines 
significantly in old age—unless one is suffering from certain brain diseases—is a 
misconception. In fact, ‘research into the relationship between ageing and memory 
demonstrates that in fact memory functions do not necessarily deteriorate with age 
as long as the subject remains healthy’; 126  and ‘memory holds up well with age. Our 
abilities to call on our enormous networks of facts and associations are generally well 
preserved’.127 Those difficulties with memory which can arise in old age tend to affect 
those recently encoded ones, not those which are decades old.128 Moreover, memory 
can even improve in old age, as people go through a process called ‘life review’: having 
retired and with time to spare, possibly for the first time since they began working, 
they recollect events from their youth in an effort to look back on and make sense of 
125 Hoffman and Hoffman, ‘The Case for Memory’, in Jeffrey and Edwall (eds.), Memory and History, 
pp. 120-1, 126. 
126 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 90. 
127 Schacter, Searching For Memory, p. 291. 
128 Ibid., pp. 286-89, 294. 
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their lives.129 It is this generational effect which can more than anything else be 
attributed with motivating commemoration, war experience literature and oral history 
work about the Second World War since the 1990s. A result of life review is that the 
elderly are often better than the middle-aged at recalling events from their youth; this 
has been called the ‘reminiscence bump’.130 Since memories are encoded best during 
youth, soldiers were primed to record and reassess their war experiences, and the 
aged memory benefits from the process of life review, interviewing elderly veterans 
about their youthful experiences ought to be one of the most fruitful possible scenarios 
for oral history. In his seminal research on Anzac veterans Alistair Thomson noted that 
although the remembering of some of his interviewees was ‘confused and 
disconnected, perhaps due to physical decline or as a result of isolation and neglect’, 
in most cases ‘remembering was vibrant and clear, and it was influenced more by the 
social experience of old age than by physical or emotional deterioration’.131 As Lynn 
Abrams concludes, ‘there is no reason to think that an older person’s memory is less 
acute or reliable than that of a younger person. Whatever our age, we remember what 
is important to us’.132 
With reference to the definition of reliability cited above, therefore, there is little 
reason to believe memories are particularly internally inconsistent. True, memory is 
variable and can be distorted in a variety of ways—ways which are assessed 
throughout the rest of the thesis—but there is little basis to the popular perception 
129 Thomson, ‘Memory and Remembering in Oral History’, in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Oral 
History, pp. 82-3. 
130 Schacter, Searching for Memory, pp. 297-8. 
131 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 183. 
132 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 90. 
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that memories decay gradually and consistently over time. Rather, ‘memory research 
suggests that long-term memory is remarkably robust’.133 Memories are initially 
malleable and vulnerable to outside influences; however, once a narrative of an event 
is rehearsed it seems it will be likely to survive largely unchanged for decades.134 
Therefore, it is evident that personal memories are persistent and enduring enough 
to provide useful historical information. That those memories represent an incomplete 
record, and are vulnerable to distortion when they are recalled, does not justify claims 
that memory is inherently unreliable and worthless to the historian. As Nigel de Lee 
argues, ‘even heavily contaminated or badly distorted evidence is better than none at 
all, so long as it is recognised for what it is’.135 
Narrative Ability 
A third issue is the ability to narrate one’s remembered stories. The stereotype of the 
war veteran often imagines him giving a rambling, incoherent and confusing account. 
This is often assumed to be a sign of poor memory, but it does not follow that in this 
scenario the individual cannot remember: such displays have much more to do with 
the veteran’s inability to express himself than they do with a decline in memory, which 
is ultimately a different cognitive function. There are veterans who can give a 
completely coherent account which contains little factual evidence because he cannot 
remember much. There are others who struggle to articulate themselves and provide 
a very incoherent account, which nonetheless is full of very detailed recollections of a 
133 Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories Revisited’, p. 26. 
134 Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight’, p. 82. 
135 de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 365. 
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great range of things. This is a distinction which has been under-acknowledged by 
scholars to date. 
The difference is well-illustrated by the account of Mike Dauncey. A former glider pilot, 
his account of the Battle of Arnhem and his capture, imprisonment, escape and return 
to Allied lines is problematic because it is extremely disjointed and incoherent, 
apparently providing little in the way of useful historical evidence because the 
chronology is so difficult to piece together. Dauncey relates anecdotes as and when 
they come to mind, without much of an overarching structure. However, this account 
does nonetheless demonstrate the durability of memory. An online biography includes 
testimony from Dauncey provided some thirteen years prior, and this demonstrates 
substantial similarities, including many of the same phrases, indicating that he has 
had a set, very well-rehearsed account, and that even as his ability to coherently relate 
the account has reduced, the main points of fact and even entire phrases have barely 
changed at all in his memory.136 His tendency to leave out traumatic aspects, and his 
silence on the circumstances of his being captured, are equally evident in both 
accounts. The chief difference is that the earlier account is much better organised. 
This appears to demonstrate that Dauncey’s ability to narrate a coherent account has 
declined, not his memory. It seems that the initial account composed by Dauncey in 
the period after the war remained largely unchanged in his memory for the rest of his 
life, even as he began to find the story more difficult to relate. Since his two accounts 
differ only in coherence, whereas the facts of the narrative are the same, they pass 
136 ‘Lieutenant Michael Donald Keen Dauncey’, The Pegasus Archive, 
<http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/mike_dauncey.htm> [accessed December 2017]. This 
account is drawn in part from Patrick Wilson, The War Behind the Wire: Experiences in Captivity 
During the Second World War (Barnsley, 2000), pp. 43-9. 
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the test for reliability. The oral account presents an increased challenge in terms of 
validity, yet just because an interviewee’s narrative ability has declined, this does not 
mean a judicious researcher cannot piece together the account and collect just as 
much interpretative evidence which can then be compared with other sources. The 
evidence is disorganised, but it has not necessarily been distorted. 
The three issues of perception, memory and narration present important 
considerations, but none represents a fatal problem for oral history, and it is evident 
that oral testimony passes the reliability test.  
Validity and Representativeness 
The validity of the testimony will be demonstrated throughout the rest of the thesis, 
but it is worth considering here in some more depth. Oral evidence has often been 
criticised on the grounds that it is anecdotal; these criticisms tend to neglect the fact 
that all data are anecdotal until compared with others. While ‘an isolated description 
of an event becomes a bit of esoterica whose worth cannot be properly evaluated’,137 
the accumulation of many such descriptions indicates wider processes. A piece of 
evidence is valid if it can be corroborated with other evidence. Although this is often 
assumed to apply only to narrating events, even descriptions of unconnected and 
uncorroborated happenings can reveal attitudes and opinions which are widely shared, 
which, as Portelli argues, themselves constitute historical facts.138 It seems clear that 
oral testimony can be compared like with like with other oral testimony, especially 
137 Hoffman, ‘Reliability and Validity’, in Dunaway and Baum (eds.), Oral History: An Interdisciplinary 
Anthology, p. 89. 
138 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, pp. 50-1. 
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when the individuals concerned had common experiences, like fighting through the 
same campaign as members of the same Army. 
Yet corroboration can also occur between different types of evidence, so it is important 
to note the relation between oral history and other types of source. Oral historians 
have suggested contrasting approaches to this issue in order to highlight its special 
benefits, some arguing that oral sources are so unique that they sit outside regular 
historical study,139 but most making the common-sense point that as long as oral and 
written sources contain comparable information, then they can readily be 
compared.140 As Brian Harrison points out ‘The briefest reflection makes it clear that 
any firm distinction between oral and documentary evidence cannot be sustained’.141 
The subjectivity of oral sources is no grounds for drawing such a distinction: many 
sources long considered perfectly valid, such as judicial records, official statistics 
derived from questionnaires, and after-action reports based on a subaltern’s partial 
judgement, are all subjective in origin. As many scholars have realised, ‘Orality is 
woven into the very texture of the written official records’.142 
139 Ronald J. Grele, ‘Movement Without Aim: Methodological and Theoretical Problems in Oral 
History’, in Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, First Edition, pp. 42-3; Frisch, ‘Oral 
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One of the major advantages of oral testimony in military history is that it fills a gap: 
human subjectivity—which can have major consequences on the outcome of events 
where issues such as morale or commanders’ decision-making are concerned—is not 
well recorded by the conventional official written sources. It has also been noted that 
the ‘Poor Bloody Infantry’ who tend to bear the brunt of combat are among the soldiers 
least likely to write about their experiences,143 and Charlotte Linde similarly points out 
that if even any literate person can write a diary, not everyone does, whereas having 
a life story which can be communicated orally is something every socially functioning 
adult must have.144 Nigel de Lee suggests the role of oral history is one of substituting 
for missing records: 
Traditional modern academic scholars are hampered in their 
investigation of military operations because the forms of evidence they 
find most acceptable are often lacking, particularly documents. When in 
action, armies are mutually destructive and often careless of their 
records, particularly if they are being defeated or enjoying an 
unanticipated success. Such records as are kept are often minimal and 
may be unreliable. War diaries, even at corps HQ level, are often written 
up several days late. The use of telephone and wireless telegraphy, of 
personal liaison and verbal orders based on the erasable Chinagraph 
markings on maps, meant that many orders and decisions were not 
recorded in writing.145 
Oral history certainly can substitute for such deficiencies in written records; however, 
another way of approaching this issue is to use oral sources to complement them. 
Although often careless, destructive, and censorious,146 armies by and large are great 
bureaucracies, and military historians are fortunate to have at hand such a wealth of 
official documentation—which is, moreover, mostly considered worth preserving and 
143 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 10. 
144 Linde, Life Stories, pp. 1, 39, 42. 
145 de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 362. 
146 Ibid., pp. 367-8. 
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making publicly available—to supplement unofficial written and oral accounts. Oral 
history originally came about by necessity in areas of study where nothing like this 
documentation exists. Military historians have the opportunity not only to employ oral 
history in a ‘recovery’ role but also, by comparing and cross-referencing, to combine 
official and personal accounts into something greater than the sum of its parts. 
Such an approach can integrate oral sources since, although they are different to 
written records in some respects, in others they are markedly similar. Oral sources 
require analysing in a particular way, as the manner of their creation is in many ways 
unique; this analysis is really the subject of this thesis. However, there is no difference 
between oral and written sources which demands the information they contain be 
employed in a different way in producing historical interpretations. As Lynn Abrams 
states: ‘It is the practice of oral history—the doing of it—rather than the content 
derived from it, that marks out this method of historical research as different.’147 
Of all the possible sources for the military historian, perhaps the closest similarity is 
between oral testimony and written memoirs; both are retrospective analyses of one’s 
own life experience, and while most autobiography is the preserve of the successful 
and famous, wars are one of the few events considered important enough to allow 
‘normal’ participants to produce commercially viable autobiography.148 It might 
therefore be asked whether the wealth of published military memoirs do not provide 
more than enough in terms of personal recollections of events such as the Second 
World War. The similarities should not be overstated, however. A vital difference is 
147 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 18; Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, p. 46. 
148 Linde, Life Stories, p. 39. 
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that memoirs are purely autobiographical, while oral sources involve an intersubjective 
dialogue between interviewer and interviewee. They are one of the few historical 
sources in which the historian is themselves involved in the source’s creation.149 This 
means that interviewers can search deeper, and the accounts produced can be more 
perceptive, more probing, more multifaceted, than autobiography. Furthermore, 
interviews can be more immediate and honest: ‘It is the opportunity presented of 
catching the informant off-guard (without any malign intent), which is one of the 
interview’s great virtues.’150 As Nigel de Lee explains: 
A written document can be examined and discussed, but it cannot be 
interrogated. Anomalies can be spotted, but not challenged and 
explored, as they can be with a living and intelligent source...An 
informant may seek to record false or deficient information, but it is 
easier to lie with calculation, or to deceive oneself undetected, when 
writing than when speaking. When it is necessary to evaluate and judge 
evidence, the spoken word can and will yield and convey more meaning 
than the written, especially when it carries an emotional charge.151 
Autobiography’s focus on the author’s public persona and achievements means that 
commonplace events which form important parts of oral testimony can be omitted,152 
and it has much in common with the over-rehearsed testimony discussed above in the 
way that it can produce idealised, self-justifying stories which relate little to what really 
took place.153 Oral history, by contrast, elicits accounts which are uncertain, 
149 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, pp. 56-7; Abrams, Oral History Theory, pp. 16, 24; Holstein 
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paradoxical, and ambiguous in their meaning, and therein lies their advantage. They 
are inconvenient sources, but ones which are more genuine records of people’s real, 
complex, confusing lives. 
Validity does not necessarily indicate representativeness: corroboration of a piece of 
evidence indicates it is veridical but does not necessarily mean that what it describes 
was normal. An extraordinary event might be corroborated by multiple sources, but 
this does not mean it can be taken as representative of a broader state of affairs; to 
demonstrate this requires another stage of analysis. Multiple pieces of corroborated 
evidence can be compared to determine which data is normal, or representative, and 
which is abnormal, or unrepresentative. Yet, although the purpose of history is, 
broadly speaking, to derive generalisations about the past—rendering the broad 
meanings of enormously complex events comprehensible—emphasising 
representativeness can be problematic. Common and uncommon events were equally 
real to those who lived through them, and a drive for representativeness risks 
entrenching orthodox interpretations and ironing out many of the unusual events 
which are some of the most interesting parts of history. Unusual events can, moreover, 
be of great consequence: ‘in battle the actions of individuals can be of vital 
significance, and information in the possession of single persons can be of vital 
historical importance.’154 
A solution to this problem is presented by the work of Andrew Gelman and Thomas 
Basbøll, who suggest that both representative and unrepresentative evidence has its 
154 de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 365. 
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place in a system of knowledge. They point out that while evidence is usually expected 
to be representative, some gains its importance by being unusual, serving ‘not to pile 
on evidence in support of one theory or another but rather to shine a spotlight on an 
anomaly…interesting stories often represent the surprising cases that represent the 
limits of our understanding’.155 This can show deficiencies with current models and 
motivate the development of more nuanced models and deeper comprehension.156 In 
history, interpretations can be tested against the norm to demonstrate their general 
accuracy but also against exceptions to reveal their limitations and areas of 
oversimplification. Unusual stories are valuable for demonstrating the extremes of 
experience, or providing an ‘exception that proves the rule’; therefore, the exceptional 
ought to be remarked upon, not excluded on the grounds of unrepresentativeness. 
Suggesting that oral evidence tends to be reliable and valid should not be taken to 
mean it is superior to contemporary evidence; a candid letter written at the time will 
almost certainly give a more accurate impression of a soldier’s thoughts than a 
memory of seventy years ago. Yet while acknowledging the limitations of oral history, 
one should remember its particular advantages. It complements contemporary 
evidence in a way no other type of source can. Oral history is living and responsive; it 
enables historians to ask questions and elicit information about subjects the 
contemporary sources failed to record. Even within extremely-well known events, oral 
history has the potential to reveal marginalised aspects. Military history is quite unique 
155 Andrew Gelman and Thomas Basbøll, ‘When Do Stories Work? Evidence and Illustration in the 
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in the way that there is potential for oral history to not only expand the record but 
also deepen it by adding new perspectives even in well-trodden areas. 
Reliability and validity are the basic criteria for a source to be usable as historical 
evidence; it is clear that memory usually provides a reliable record of past experiences, 
and that oral evidence can readily be compared with other sources. However, the 
analysis of oral sources provides unique problems, as they are fundamentally 
subjective sources. It is necessary to explore more deeply the particular subjective 




Popular Memory and the British Army in the Second World War 
 
Interviewees draw upon shared conceptions of the past to produce their oral 
testimony: this process, known as popular memory, is a vital concept in oral history. 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs was responsible for coining the term ‘collective 
memory’ in 1925, and this marked the beginning of the shift from understanding 
memory as an individual psychological process to a shared cultural one. Halbwachs 
argued that an individual’s memory is always situated within a social consciousness of 
the event or period in question. Personal experiences that accord with collective 
memory tend to predominate and ones which do not tend to be marginalised. In 1982 
the Popular Memory Group further explored the processes by which private and 
collective memory struggle in the creation of a dominant narrative of history, stressing 
that no interpretation is ever ubiquitous or uncontested.157 The term popular memory 
therefore specifically indicates the way personal and collective memory simultaneously 
compete with and support one another—‘there are always struggles over the past 
involving dominant, subordinate and marginalised groups, but there is always a 
reciprocal relationship between private and public memory’.158 More recently, the 
concept of the ‘cultural circuit’ has been developed to describe the way in which 
personal memories make their way into public discourse, where they are ‘adapted, 
glossed and elaborated, and become woven into the generalized, public form of those 
stories’, which go on to influence how later individuals articulate their personal stories 
157 Abrams, Oral History Theory, pp. 95-97; Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory’, in Perks and 
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in turn.159 Many popular historical perceptions take the form of discourses—ideas 
about the world that are widely taken for granted within a social group as common-
sense knowledge, absent of the need for specific evidence-based justification.160 
Popular memory is also related to the concept of historical myth. This may be defined 
as a shared, simplified, but not wholly incorrect interpretation of a period of particular 
national importance—an especially stable and widely recognised example of popular 
memory. As Mark Connelly has argued, the British myth of the Second World War 
‘contains many elements of truth and should be viewed as a particular explanation 
and interpretation of events rather than as a cleverly designed falsification of 
reality’;161 as one of its main critics argues, ‘the word “Myth” should not be taken to 
be equivalent to untruth, much less to lies’.162 It is now firmly recognised that the 
cultural context described by these concepts plays a crucial role in how all individuals 
think about the past, resulting in what in the arts and humanities has been called the 
‘memory boom’, an interest in the way the past is remembered throughout society. 
The popular memory of the Second World War is crucial here because it not only 
informs people’s beliefs about events they did not personally witness,163 but also 
provides a framework for the recollection of participants’ personal experiences. This 
process, known as ‘composure’, is one of the key theoretical principles in oral history. 
Coined in the early 1990s by Graham Dawson—although evident in the writings of 
159 Richard Johnson, ‘What is Cultural Studies Anyway?’, Anglistica 26/1-2, (1983), pp. 26-39, cited in 
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various other scholars—164it is a two-fold concept which describes firstly how people 
bring their past and current lives, and their past and current selves, into alignment to 
‘compose’ a narrative which ‘can be lived with in relative psychic comfort’,165 and 
secondly the end result of this process, respondents having ‘achieved composure’ once 
they have formulated an account they feel comfortable telling:  
The cultural importance of storytelling lies not only in the stories we are 
told…but also in those we ourselves tell, or compose. It is a cultural 
practice deeply embedded in everyday life, a creative activity in which 
everyone engages. Even the most mundane of narratives is an active 
composition, created through the formal arrangement of narrative 
elements into a whole.166  
As Lynn Abrams explains, ‘The life story interview invites the narrator to dig deep, to 
reflect on the inner self, to reconcile any conflicts and then to reconstruct the self as 
a coherent whole in the form of a single narrative...the interview becomes a process 
in which the respondent actively fashions an identity.’167 Popular memory is vital in 
this process because: 
The effort towards composure is an inescapably social 
process…Subjective composure fundamentally depends on social 
recognition, with its power to confirm that the versions of self and world 
figured in a narrative correspond to those of other people…The narrative 
resource of a culture—its repertoire of shared and recognised forms—
therefore functions as a currency of recognisable social identities.168  
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In this way people continually re-compose past experiences in order to present stories 
and a sense of self which satisfy expectations at the time and in the particular 
circumstances in which the stories are being told. If this cannot be done, this can 
cause ‘discomposure’, ‘a kind of psychic unease at [one’s] inability to align subjective 
experience with discourse’, which can result in difficulty telling the story, self-
contradiction and silences.169 
Understanding the processes of composure among the interviewees is necessary to 
understand the meaning of their testimony; this chapter therefore aims to define the 
popular memory of the British Army as generally understood, and assess the main 
discourses with which the interviewees are likely to bring their narratives into 
alignment in order to achieve composure. In cultural history soldiers have often been 
viewed through rather simple forms which fail to recognise the level of ambiguity in 
veterans’ identities, as in Dawson’s influential formulation, for instance, in which 
‘soldier heroes’ are held to represent the pinnacle of masculinity: ‘The soldier hero has 
proved to be one of the most durable and powerful forms of idealized masculinity 
within Western cultural traditions since the time of the Ancient Greeks. Military virtues 
such as aggression, strength, courage and endurance have repeatedly been defined 
as the natural and inherent qualities of manhood, whose apogee is attainable only in 
battle’.170 This interpretation certainly has a basis in reality but, in relation to Second 
World War Army veterans, seems insufficiently nuanced. It is assumed that the ‘soldier 
hero’ represents a dominant or ‘hegemonic’ representation; however, the fact ‘soldier 
169 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 69. 
170 Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 1. 
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heroes’ provide attractive idealised forms for civilian men does not mean veterans will 
find them similarly attractive. There is a risk of downplaying alternative discourses 
around soldiering, such as ‘victim-veteran constructions’ and the presumption of war 
trauma.171 Many of these ideas have evidently advanced considerably due to social 
changes since Dawson penned his assessment in the early 1990s. While soldiers still 
encapsulate masculinity for many, this is now by no means a straightforward or 
uncontested identity for veterans to take on. The limited applicability of the ‘soldier 
hero’ is evidenced in the testimonies of Bill Partridge and Robert Purver: both secure 
in their identities as soldiers and proud of their military service, they openly state that 
‘I have a sensitive nature’172, and ‘I could describe myself as a gentle man, I had no 
aggression, I got no hostility’.173 Evidently, these men are happy to present identities 
which would contradict fairly directly the ‘hegemonic’ notion of military masculinity as 
analogous to aggression, strength and endurance. 
It is therefore necessary to establish a more nuanced picture of the various discourses 
Second World War veterans’ narratives are subject to. The popular memory of the 
Second World War has been a subject of substantial research, but the specific position 
of the Army in this has not been the focus of much attention, and as it pertains to the 
British Army between D-Day and VE Day any popular memory is complex and difficult 
to define compared with, say, the heroic and egalitarian image of Australian and New 
171 Jerry Lembcke, ‘War Trauma in the Construction of American Lost-War Culture’, Proceedings of the 
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Zealand troops in both world wars, which has been extensively explored.174  The most 
important features are the British national myth of the Second World War, which has 
been called the ‘People’s War’; the popular memory of the 1944-5 campaign 
specifically; the popular historiography of the British Army; and discourses around 
veterancy which relate to ‘trauma culture’. These contrast in certain ways but there 
are also major points of agreement and as a whole they provide quite a stable 
interpretation through which the veterans can compose their accounts. The combined 
effect is to cause veterans to downplay their agency to influence events and 
characterise the war not as an active achievement but an experience which simply 
had to be endured—in which victory was analogous to survival. 
The British Myth of the Second World War 
In the 2010s it is possible to perceive that one relatively consistent and stable public 
interpretation of the British role in the Second World War exists, which a large 
proportion of the population appears to recognise and accept, and which is not subject 
to widespread contestation. This is the myth identified by historians as the ‘People’s 
War’—a period of national unity, when the nation demonstrated its character by 
enduring in the face of, and ultimately triumphing over, Nazi aggression. Graham 
Dawson noted in 1984 that an interpretation which originated during the war 
continued to define the popular memory: ‘The central and founding myth of World 
War II is of a nation united through idolatry for its totemic leader Churchill. All other 
mythic aspects of the war are subordinated to this one, that had its genesis in May 
174 Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp. 1-7; Hutching, ‘Oral History and War’, in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford 
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1940, and is reproduced to this day.’175 To a great extent, this remains true in the 
2010s. It was the period between the Dunkirk evacuation and the end of the Blitz, 
Dawson maintains, when the civilian and military spheres most closely converged and 
which is the crucial period for the myth.176 As Mark Connelly stresses, ‘Britain’s 
memory of the war is skewed towards the early years of the conflict because this suits 
Britain’s self-perception: resolute in a crisis and at its best when alone.’177 In the 
People’s War, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the Blitz, are together perceived as 
the nation’s greatest triumph. Reeling from defeat in the Battle of France, the nation 
turned defeat into victory at Dunkirk, with the ‘Little Ships’ manned by patriotic 
civilians crucial to the salvation of the Army to fight another day. With the Army 
reduced to impotence, the pilots of Fighter Command saved the nation by defeating 
the Luftwaffe, and the British people themselves endured the Blitz according to a 
‘popular image of placid fortitude’.178  
The People’s War is dominant, but is not necessarily the only public interpretation and 
by no means universal. Different sectors of society are likely to view the war in 
different ways; moreover, assessments of the war in history and culture have shifted 
since 1945, resulting in generational variations in perception. It is also important to 
acknowledge the limitations in the way these discourses are assessed. In many ways 
popular memory is invisible, and the primary means of assessing it is by examining 
popular cultural and historical products, with the assumption that these would not sell 
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unless they conformed reasonably closely to the views of their consumers.179 Yet in 
doing this one risks equating the most publicly acceptable interpretation to the private 
views of everyone in a society which is highly stratified along the lines of class, gender, 
ethnicity and age. It is too simplistic to believe that popular memory is universal, 
especially given the arguments put forward in favour of individual memory. As the 
concept of the cultural circuit demonstrates, different ideas certainly exist, ready to 
be picked up and distributed through the mechanism of popular culture. Nonetheless, 
as Connelly notes, ‘It is never assumed that this memory was owned and perpetuated 
by one particular group within society; or that it can be ascribed absolutely and without 
qualification to all British people, but it is argued that its broad outlines and salient 
points can’.180  
Recent popular depictions demonstrate that the mythic interpretation of 1940 remains 
meaningful. Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk (2017) gives a very traditional 
assessment of Operation DYNAMO, focussing on the trapped soldiers on the beach 
and the efforts of a tiny number of RAF pilots and the ‘Little Ships’ to help them. The 
efforts of the Allied troops to hold the perimeter are scarcely portrayed, while the 
Royal Navy, which actually evacuated the majority of the troops, is included only in 
order for each of its ships to be promptly sunk; yet it was the film’s neglecting to 
represent Indian and African soldiers, not its peddling of the mythical version of 
179 See Hurd (ed.), National Fictions; Connelly, We Can Take It!; Sam Edwards, ‘The Beginning of the 
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Dunkirk, which stoked controversy.181 Darkest Hour (2018) also portrays the ‘Little 
Ships’ as the saviours of both the Army and the impotent Royal Navy, while one 
fictionalised scene in which Churchill talks with ordinary Londoners is a clear evocation 
of the unanimous sense of defiance which supposedly defined the ‘spirit of 1940’. 
Although the People’s War is in many ways incompatible with both historical research 
and personal recollection, it has been extremely durable, and must therefore, Dawson 
reasons, be invested with significant meaning.182 Popular cultural products 
demonstrate that it provides a framework for understanding the Second World War 
still widely recognised throughout British society today. 
Historical opinion has swung from endorsing the ‘People’s War’, to criticising it for its 
idealistic ironing-out of inconvenient facts, to settling on a compromise position in the 
middle-ground.183 Recent scholarship has reasoned that the myth of the ‘People’s War’ 
perhaps enjoys such persistence because it is a reflection of historical reality: ‘What is 
extremely hard to explain away is the extent to which ordinary people at the time 
seem themselves to have felt that they were living through a quite special moment of 
history, a time when the people they knew behaved more selflessly than in the past, 
when the country meant more to them, and the usually inarticulate British said so 
rather more often than usual.’184 Whatever the case—and here the concern is with 
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perception, not fact—it is through phrases such as ‘Blitz spirit’, ‘stiff upper lip’, and 
‘keep calm and carry on’, that the war is still understood by many people. As Corinna 
Peniston-Bird notes, ‘[The] motifs of “being all in it together” and “doing your bit”’ 
provide ‘a narrative framework shared and readily understood…and one which finds 
little contestation in other public arenas’.185 
A key feature of the People’s War is its conflation of military and civilian experiences; 
one of its central tenets is ‘the idea of the war as primarily a civilian experience’.186 
The war was seemingly won as much on the home front as on the fighting front, and 
so ‘It was inherent in the construction of the “People’s War” that patriotic service was 
not reserved for the members of the Armed Forces, but could be exhibited on the 
Home Front also’.187 The fact civilians came under attack was vital to this 
interpretation: ‘The endurance of the Blitzed population at home was used to point to 
a common experience and an equality of sacrifice by servicemen and civilians’.188 As 
Lucy Noakes similarly points out, ‘the Blitz has become an important part of public 
memories of the war because public images and memories of it overwhelmingly 
present a unified picture of Britain at war; a time when “we” were all soldiers in the 
front line’.189 According to the myth, ‘Surviving the Nazi onslaught ensured that its 
stain would be removed from the world and that the British way of life would 
continue’.190 In this way civilian endurance is perceived as having been of material 
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importance to the nation’s surviving the key period in 1940 which forms the foundation 
of the People’s War, and therefore in winning the war as a whole.  
The military campaigns which directly defeated the Third Reich are less central to the 
myth, and can be seen as an inevitable consequence of 1940: even if it would take a 
further five years to finally defeat Nazi Germany, simply by enduring, the British people 
had ensured the war would be won. Soldiers’ actions became barely distinct in their 
perceived historical importance from those of blitzed civilians. If the ‘People’s War’ is 
taken as the most publicly influential popular interpretation of the Second World War—
though this is not to suggest that it is the only one—then the British Army occupies a 
curious and problematic position in relation to this myth. For the interviewees there is 
pride to be felt in their participation in the national triumph which was the Second 
World War—they do not struggle for public recognition of their experiences as do 
Argentine veterans of the Falklands War, for example191—but nonetheless soldiers’ 
experiences are subsumed under the civilianised interpretation of the war which 
stresses stoic, but essentially passive, endurance.  
Sally Sokoloff has suggested that in political terms, too, veterans were elided with the 
rest of British society. ‘The notion of the forties as a crucible of social and political 
change for the British people extends to seeing soldiers as “civilians in uniform” who 
retained so much of a civilian attitude that they returned to post-war life unchanged 
by the experience apart from the natural growing up of young men away from 
home’.192 Certainly, incorporating a new generation of less deferential recruits has 
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been noted as one of the Army’s main challenges during the war, but if the Army had 
to adapt to its recruits, they also had to adapt to the Army.193 Based on her interviews 
with Birmingham veterans, Sokoloff reports no evidence of the political radicalisation 
in the Army which is often suggested to have been a factor in the Labour landslide in 
the 1945 general election, and suggests on the contrary that more conservative values 
were inculcated by army service: ‘The imprints of discipline, authority, hierarchy, and 
comradeship which were experienced in the Army by young men in the ranks have 
displaced any radicalisation that may have taken place because of the war’.194 
However, although they evidently took on some of the values of the Army, popular 
perceptions of a united wartime nation, and of a people’s army that was essentially a 
reflection of wider British society, caused Sokoloff’s veterans to downplay the lasting 
effects of army service, and imply that they quickly moved on from the war after 
demobilisation.195 Ultimately, the ‘homogenisation of a ‘People’s War’ experience 
helped to minimise the sense of specialness of the 1939-1945 armed service veterans 
in the post-war period.’196 
Civilianised as it may be, the People’s War does have space to acknowledge the 
evident reality that the war involved a great deal of actual fighting; yet the important 
combat roles are attributed to a minority of elite combatants, which excludes most 
veterans. While for the First World War the volunteer soldier in the trenches is the key 
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figure in the popular perception, for the Second World War ‘it was the pilot of the 
Royal Air Force who occupied the position at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of wartime 
roles’,197 and the prestige of the fighter pilots of the Battle of Britain remains scarcely 
dented today, resistant to reassessments which have argued that it ‘was never a 
contest of the Few against the Many’198 (bomber crews receive less attention). Britain’s 
sailors also gained prestige for defeating the U-Boat threat, ensuring the nation could 
be fed. These perceptions may indeed have originated during the war, when the 
immediate implementation of conscription, the fact the RAF and the Royal Navy had 
their pick of the high-quality recruits, the increased importance of the air and naval 
aspects of the war, and the general inactivity of the Army in the key period of 1940-
1, all served to reduce the prestige of soldiers.199 As national solidarity ebbed as a 
theme in post-war culture, wartime perceptions may have resurfaced; or perhaps this 
is related to a conception of the Second World War as a war of machines rather than 
bodies.200 
Popular cultural depictions of the Army have reflected the way that, as events fade 
from living memory, nuance is lost and simplification occurs. The Army had a place in 
generalised heroic depictions of the People’s War in the immediate post-war period—
'After 1945 war films could celebrate victory and Britain’s role in winning it. The conflict 
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was generally depicted as a good war in which Britain’s national solidarity and heroic 
deeds were emphasized.’201 Yet soon ‘The democratic equality highlighted during the 
war drifted away from the foreground’ in favour of portrayals of the ‘hierarchies and 
masculinity’ of the military.202 Juvenile literature portrayed soldiers as manly heroes 
carrying out dashing missions to thwart the Nazis, and occasionally sacrificing 
themselves for their country. Yet from the 1950s cinematic assessments did not treat 
all servicemen equally, as the focus was on the deeds of individuals, ‘the dilemmas 
faced by exceptionally heroic men’ who were marked out as not being normal.203 
Certain elite units began to receive a disproportionate amount of popular attention. 
War films were often ‘simply exciting adventure stories set against the backdrop of 
war’, usually involving special forces, while serious attempts to portray more typical 
Army experiences, such as A Bridge Too Far (1977)—which, although featuring the 
Paras, was a negative story about the consequences of command hubris for the front-
line troops—saw a more mixed reception.204 In the 2010s it is Commandos, SAS, and 
Paras who are mostly attributed with decisive, high-intensity operations on land; the 
popular history obsession with special forces indicates this, as does the idea evident 
mainly in US-produced video games that Britain, as the ‘brains’ of the Allied war effort, 
directed its fighting power towards clandestine missions rather than conventional 
military operations.205 Meanwhile the British Second World War film has largely 
disappeared, the children’s comics only remain for nostalgic purposes, and the few 
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recent depictions—Dunkirk for instance—stress the ‘pity of war’ rather than the Army’s 
fighting ability. 
Another factor strengthening the popular memory has been a reluctance to fixate on 
battlefield violence during the Second World War—the ‘mud and blood’ of the First 
World War remains a much more durable image. Brian Bond has noted how, although 
many writers have amply described the dire conditions of the Second World War 
battlefield, ‘That they have not had a comparable impact on public opinion remains a 
mystery. Perhaps combatants in the later war have convinced themselves that none 
of the dreadful conditions, hardships and miseries they experienced were comparable 
to what their fathers had endured in the trenches between 1914 and 1918.’206 
Although this idea may be altering under the influence of modern discourses on 
soldiering and ever more authentic portrayals of the violence of the Second World 
War, it is still evident that the trenches of the Somme resonate emotionally in a way 
that even the notorious hedgerows of Normandy simply do not. Downplaying the 
unpleasantness of battlefield conditions further facilitates the conflation of military and 
civilian experiences, permitting the self-effacing character of the British soldier, 
determined yet not ideological, to be seen as an extension of the ‘keep calm and carry 
on’ mentality demonstrated by the nation as a whole. The People’s War, then provides 
a dominant framework for remembering the war, and one which the interviewees 
largely defer to, although they undermine it in some ways, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate. 
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The Popular Memory of D-Day 
If the People’s War attributes victory to the conduct of the British people in the ‘backs 
to the wall’ period of 1940-1, soldiers can claim their own successes. D-Day is in the 
Anglophone world the most widely remembered event of the war, as the substantial 
commemorations and the vast literature around the battle demonstrate. It is D-Day 
which is perceived as the defining event of the campaign to victory, even though many 
battles in the subsequent ten months would dwarf the landings in effort and cost. 
Even the remainder of the Normandy campaign tends to be downplayed compared 
with the first day of the landings: if Antony Beevor’s 2009 book sought ‘explicitly to 
challenge aspects of the American and Ambrosian narrative of the landings’207 by 
assessing the campaign from start to finish in its full breadth, the need to appeal to a 
popular audience required that it nonetheless be entitled D-Day.208  
The focus on D-Day can be attributed to two main factors. The first is a matter of 
evident strategic reality: D-Day was the point of main jeopardy for the Allied war effort 
in 1944-5. Even though German victory was inconceivable by this stage in the war, 
failure in Normandy could delay victory by years, result in thousands more Allied 
casualties, and even make possible Soviet occupation of Western Europe. Once the 
beachhead was securely established, on the other hand, the Allies could expect to 
make steady progress towards Germany itself. Secondly, D-Day has been invested 
with meaning by the participant nations. For Americans, it is the key moment in a 
moral crusade to vanquish evil. For the British, similar ideas are also bound up with 
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assessments of Britain’s imperial decline: D-Day represented a last demonstration of 
British military force before it was superseded by the burgeoning power of the United 
States. Aligned with the ‘People’s War’, D-Day serves as a counterpoint to Dunkirk 
‘that redeemed the earlier evacuation’.209 Furthermore, it arguably functions as 
microcosm of the entire war: in the same way that ‘the first day of the Somme’ 
encompasses the notions of naïvety, futility and uncaring generalship which have 
come to define the First World War in British popular memory, D-Day signifies unity 
within and between nations, moral righteousness and the military and industrial might 
of the Allies in the Second World War. 
The popular view of D-Day does not gel perfectly with the ‘People’s War’, however. As 
Mark Connelly points out in his perceptive exploration of the myth, not only do the 
British like narratives of ‘starting off on the wrong foot’, but the myth focuses on the 
period where Britain ‘took it’ rather than ‘gave it’, and this period ‘is far more attractive 
to the British than the moment they began to unleash their power’.210 Soldiers of the 
first half of the war therefore encapsulate the best aspects of British character, 
despite, and indeed because of, their endearing amateurishness and lack of military 
success. ‘D-Day’, by contrast, ‘was not a natural fit within [the framework of the 
People’s War]: it was a purely military operation conducted without direct civilian 
input, and as a victorious offensive action it lacked the romantic qualities the British 
find so attractive in defense [sic] and defeats.’211 When viewed through the lens of 
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certain aspects of British national character, victory gained through superior force 
appears quite possibly unfair, unsporting and therefore ‘unBritish’: while Connelly cites 
the example of strategic bombing,212  this interpretation might also be applied to the 
land campaigns, in which it is the Germans, whatever their political flaws, who are 
often cast in the role of the plucky underdogs with the odds stacked against them.213 
Therefore there exists a tension between the People’s War and the British Army’s 
becoming an ever more effective fighting force: as it came closer to winning the war, 
it began to reflect key principles of British national character less and less. Besides 
this there is an implication inherent in the People’s War that victory was virtually 
assured once the Nazi threat to Britain had been ended, and certainly after the 
Normandy landings had been successfully carried out.214 This serves to reduce the 
importance attributed to the actions of British soldiers in 1944-5. The Army did not 
need to turn the tide of the war, like ‘The Few’ had done in 1940—the war was already 
won, and all that the soldiers needed to do was ‘stick it out’ until the inevitable victory 
became reality. The exception is the Battle of Arnhem, in which the British were once 
again on the back foot, which helps to explain why it remains undoubtedly the most 
famous episode of the campaign after D-Day.215 
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The Historiography of the 1944-5 Campaign 
That said, it is possible to align the Army’s late war operations with the ‘People’s War’, 
through assessments which view British soldiers as largely passive, with limited tactical 
agency. This is possible because the dominant historical interpretation of the Army’s 
performance after D-Day has held that it was overly dependent on overwhelming 
material superiority, firepower and air support, and, crucially, many of the 
explanations put forward for this are directly linked to British soldiers’ competence (or 
lack thereof compared with the Germans). As David French has noted, ‘Most of the 
unofficial accounts of the campaign manage to imply, without ever stating explicitly, 
that morale was at best mediocre and in some units downright poor’.216 Reverential 
and insufficiently searching official appraisals of the campaign in the immediate 
aftermath of the war proved easily displaced by more critical assessments from Basil 
Liddell Hart and Chester Wilmot, both of whom viewed the Allied application of 
superior firepower as a corrective for the troops’ lack of confidence and drive—had 
the troops performed better, they suggested, victory might have come more quickly 
and at less cost.217 The view that the application of overwhelming force was not an 
intended or desired method, but necessitated by the failings of the front-line troops, 
has proved a persistent one. Antony Beevor reports that ‘An aversion to risk had 
become widespread and opportunities were seldom exploited…the Second Army in 
Normandy preferred to rely on the excellent support provided by the Royal Artillery 
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and on Allied air power’, while ‘Both Canadians and Americans were bemused by the 
British Army’s apparent inability to complete a task without a tea break’.218 Carlo D’Este 
writes that ‘British infantrymen fought bravely in Normandy but not always to the best 
advantage…The all-too-frequent end result in battle were situations at the squad level 
where the men were simply inadequately indoctrinated not to wait around for an 
officer or NCO to tell them what to do next, but to close with the enemy, firing every 
weapon available and for the next-in-line to take command at once if their leader was 
hit’.219 John Ellis argues that ‘the British and Canadian armies that went across to fight 
in Normandy were not finely tuned fighting machines and comparison with their 
opponents can only be invidious’.220 Max Hastings, perhaps the most strident critic of 
the Allied forces and admirer of ‘the glory of German arms’, complains that ‘Some 
green [British] units seemed slow to treat their task with the absolute commitment 
necessary’, and ‘fought superbly, with great bravery, only to lack the last ounce of 
drive or follow-through necessary to carry an objective or withstand a counter-
attack’.221 Even generally positive assessments which conclude that British soldiers 
‘learned their trade and became entirely professional’ nonetheless acknowledge the 
Army was ‘sometimes ponderous, lacking in élan’.222 
Because these assessments place importance on the attitude and skill of the front-line 
soldiers, for veterans they are likely to be of great influence. Revisionist views in 
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academic223 and popular224 works have gained traction, but the critical school remains 
influential among a mainstream readership, not least because the works of Hastings, 
D’Este and others remain popular and easily found on bookshop shelves, as they surely 
will be for some time yet. These works are likely to be particularly influential on 
veterans, who evidently take a greater than average interest in the history of the war 
in which they fought: it is common for interviews to digress into discussions of books 
and authors, and Hastings and Beevor are mentioned by name.225 If one can attribute 
the deficiencies of British soldiers to inadequate training and poor leadership, it 
remains the case that veterans seem to have little to be proud of. This is likely to 
encourage giving a generally negative assessment, and many appear to have taken 
the questionable performance of the British Army as the vital context for their 
testimony. Indeed, Robin Neillands expressed alarm at the impact on veterans of the 
apparent denigration and belittling of the British effort in Normandy:  
Talking to British veterans—a dwindling number—it is clear that this 
steady erosion of their war from the public conscience, even in Britain, 
is causing them anger and distress. More and more of the general public, 
in Britain as well as the USA…are clearly unaware that the British and 
Canadians fought in Normandy at all.226 
One cannot, of course, suggest that those who read about the war are the same as 
those who know nothing about it, but many of the public are likely to occupy a middle 
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ground—having picked up negative ideas about the British Army in the Second World 
War through hearsay or popular culture without ever reading a book on the subject. 
Although, as will be seen, most veterans are quite willing to dispute what they see as 
misconceptions, there is nonetheless little in the popular literature or popular culture 
to support the notion that the average British soldier, albeit dependable and often 
courageous, was anything more than competent. As John Ellis argues, the Army in 
Normandy ‘exhibited the most notable characteristic of the British soldier, a bloody-
minded capacity to endure when the chips were really down and when sheer grit was 
at a premium rather than flair and tactical suppleness in a fast-moving situation’.227 
Incapable of matching the Germans’ superior professionalism and improvisational skill, 
the British soldier is held to have been capable of enduring the enemy’s fire, but rarely 
of directly defeating him. In this respect the major historiographical trend, although 
not directly informed by the People’s War myth, matches with it rather neatly. 
Discourses of Veterancy and Victimhood 
Another important influence on veterans’ testimony is what it means to be a veteran, 
an identity which has shifted since the Second World War mainly due to new ideas 
about trauma. The factual basis for understanding trauma, and its ramifications for 
analysing the testimony, are discussed in Chapter Five, but here the concern is with 
how subjective conceptions of trauma provide further discourses which mediate 
veterans’ accounts. The general trend has been towards viewing soldiers primarily as 
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victims in a general understanding of war as unreservedly awful, wasteful and 
pointless. As Richard Bessell has noted, 
the trend in recent historical research, like that in the public sphere, has 
been to view war in terms of the violence it embodies and the 
destruction, both mental and physical, that it leaves in its wake. The 
history of war in Europe has become, in large measure, a history of its 
victims—and just about everyone has come to be counted among the 
victims of war.228 
This was not so much the case during the Second World War, when soldiers derived 
more prestige from patriotic notions of serving the nation and combatants in particular 
‘were represented as occupying a higher point in the masculine hierarchy’:229 ‘To be 
manly in wartime…was to be a combatant’.230 If the psychiatric consequences of war 
were better understood and attitudes were softening, receiving treatment for such 
conditions was still stigmatised.231 Today, patriotism and masculinity remain sources 
of prestige for soldiers, but wartime trauma is also a source of prestige, not only 
because war is now understood in terms of its victims, but also because, impelled by 
identity politics and amid concerns about correcting societal injustices, victimhood has 
become increasingly regarded as virtuous. In this way, Alistair Thomson identified new 
discourses appearing in the 1980s which accepted soldiers could be victims as crucial 
to allowing certain of his Anzac interviewees to achieve composure and speak about 
the First World War.232  
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The aftermath of the Second World War has been identified by some as the point at 
which attitudes began to change,233 but the most profound shift occurred due to the 
Vietnam War and the recognition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: ‘More than any 
other war in history, Vietnam redefined the social role of psychiatry and society’s 
perception of mental health…help[ing] to create a new “consciousness of trauma” in 
Western society’, so that by 2000 ‘it was becoming clear that enormous changes in 
social values since the Second World War had redefined the role of emotion and stress 
in Anglo-Saxon public culture’—resulting in what has been labelled ‘trauma culture’,234 
and a view of soldiers as disillusioned ‘victim-veterans’.235 In Britain specifically, the 
Falklands War can be attributed with bringing issues of trauma to the attention of the 
public and the armed forces.236 Military psychiatry became ‘part of a burgeoning socio-
medical movement’ which sought to understand the consequences of various types of 
trauma throughout society, and vital to this was the fact PTSD was defined as universal 
reaction, which could strike anyone, at any time after trauma took place, and did not, 
as previously, imply pre-existing weakness in character or psychology.237 
Reassessments of the Holocaust also allowed trauma to be re-visualised as something 
which could have a delayed effect on entire groups of people.238 Related to Vietnam, 
this ‘allowed veterans to be viewed as another group of victims of an insane and unjust 
war’.239 As Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely state, ‘Vietnam and PTSD both reflected 
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and fuelled a growing preoccupation with trauma in general, and its victims in 
particular’, so that ‘From a position of advocating or admiring resilience and/or 
reticence, western values have shifted to encouraging and valuing emotional display 
or vulnerability’.240 Idealistic heroics, by contrast, declined in merit, so that: 
Many believe that, since Vietnam, it is harder to commemorate gallantry 
and victory or to suppress individual subjectivities at the expense of 
collective ones. Thus delineations of victims—from Vietnam, from the 
AIDS epidemic, from racism, from child abusers, from rapists, from 
drugs, even from World War II—now command more cultural space. 
Statements of what was lost now eclipse expressions of what was 
gained.241 
In an increasingly post-modern society, Patrick J. Bracken maintains, ‘all ideas come 
up for question, all identities are a matter of personal choice’, and the social 
frameworks which organised people’s lives decline; the result is that ‘current thinking 
about trauma is guided by an individualist and positivist agenda’, in which PTSD is 
seen as a universal syndrome applicable to numerous groups in society.242 As attitudes 
to trauma have shifted, and war and trauma have become ever more intrinsically 
linked, trauma has become strongly associated with veterancy, not as an unusual 
reaction affecting a minority of vulnerable individuals, but a near-inevitable 
consequence of military service, so that ‘in the post-9/11 wars psychological injuries 
have taken centre stage in the ways we talk about, digest, and engage with war and 
240 Ibid., pp. 173, 186, 212; Wessely, ‘Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, p. 286; Shephard, War of 
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its consequences’,243 and therefore ‘one could be forgiven for thinking PTSD is the 
main mental health problem facing the modern military’.244 
The end result of these developments has been to produce a triangular relationship 
between the three factors of veterancy, victimhood, and trauma. Veterancy is linked 
via combat to trauma, and trauma is commonly linked to victimhood;245 this means 
veterancy too is linked to victimhood. The effect is to marginalise experiences which 
do not accord with all three criteria. It is problematic to be an active participant in 
violence and traumatised, since trauma is associated with victimhood, so for veterans 
this can be an important reason to downplay their agency in combat, particularly 
involvement in killing, and instead present themselves as passive victims. It is also 
problematic to be a veteran who has been ‘victimised’ by enduring combat but has 
escaped psychological damage: in oral history part of achieving composure is to search 
for evidence of traumatic experiences, potentially resulting in ‘a gradual “inflation” of 
traumatic memories’, because in the popular view it is scarcely possible to be a combat 
veteran who has not been traumatised.246 The presumption of trauma invites certain 
responses: in this way Alistair Thomson’s interviewee Fred Farrall came to regard all 
his problems as stemming from the First World War, although ‘there’s every chance 
that Fred’s peace was as damaging to his mental health as his war’.247 These themes 
are returned to in Chapter Five. 
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In the 2010s, although warrior figures provide attractive archetypes for knowingly 
unrealistic films and video games, soldiers are rarely subject to serious assessments 
that stress their skill as fighters. Combat is envisioned as an impersonal, elemental 
occurrence, akin to a natural disaster, which can only be endured, not controlled. 
Victorious soldiers, who happen, apparently by chance, to find themselves on the 
winning side, are now thought just as likely to be damaged by war as the defeated 
enemy or civilians caught in the crossfire. The virtuous aspect of soldiering is not 
righteously meting out violence but simply surviving combat and the ensuing trauma. 
In many ways such discourses now provide the lens through which the Second World 
War is viewed. It is very much consistent with these that Dunkirk (2017), which was 
widely hailed for its authenticity in portraying ‘real’ war, involves the soldiers taking 
no hostile action towards the enemy but merely doing their best to evade his attacks 
and escape—summed up by the tag-line ‘Survival is Victory’. In this way popular 
discourses around soldiering have aligned with the People’s War; both emphasise 
largely passive endurance in the face of aggression, and therefore they can coexist 
with relative ease. 
Although Dunkirk is curiously sanitised, there is also a relation here to the way the 
violent realities of war are now more widely recognised in popular culture. War films 
such as Saving Private Ryan (1998), Fury (2014), and Hacksaw Ridge (2017), 
television series such as Band of Brothers (2001) and The Pacific (2010), and a host 
video games have become ever more ‘ghoulishly forthright’248 in their depictions of 
violent and traumatic battle, all of which emphasises the perceived heroism of those 
248 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 5. 
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who survived such ordeals—‘the fact that combat was so frightening serves mainly to 
reinforce our admiration for these soldiers and their gallantry’.249 Steven Spielberg was 
motivated to produce Saving Private Ryan after hearing from veterans that they did 
not recognise cinematic depictions of their war. The assumptions implicit in this are 
that realism is a worthwhile goal, since veterans deserve to have their stories told 
accurately, and that veterans are authoritative on their own experience—these two 
ideas underpin much war-related filmmaking, history-writing and, of course, oral 
history. Saving Private Ryan was hailed by many for its realism, but the realism here 
is not in the literal accuracy of the circumstances depicted but in the film’s 
acknowledgement of bloody violence, which is held to be a general truth of all wars—
curiously allowing US Air Force veterans of the Gulf War, whose experiences cannot 
possibly have resembled the landings on Omaha Beach, to attest with presumed 
authority to the film’s realism.250 In fact, in emphasising the truth of the violent parts 
of war, Saving Private Ryan arguably conceals the greater truth that most experiences 
of Army service in the Second World War were mundane rather than violent. However, 
its brand of authenticity is in keeping with the views of war, trauma and veterancy 
which came about in the aftermath of Vietnam. 
It is perhaps indicative of the previously mentioned reluctance to acknowledge violent 
combat in the Second World War in British memory that these representations are 
mostly American; it is notable that there is no British counterpoint to Saving Private 
Ryan or Band of Brothers, although equivalent British representations do deal with the 
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First World War. This difference in focus does not dispute the larger fact that war and 
soldiering have become ever more intrinsically associated with trauma and victimhood 
throughout Western culture, but does indicate the ways in which similar discourses 
can vary in their interactions with different national myths. This may be illustrated by 
comparing the situation in Britain with that in the United States. Although the source 
of the modern attitude to trauma, there is still much more space in American memory 
for patriotic wartime heroism; the notion of the ‘Greatest Generation’, continues to be 
extremely persistent and has only recently begun to be challenged. According to this 
interpretation the generation of Americans who lived through the Second World War 
and its aftermath demonstrated a sense of patriotism and shared duty unmatched by 
any other generation before or since.251 For Americans D-Day in particular 
‘represented willing sacrifice and military strength in a “Great Crusade” to vanquish 
evil, save the world, and launch the American century. These democratic heroes of D-
Day then returned home, made America great, and became the “Greatest Generation” 
as a result.’252 Implicit in this view is the image of American soldiers as righteous, 
heroic warriors, an image which was promoted during the war by propaganda which 
aimed at ‘keeping the public ignorant (in the name of morale) of the appalling realities 
of combat’.253 The Vietnam War demolished the notion of American soldiers being 
heroes fighting for a just cause, but by comparison with later wars the Second World 
War has appeared even more the quintessential ‘good war’, more morally justified and 
more heroic. 
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In Kenneth D. Rose’s critique of the ‘Greatest Generation’ myth, it is striking to note 
that the ‘realities’ behind many aspects of the American myth resemble British popular 
memory very closely. He notes that there was little evidence of patriotism in the 
wartime US military: ‘The patriotism that supposedly dominated American life during 
World War II is mostly of the hindsight variety’, and it was only ‘With the passage of 
sixty years [that] the young serviceman sceptical of patriotic appeals has become the 
old, aggressively patriotic veteran’.254 Scepticism of outward displays of patriotism, 
although harbouring a quiet, dignified love of ‘Blighty’, is an aspect of the British 
national character frequently attributed to the wartime generation, seen to form a link 
between past and present, even though it seems that wartime Britain was in reality 
much more overtly patriotic than it is today. Rose further explains that ideological 
motives appeared to matter little to American soldiers, as most seem to have treated 
their service as a job, and taken more pride in the quality of their performance than 
the reasons they were doing it.255 In this vein, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. notes that ‘[the 
Greatest Generation] was like most other generations in American history. It consisted 
of plain people who, confronted by moral threats to their country, accepted their duty 
and performed it laconically, modestly, self-effacingly, without show, without 
flourish’.256 These assessments could be transferred with next to no alteration into a 
description of present-day British popular memory. It is unclear whether in the British 
case the popular memory has shifted in the opposite direction to the American case—
working over time to downplay rather than exaggerate patriotism—or whether it has 
254 Ibid., p. 5. 
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proven more stable, and Britain was simply less patriotic in the first place. It may be 
instructive to note the opinion of two influential contemporary observers: ‘American 
and British soldiers tend to consider their wartime service as a disagreeable necessity, 
as a task which had to be performed because there were no alternatives’.257 It may 
be that the immediacy of the threat posed to Britain itself, and the more obvious 
necessity of defeating Nazi Germany, obviated the need to evoke patriotic or moral 
motives for participating in the war, compared with the more isolated United States. 
Whatever the case, the idea of the war as a moral crusade seems today rarely to be 
as overtly articulated in Britain as in the United States, and this in part explains why 
American veterans are more often the subject of heroic depictions in popular cultural 
productions. The British soldier is more usually portrayed as ‘heroic precisely because 
of his unheroic nature’,258 in terms of the understated character which is held as 
representative not only of the Army but the entire British nation in the People’s War. 
Summary: Popular Memory and the British Army in the Second World War 
It can be seen that the People’s War, the popular historiography and discourses around 
veterancy provide relatively complementary discourses through which the British Army 
in 1944-5 is popularly assessed. D-Day is remembered as a magnificent feat of arms, 
but at the same time the way that the British Army’s battlefield performance has been 
denigrated, and discourses around soldiering have increasingly characterised veterans 
as passive victims rather than active fighters, permit those aspects of the British 
national character perceived as crucial for surviving the dark days of 1940 to be 
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transferred to the soldiers of 1944-5. British soldiers are seen to embody the same 
characteristics which, according to the ‘People’s War’ myth, allowed the nation to 
weather the storm during Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, and thereby lay 
the foundation for the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany by enduring, quietly and 
stoically, refusing to ‘make a fuss’, demonstrating ‘stiff upper lip’, and tackling an 
unpleasant but necessary job with resigned determination, though without much 
panache. A relatively stable set of discourses is therefore available through which, as 
per the theory of composure, British veterans can articulate their war narratives. The 
ways these discourses shape the veterans’ testimony is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 
Popular Memory and Composure 
 
This chapter will assess the impact of the popular discourses assessed in the previous 
chapter on the veterans’ narratives. The current field of oral history can be criticised 
for focussing too much on the in-depth analysis of oral testimony’s (retrospectively) 
subjective aspects, work which really constitutes memory studies, and too little on 
employing it in historical interpretations. Nonetheless, the former task is an essential 
preliminary for the latter. This and the next chapter will examine the ways in which 
the interviewees formulated their testimony through the process of composure. 
Processes of composure are evident throughout the interviews, usually intertwined 
with various narrative techniques. Most of the accounts contain a central ‘argument’ 
or moral, sometimes overt and sometimes more subtle, which serves to highlight what 
each individual regards as the main features or themes of his war experience. The 
accounts, along with the processes of composure which produce them, are therefore 
highly individual. 
Popular memory has long been regarded as one of the main influences on composure; 
undoubtedly respondents align their accounts according to popular representations of 
the events they experienced, and if this is impossible, they may be inhibited from 
speaking altogether. There has been space, however, to reassess the way popular 
memory is understood. In particular, several historians have worked to restate the 
importance of individual cognition in the face of what is perceived as an overextension 
of the theory of collective memory. As Jay Winter explains, ‘One of the unfortunate 
features of the memory boom is the tendency of commentators to term any and every 
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narrative of past events as constituents of national memory or collective memory’, 
wherein cultural representations such as films are held to ‘remember’.259 For this 
reason he avoids the term ‘collective memory’ and maintains that popular 
representations do not dictate personal memory, but cause people to ‘restructure and 
fortify’ historical ideas which they themselves brought to the occasion; he calls this 
more complex process ‘historical remembrance’.260  
Anna Green has likewise criticised the overemphasis on collective memory, also 
pointing out the curious situation that ‘all forms of historical understanding are 
increasingly classified as memory’, and arguing that a paradox has resulted—how can 
collective memory, aggregated from individual memories, be concerted and ‘permitted 
a high degree of intentionality’ if those individual memories are themselves 
unconscious and aimless, with no power to dispute collective memory?261 As people 
are exposed to a large number of conflicting beliefs and values, and only some are 
incorporated into individual memory, must there not be some individual agency at 
work?262 Moreover, Green argues, an overemphasis on cultural discourses can lead to 
a ‘reductionist’ approach whereby complex and contradictory accounts are forced into 
narrow categories determined a priori by previously identified discourses;263 this can 
be seen in Gabriele Rosenthal’s study of German war memory, which uses a range of 
accounts not to stress the variety of possible war experiences but to underpin 
generalisations which conflate the experiences of every German soldier in the world 
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wars according to seemingly predetermined ideas.264 ‘In practice’, Green concludes, 
‘individual and collective memories are often in tension…oral historians need to re-
assert the value of individual remembering, and the capacity of the conscious self to 
contest and critique cultural scripts or discourses.’265 In the same way, Michael Roper 
has complained of the tendency of popular memory to downplay ‘the range of possible 
personal motivations for remembering’, and called for more attention to be devoted 
especially to subconscious emotional impulses.266 
This study recognises these criticisms and argues that popular memory only exists in 
so far as it is the agglomeration of individual acts of remembrance, and that individual 
circumstances are always of prime importance in the production of memory. The point 
here is that individuals always make decisions over how far to reflect popular memory. 
If popular memory is an important influence on how non-participants come to 
understand the past, and participants voluntarily refer to popular memory, the idea 
that it can hegemonically dictate individual remembering is much more doubtful. In 
this and the next chapter, it will be suggested that overt references to popular 
representations are fairly rare; rather, popular memory provides the boundary 
limitations for discussing the war. As Lindsey Dodd notes, ‘the public version of events 
act like a jelly mould, shaping personal memories to its contours’.267 Within the ‘mould’ 
of popular memory, however, most of the war narratives are in fact highly 
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personalised, influenced to a far greater extent by individual character and outlook 
than by any shared conception of the past. 
The People’s War and Composure 
Although the veterans’ accounts reflect multiple influences, only one of which is the 
British popular myth of the Second World War, some features clearly derive directly 
from the People’s War. Hereward Wake provides an account which clearly borrows 
extensively from the myth, intermingled with his own faith: 
I want everybody to know, that our Christian faith played an important 
part...[9] We were fighting evil against the terrible behaviour [of] the 
Nazis. We would never be beaten. And I will say now straight away, that 
we were inspired of course continuously by Churchill and his speeches, 
we were inspired by Monty when he eventually joined us, previous to 
that we had poor leadership at the top...[6] and we were inspired by our 
faith in Christ.268 
This example references aspects of wartime propaganda—the demonization of the 
Nazis, Churchill’s rhetoric of defiance, and the way Montgomery was solely attributed 
with reviving the Army’s fortunes—with unusual clarity. Robert Ford provides similarly 
conventional reasons for fighting, although he focusses less on moral motives and 
more on patriotically defending the homeland from outside aggression: 
ML: And how did you motivate yourself and your crew? How do you keep 
going? 
RF: Well I'll tell you, it's a very different war from all these wars that go 
on now. We were fighting for the survival of our home country. We were 
surviving for our wives, girlfriends, mothers and fathers, who were living 
in England, and we all knew, if we lost the war, Germany would occupy 
us, and that would be-, that would be impossible, intolerable, and so, 
the...the morale and the need to do it was in- borne in us, really...And, 
268 Wake, 1, 08-09. 
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we never questioned whether we were doing the right thing, or doing it 
at all, never, not at my level anyway, which was very young. No, what 
we wanted to do was get on with it and win it...put it bluntly.269 
It may not be coincidental that both these retellings of the popular myth come from 
upper-class officers. 
Most references to the popular myth are more subtle and nuanced than these, 
however. For instance, some deference to the apparently more important role played 
by other services, especially the RAF, in the ‘backs to the wall’ period of 1940 is 
evident. An especially clear example appears in the account of Geoff Young. Although 
Lucas prompts him to talk about the preparations for D-Day, Young instead discusses 
the threatened German invasion of Great Britain: 
ML: When did you first think about the invasion? When was it getting 
obvious that something big was going to happen? 
GY: Well, it was very-, of course we went down to the south-east coast 
you see, and we were there as a front-line troops then. And...it was very 
edgy, because we had one chap taken away from...a German E-Boat 
came in and captured one of our chaps. And of course, it's all in my book 
actually, that was a bit of a shock. Yes, we were very apprehensive then. 
Luckily the air force saved us that time, as you know, Battle of Britain, 
they saved us, but then don't forget, the Merchant Navy also saved us, 
and that was, I think a fantastic-, they had some fantastic people, the 
merchant sailors, and of course in the Navy as well. So don't think we 
done everything!270 
Young establishes the threat posed by the Germans, capable of landing on the British 
coast where and when they wished, and the fact that it was the air force and navy 
which ‘saved’ the country.  This extract comes directly after Young remarks on the 
high quality of his division, 43rd (Wessex); it can be interpreted as bringing this 
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sentiment into agreement with the popular memory, assuring the listener that if the 
Army was highly capable, this should not be taken to imply that he disputes the war-
winning role played by the other services. Similarly, Harry Askew recalls the death of 
a fellow trainee during a Luftwaffe bombing, which likewise aligns his war with the 
threat posed to Britain itself.271 Two others, Eric Tipping and Stan Procter, both 
formerly of 1st Worcesters, report that they initially volunteered to be (specifically 
fighter) pilots; curiously, they are also the only two Worcesters to mention later 
observing aerial combat in the skies over Nijmegen, perhaps referencing popular 
notions of the importance of the air war.272 Ray Gordon also recalls trying to join the 
RAF, while Denis Laws notes that he was motivated to enlist by his brother’s RAF 
service.273 Evidently the way that the Army occupied a less prestigious role than the 
air force has influenced some of the accounts. 
Overall, though, there is little outright deference to the popular myth of the People’s 
War. As discussed in the previous chapter, according to the People’s War the entire 
nation was perceived to have united and every individual to have ‘done their bit’, and 
as a result veterans are perceived—and therefore, to some extent, perceive 
themselves—to have done their patriotic duty in a similar manner to the civilians in 
the Blitz. Yet, while the veterans do not overtly question the popular myth, nor do 
most actively validate it. If soldiers’ and civilians’ experiences are conflated in the 
People’s War, the interviewees do not appear to blithely endorse this; instead, they 
refashion their memories to produce distance between the military and civilian 
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spheres. Throughout the interviews the concept of ‘doing one’s bit’ is only ever invoked 
in relation to enlistment, not to Army service once the interviewee had made the 
transition from civilian to soldier. Often this is done with a sardonic sense of irony, or 
to imply an image of youthful naïvety.274 This is striking because ‘doing one’s bit’ has 
been identified as a major theme in testimony drawn from comparable groups such 
as Home Guard members and war workers;275 indeed, one of Corinna Peniston-Bird’s 
interviewees associated wartime unity with his Home Guard service rather than his 
later Army service, ‘underlining the symbolic meaning of a force set up specifically to 
defend the home and a nation united to thwart the enemy’.276 In defiance of 
probability, none of this study’s interviewees mention involvement with the Home 
Guard prior to their Army service. On the one occasion it is referenced, the aim is to 
denigrate it by drawing on the humorous image presented in popular culture—'Dad's 
Army looks like professionals compared to what we were’—emphasising the 
amateurish nature of training in order to illustrate the quality of that individual’s unit 
by the time it actually saw action.277 This is only one example of testimony which aims 
not to align the experiences of the various participants in the People’s War in order to 
validate the popular image of national unity, but rather to separate them.  
To emphasise the implied gulf between the experiences of soldiers and civilians, Britain 
and the Home Front are rarely mentioned, even though it is evident, both from the 
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interviews and broader historical research, that maintaining connections with the 
home front by sending letters and parcels was extremely important in the maintenance 
of morale and something to which almost all soldiers devoted a great deal of their 
time.278 Parents, wives, girlfriends, and children are mentioned in passing, if at all. 
Where they do appear in the story, it is usually to illustrate a transferral back to the 
civilian world: leave, demobilisation, or medical evacuation to Britain.279 The general 
impression is that the Army stood apart from the rest of British society; its experience 
was not that of the rest of the nation, even if articulated in the same terms of 
endurance.  The veterans stress individual experience, or the experience of their unit, 
over collective national effort; if they look back with nostalgia, it is to stress unity and 
camaraderie in their regiment rather than in wider British society. There is, in oral 
history terminology, a silence on one of the central tenets of the People’s War.  
Partially, the rhetorical distance this creates between Britain and the fighting front can 
be attributed to wartime perceptions of the home front as ‘an essentially feminine 
place, embodying in the soldier’s mind all the supposed evils of women’;280 a false but 
persistent impression existed and continues to exist that there were no young men on 
the home front.281 Yet it is also a striking rejection of the popular memory’s tendency 
to subsume the Army’s experience under the civilianised interpretation of the People’s 
War. Although they broadly validate the popular memory, the veterans’ identities 
278 Majendie, 1, 38-40; Beach, 1, 12-13; Hutchinson, 3, 14-15, 62-63; Jonathan Fennell, Combat and 
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subtly undermine it by establishing distance and difference between soldiers and 
civilians. This ensures that their experiences and achievements can be appreciated in 
their own right both by the veterans and their audience.  Whereas most British people 
align the Army’s wartime activities with a larger united effort, the veterans attempt to 
present an identity separate from the universalising People’s War myth which holds 
that all Britons, civilian and military, were ‘all in it together’. 
Evidently, the influence of popular memory can be limited, especially where it comes 
into conflict with personal recollections or the collective memory of subgroups like 
veterans. The veterans prefer to stress the uniqueness of Army service rather than 
wholeheartedly align their memories with the People’s War. This brings into question 
the idea in oral history theory that there exists a dichotomy between happy 
composure, supported by popular memory, which allows respondents to speak, and 
unhappy discomposure, not supported by popular memory, which causes repression 
and silences. Previous assessments have maintained that individuals can draw upon 
certain aspects of public discourse only by ignoring aspects which are unrepresentative 
of their experience. For example, Alistair Thomson suggested that after achieving 
composure, one of his Anzac interviewees ‘was so pleased with the new recognition 
that he did not always see that other aspects of his experience were still ignored or 
denied by the legend…affirmation may be essential for individual peace of mind, but 
in the process contradictory and challenging memories are displaced or repressed’.282 
It seems possible, however, that respondents draw upon discourses which, even 
282 Alistair Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in Australia’, in 
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though they do not perfectly reflect their experiences, are considered ‘good enough’, 
that they may be quite conscious of this, and that this does not necessitate repressing 
or forgetting memories which dissent from the received wisdom. After all, popular 
discourses are a way for individuals to relate stories to their audience; they need not 
supplant personal memory. In this way, more recent theorising has suggested that a 
simple dichotomy between composure and discomposure is insufficiently nuanced. 
Thomson himself has reassessed his original research and acknowledged the process 
is a more complex one in which ‘composure is never fully achieved’.283 
Enlistment, Patriotism and Composure 
Corinna Peniston-Bird has explored the complexity of composure by assessing an 
aspect of British Second World War memory which has declined: the notion of wartime 
patriotism. Popular memory not only suggests frameworks for remembering—like 
‘doing one’s bit’—but makes some frameworks problematic. Peniston-Bird argues that 
while patriotism was quite widespread during the Second World War, ‘the role of 
patriotism as a motivating factor for service was much more problematic for 
composure in today’s context’, and ‘Unlike ‘doing your bit’, patriotism has come to 
have different connotations in the contemporary context’.284 It is difficult in the 21st 
Century to explain how love of one’s country and societal expectations could provide 
sufficient motivation for military service. The Home Guard volunteers which Peniston-
Bird assesses, she notes, find it much easier to invoke ‘doing one’s bit’ rather than 
patriotism when fashioning their wartime identities. Discomposure when the subject 
283 Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories Revisited’, pp. 17-23. 
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of patriotism appears can be instructive, however, as it ‘provides a powerful indicator 
to the historian that the topic under discussion is one in which there may be a 
mismatch between individual experience and popular discourse’.285 
Similar effects are observable in the veterans’ recollections of enlisting, in which they 
must explain how they came to be in the unenviable situation of fighting a war. 
Naturally, conscripts need not cite any reason for enlisting, and if they were 
patriotically enthused at being called up they rarely state this. However, the fact of 
wartime conscription means that even Army veterans who volunteered have little 
difficulty finding adequate ‘causality’286 to explain their enlistment. Although it may be 
difficult for a veteran to acknowledge patriotism as a motivation—they were not 
merely making a pragmatic and ultimately hypothetical commitment to defend their 
own homes, but accepting a very real risk of death or injury, potentially overseas—
they can find alternative ways to explain their decisions. Geoff Young volunteered in 
1939 after a recruitment drive by the local territorial unit: 
ML: So what made you join up, what...what was the motivation? 
GY: Well because, you see, I wanted to get in and have a little bit of 
interest before I done my six months national service, you see. That's 
all the reason I was going-, 'cos my two mates were older than me and 
I wanted to be with them, you see. And my brother also was there.287 
Young emphasises a desire to ‘do his bit’ along with his peers, and avoids citing 
patriotism. In the case of Bill Edwardes too, ‘doing one’s bit’ is sufficient justification 
for his decision to pre-empt conscription: 
285 Ibid., p. 71 
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...and I said to mother, 'I've taken the King's shilling', and she knew 
what I meant, and she said, 'You're mad, you don't have to do it for 
another year, why have you done it?', and she reminded me afterwards 
that I said, well I thought it could be all over before I had a chance to 
join in. I was keen to join in.288 
Even those who left secure reserved occupations to volunteer can downplay the 
potentially problematic matter of individual agency in their decision. In explaining his 
enlistment, Doug Mayman satisfies the wartime discourse of ‘doing one’s bit’ as well 
as the modern scepticism about military service: 
ML: Doug, could I ask how you...came to be in the army in the first 
place? 
DM: Yes indeed, fairly simply, I could have avoided being in the army, 
because I was in a reserved occupation in munitions. 
However...I...decided that I couldn't be...a coward, I suppose, and miss 
the whole of the war...and whilst I didn't fancy being shot at, I didn't 
volunteer for the army, but I did the reverse, I did not, although 
instructed by my superiors, did not register to have a reserved 
occupation and miss the war, so I was called up in the normal way, and 
received my call-up papers and joined the army...as a con-, a 
conscript.289 
Mayman is careful to note that he did not directly volunteer, implying that truly it was 
the state which decided he should become a soldier. Patriotism and social pressure to 
enlist are implied as motives but not fully acknowledged.  
Two contrasting accounts of voluntarily enlisting indicate the importance of individual 
motives for remembering. Bill Partridge has little difficulty negotiating with the idea of 
patriotism. This may be because he personally regarded himself as a good soldier and 
288 Edwardes, 1, 03. 
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therefore avoided the feeling of many that, on reflection, volunteering seemed an 
impulsive and naïve mistake. 
ML: Mr Partridge, can I ask by...well can I start by asking how did you 
come to be in the army in the first place? 
BP: I suppose about three reasons. One was that I always had a bit of 
a hankering after being a soldier, talking to guys who'd fought in the 
First World War, seeing pictures and books and things. Secondly I was 
fiercely loyal, your king and country, ridiculously so in those days. And 
thirdly...there were obviously going to be a war, Hitler was going to go 
on and you know...conquer the world if he could, there was no doubt 
about it, and I thought if there was a war I wanted to be in it. And 
although I was in a reserved occupation that's how I came to be in the 
Territorials and get called up.290 
Partridge’s first two reasons for enlisting can be explained as belonging to a bygone 
era, understandable in the context of the time but ‘ridiculous’ in hindsight. His third 
reason clearly evokes images of standing up to Nazi aggression which are still very 
meaningful today, so there is some alignment with popular memory. Partridge 
therefore has ‘sufficient causality’291 to explain leaving his reserved occupation in 
agriculture, and by afterwards specifying that he returned to the farm at harvest 
time,292 he makes clear that his Army service was a virtuous duty, a chance to ‘do his 
bit’, rather than being motivated by less mature desires like escaping from civilian 
work or seeking adventure. Since he joined the Territorials, it was ultimately the state’s 
decision to send him into action. As Partridge fulfils the relevant discourses his 
response is clear and confident, and there is no evidence of discomposure. 
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Denis Laws, by contrast, found it more difficult than most to explain why he 
volunteered for the Army: 
ML: So Denis, you volun-, what made you volunteer as you were in a 
reserved occupation? 
DL: Well...you've got to experience that...I mean...it was 
almost...everybody of the...eighteen, all your friends were either 
volunteering or calling up-, called up, and...I mean, you feel isolated, 
and you wonder what-, later on when you get married and have children, 
what they're gonna say, 'What did you do in the war Dad?' All you can 
say is 'I did nothing but...but make things for the army, you know, the 
forces', so...my brother was in the air force flying Lancasters, and he 
was coming on leave and we were having a wonderful time, when he 
came on leave, I thought 'This is a good life this is' [laughs], but you 
know, you don't look at the-, you don't understand the...293 
Unlike Partridge, Laws was dissatisfied with his position in the Army, as he became a 
tradesman doing similar work as he had done as a civilian, so there may be a level of 
insecurity over his decision to volunteer, which did not pay off as he envisioned. Laws 
certainly finds his motives difficult to explain in a modern context in which the military 
life appears unenviable and patriotism and social pressure seem poor reasons to risk 
life and limb in war, but it is important to note that his discomposure does not cause 
him to exclude the disorientating section from his narrative, but rather to acknowledge 
that in later life his perspective has changed. As Peniston-Bird argues, discomposure 
is not invariably problematic; it is ‘revealing of the greatest disjunctures between past 
and present experiences’, and if respondents attempt, sometimes with limited success, 
to frame their stories in terms of public discourses, ‘This is not to argue, however, that 
293 Laws, 2, 00-01. 
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collective memory or collective amnesia limits the ability of individuals to explore their 
pasts in the context of the present.’294 
Ultimately, the veterans are able to acknowledge the extent of wartime patriotism; 
however, they do this through discourses which are comprehensible by a modern 
audience. Patriotism is acknowledged to have been a fact of life during the war, 
although largely disdained in the present. As conscription meant their individual fates 
were outside their personal control, the veterans can approach the issue of patriotism 
with more freedom than Peniston-Bird’s Home Guard volunteers. They acknowledge 
patriotism obliquely, by referencing the image of idealistic recruits soon to be shown 
that their preconceptions of soldiering were naïve, or simply framing it as a fact of life 
in a bygone era. As Ken Tout states knowingly, ‘it was a great adventure, we're serving 
our country and all the rest of it’.295 In this way it is possible to acknowledge the 
differences between past and present. Discomposure over the issue of patriotism does 
not necessarily lead to silence on the issue, but merely to alternative discourses. There 
are, it seems, very few issues which cannot be articulated at all; even sentiments 
which have declined are explicable through a wide range of discourses, not least the 
versatile idea that the past was a different time. 
Popular Memory and the Topical Confines of Veterans’ Narratives 
Although easy to overlook, perhaps the most important ramification of popular 
memory is the unspoken understanding that the subject of the interviews is the war, 
294 Peniston-Bird, ‘Patriotism and the People’s War’, pp. 71, 78. 
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understood as possessing distinct geographical and temporal boundaries. It is not 
necessarily a given that this be the case: veterans of other, more obscure wars might 
be more likely to offer broader narratives which contextualise their service in relation 
to the whole of their lives. Yet this is not necessary where the Second World War is 
concerned: it is a unanimously understood cultural and historical construction to see 
the time between the appeasement of Hitler in the late 1930s and Labour’s post-war 
creation of the welfare state as a critical, well-defined and self-contained period in 
British history. 
This may be an important reason why the narratives begin with enlistment into the 
Army and end with demobilisation. The researcher was, of course, interested in the 
war, and prompted discussion of training and doctrine in particular, but the interviews 
were largely unstructured and respondents were free to discuss their broader lives if 
desired. While some did, few felt a need to explain their background or upbringing 
before the war in much detail, and nor was later life considered important: Denis Laws, 
for example, ends his account at the end of the war with the repeated statement, 
‘That’s it. That’s my life story’.296 Where events outside wartime are mentioned, this 
is generally because there is a specific personal point to be made, not because there 
is a sense that it is necessary to discuss wider life experiences. Of course, later 
experiences do influence the veterans’ search for composure; it is simply that little 
impulse is felt to acknowledge these. 
296 Laws, 3, 04, 4, 04. 
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Likewise, there are geographic boundaries imposed by the popular memory too; while 
many of the interviewees served in Palestine or various other hotspots of unrest 
immediately after the end of the war, these are discussed little; the focus is understood 
to be on the main theatres of North Africa, Italy, Holland, Germany, and, most 
importantly, Normandy. Thus, after explaining how he was taken out of action in 
Holland, Ken Tout races through his stay in hospital and his arrival in Palestine at 
which point he declares ‘and that's where I stayed until my number came up to...leave 
the forces. End of story.’297 The ‘real’ war took place in Europe. It is worth reiterating 
that this temporal and geographic focus should not be taken for granted; the fact that 
it appears so obvious demonstrates how pervasive a framework it is for understanding 
the war. 
D-Day and Composure 
D-Day is seen as the most prominent moment of the 1944-5 campaign. The job of 
winning the war was seen as nearing completion by 1944: ‘All stories need a satisfying 
conclusion, and for the British, D-Day is just that—a reassuring end to the nation’s 
war story’.298 The ramification of this for the veterans is to strengthen the notion that 
after D-Day the war was won, even though really there would be much hard fighting 
to come. The focus on D-Day as the event which sealed victory turns the subsequent 
ten months of fighting into something of a foregone conclusion—as Mark Connelly 
notes, 'the overwhelming sensation is of…a slow, inexorable grind to victory’.299 It is 
no surprise, then, that the interviewees attempt to elaborate their role in the early 
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stages of the great invasion wherever possible. Descriptions of the landings are never 
rushed through or cut short; they are important not only in aligning personal 
experiences with the popular memory of D-Day but also in marking the point at which 
green soldiers became combatants and, therefore, veterans. Sir Robert Ford 
articulates the feelings which most of the veterans attach to the landings with more 
clarity than most: 
...it was a great moment for all those of us who took part. Whatever 
happened afterwards, and terrible things happened, and...many of us 
killed and wounded and one thing another, but that was the...the day, 
we were going to liberate Europe, we were going to defeat the Germans, 
and we couldn't get on with it quickly enough, and there was no 
hesitation, anywhere, and it was-, we'd never-, I'd never seen action 
before, obviously, and in fact none of my crew had, none of-, hardly 
any, a small element of the regiment had seen action before, very small, 
that was before Dunkirk...But...it was...had its great moments, I mean 
it really was something we just thought we had to do, just had to do, 
and wanted to do, certainly as far as I was concerned, and I think as far 
as the others were concerned too, most of 'em, too.300 
The image of the invasion fleet is a well-known one, described by many, and one 
which Ford also evokes: 
ML: What stands out most in your memories about your time in 
Normandy, and your time during the war as a whole? 
RF: I think D-Day, this incredible morning, dawn, what was it, about half 
past four? And seeing...so many ships, it was almost unimaginable. I 
think that stands out clearly...and the landing itself stands out, but then 
I've talked about it so much of course, that's probably the reason why.301 
Most of the interviewees’ accounts are more prosaic than this, however: Harry Askew 
provides a representative example: 
300 Ford, 3, 55-57. 
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ML: And what did you do when you landed? 
HA: Well we waded ashore. We had to wade ashore. They were still 
shelling the beaches, and...we were told to...not line up, you know, 
but...you couldn't, and that, you got some snipers and some of those as 
well, where we went up, so we...it was like every man for himself really... 
ML: So once you'd got ashore, what were you doing? 
HA: Well we tried to find somewhere-, it was night-time, we tried to find 
somewhere where it was safe, and...the engineers had put tape laying 
where you mustn't go, and anyway when they finished we set to go 
through...orchard, yeah. Used to make a little tent with our ground 
sheets, two of us. We only had one blanket then, well one blanket each, 
and...no sheets or nothing.302 
Although this extract appears straightforward, popular discourses are evident 
nonetheless; Askew mentions the iconic experience of wading through the surf and 
emphasises the threat posed by German shelling and snipers, while the confusion and 
his uncomfortable sleeping arrangements symbolise the transition into front-line life. 
Mike Hutchinson remembers disembarking at Port Winston, the Mulberry harbour 
established off Arromanches, as a somewhat fraught process: 
...and then we had to...go up and down, and we had to say, when 
the...[4] boat came up and down, we had to jump onto the...Mulberry 
dock and scrabble the best we could along it to get onto the...into 
France.303 
Again, arriving in Normandy meant not simply disembarking onto the dock but making 
the conceptual transition to being on campaign in an occupied country. Others inject 
a note of humour into their descriptions. Bill Edwardes makes sure to mention his 
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encounter with one of the beachmasters, who have been represented in films such as 
The Longest Day:304 
So off we went across the ocean, coming-...We had to offload the ship 
in a huge swell, going down rope ladders, quite exciting, and...we'd done 
all this training before and with the vehicles, our driver was fed up to 
the teeth with overheating, because the...all the important parts were 
all waxed up and the exhaust taking...in the air, and we got ashore and 
as the barge came onto the sand, the gravel, the...the ramp dropped 
and there was about an inch of water, so we just got the bottoms of the 
tyres wet. We got onto this ready-made metal road across the beach, 
wire mesh sort of thing, and our driver stopped, and he said, 'I'm gonna 
get that bloody stuff off this...distributor cap', and he stopped and got 
out of the cab, and it was like a voice came, literally, came out of the 
sky. The beach masters who were buggers, they really were. And...we 
heard this voice saying, 'Get that fucking thing off my beach!'. [Laughs] 
So we quickly mounted this cab again and off we went, but...it was quite 
a welcome to France, 'Get it off my beach!'.305 
There is also a typical sense of irony in suggesting that the waterproofing measures 
were unnecessary, a point echoed by Ken Tout and Joe Ekins, who both recall that 
the ‘ghastly’ days-long experience of covering every nook and cranny of their tanks 
with a sticky tar-like substance proved pointless when they went ashore in only 
eighteen inches of water.306 
Landing on D-Day, or arriving in Normandy shortly afterwards, provides an opportunity 
to align personal and popular memory in a way none of the interviewees willingly pass 
up. Yet where this cannot be done—and many soldiers arrived in France well after the 
crucial first few days—frustration is expressed. Reg Spittles’ armoured regiment landed 
too late to share in the prestige associated with 6th June, and he is cognizant of the 
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fact that the attention focussed on D-Day contrasts with the lesser remembrance 
afforded to the much bloodier battles later in the campaign: 
...now if you can say 'I landed on D-Day', you're special. You're, forever, 
you're special. Don't matter what function you're at, if it's a military 
function, don't matter who you're with, you're special. And then you are, 
D1, 'Oh, was ya?'. D2, 'oh...'. By the time you get to...what we 
landed...D10, 16th, D10, you're nobody! But what, it's not known you 
see, unless people go into the...intricacies of what happened from D-
Day onwards, we were the green troops who were gonna get 
slaughtered...and were slaughtered. D-Day casualties, by comparison 
with what we was gonna get, were nothing.307 
It is evident that, as so often in this review of popular memory, the veterans’ 
assessment of the invasion reveals continuities between past and present attitudes. 
The temptation to claim the prestige attached to D-Day was also strongly felt during 
the war: 
Because we were Three Group and arrived on D-Day and Four Group 
arrived a month later, we looked down on them. It's not fair, is it? We 
shouldn't have done, in the Army you go where you're ordered, you go 
where you're sent, it's not down to you. But anyway, it's in the nature 
of man to feel like this but you mustn't let it get hold of you and turn 
you up the wrong way.308 
 
Historical Consciousness and Composure 
Such continuities between past and present highlight another important aspect of 
popular memory: the ways in which the interviewees place their experiences in a 
broader historical context. Kathleen Ryan rightly states that ‘oral history offers a way 
for ordinary individuals to evaluate their lives in relation to the historical 
307 Spittles, 1, 139-140. 
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metanarrative’.309 Second World War veterans are naturally curious to compare their 
war with other conflicts before or since. Doug Mayman’s account is of particular 
interest here, as he makes numerous references to the stilted popular view of the First 
World War in order to emphasise that however bad his experiences were—and he 
does seem to present some signs of trauma—they could have been worse. This is a 
tendency which Gary Sheffield has argued was common: ‘for many British soldiers of 
the Second World War folk memories of the Somme, Gallipoli and Passchendaele acted 
as a benchmark of the appalling nature of war, and as a result they sometimes failed 
to recognise just how terrible “their” war was’.310 In Mayman’s case, though, this may 
have come about at a later stage: 
ML: You were talking about a drive from Amiens to Arras, and you're 
going through obviously some very well-known First World War 
battlefields round the battle of the Somme and...what did that make you 
think about, when you were thinking about things that were happening 
twenty-five years before? 
DM: I don't think any of us thought of the First World War. We just got 
on with today's war. And some of us looked at the old First World War 
gravestones and thought, well, so what, you know, that was a different 
war. But it didn't really have much effect, no, I don't think it did.311 
In 2013, however, Mayman was eager to discuss the First World War without any 
specific prompting: 
ML: So what would you be doing in that period in France, to start with, 
when you're not actually in action. 
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DM: Well...when you were not actually in action, it was...a damn sight 
better than the First World War. Psychologists had got hold of warfare 
and knew how bad it was, and so we used to have...fight for maybe two, 
three weeks and then be pulled out and replaced by another tank 
regiment. Now that was good. In the First World War they were in 
trenches for months, whereas we did get, not a-, not a leave or anything, 
but pulled out, maybe after two or three weeks, replaced by another 
regiment, and you get three days' rest. Now that three days' rest, that's 
just what you did, you just thanked God you were alive, sat down behind 
the lines and...then waited for the next three days and went in and 
replace the other regiment. So the...army people had that sense that 
there were-, they did know about giving people rests. They did know, 
not if someone was shell-shocked, not to treat them as cowards and 
things and so on. There was a better approach to the mental stress of 
fighting, yeah.312 
In the First World War battalions were in fact regularly rotated in and out of the front 
line;313 meanwhile, in the extract above and elsewhere Mayman is forced to 
acknowledge that leave was a rare privilege even in the Second World War.314 In this 
way Mayman’s use of received wisdom about the First World War to achieve 
composure is at times belied by the evidence of his own experience. Where he speaks 
of a trench full of frightened infantrymen being exhorted to go ‘over the top’ by a 
screaming sergeant-major, it is necessary to specify that ‘[it] sounds a bit like World 
War One, but it wasn't quite’.315 His recollections of one particularly bad day of fighting 
on the German border are nonetheless moderated by comparison with the First World 
War:  
So that was my little, nasty bit of the war, so...you have that, but what 
was good was, they didn't put you right back again in the following day. 
In the First World War, you would have been in the next day. They gave 
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you four or five days' rest to get over it, which was very considerable, 
you know, it was thoughtful.316  
Even the ability to turn down an officer’s offer of a promotion is seen as an indication 
of better inter-rank relations in 1944-5, evidence that ‘it was a different situation, it 
wasn't a bullying thing like the First World War’.317 Although Mayman’s interview is a 
particularly clear example, several of the interviewees make reference to the First 
World War as encapsulating outdated tactics, high casualties and uncaring 
leadership.318 Using this popular image as a reference point for narrative effect is not 
quite the same thing, however, as consoling oneself with the thought that conditions 
were worse in the Great War, as Sheffield illustrates; one involves past experience, 
the other narration in the present, a distinction that will be returned to. 
Comparisons with modern wars are also to be expected, as the interviews took place 
during the closing stages of British Army involvement in Afghanistan and while British 
intervention in Libya was in the news. Victor Gregg relates his war to the history of 
his regiment, which he sees as exerting an innovative stimulus on the rest of the Army 
from the time of its creation to the present day.319 Early in his interview Michael Watts 
compares his time in an armoured car in Palestine shortly before the war with the 
situation in Afghanistan: 
ML: What sort of vehicles were you in at this time? 
MW: Rolls Royce armoured cars. And we were armoured underneath. 
They don't do that over in Afghanistan, do they? I can't believe it! I 
316 Mayman, 1, 19-24. 
317 Mayman, 1, 25-26. 
318 Tipping, 1, 56-60; Dutton, 1, 06-07; Hunt, 1, 120. 
319 Gregg, 2, 16-17. 
114 
mean, we ran over bombs and that. It wrecked the cars but it didn't kill 
anyone.320 
Since Watts seems to have enjoyed his pre-war army service, he uses Afghanistan to 
present the dangerous periods in a more positive light. However, it is more usual to 
use modern wars to demonstrate the severity of the fighting in 1944-5, as in the 
account of Syd West: 
ML: And how do, or how did, casualties affect you? People that were in 
your own company, your own platoon? 
SW: Well, to be fair, not like today where they've been together for 
years, train together, live together, and as I say my old regiment, the 
last time they were in Afghanistan they had four casualties in six months. 
We was lucky if we didn't have four in four minutes.321 
Popular notions around history-writing also shape the testimony. Many of the 
interviewees, being themselves interested students of the history of the war, air 
opinions on the work of historians. They often discuss how they have continued to 
learn about the war in later life, and it is in this vein that John Majendie remarks that:  
I've learned so much about the war afterwards, what went on and, 
though reading things and finding out, and I think some of the military 
historians, one or two I've met, they do an incredible job, they 
put...marry one side and the other side, get all the details right in what 
had happened, and...you hear the German view, and...go on learning.322 
However, this positive comment stands in contrast to complaints by Majendie earlier 
in the interview about historians, ‘wise after the event’, criticising British 
commanders.323 Several of the interviewees had shared their memories on previous 
occasions, and while they are grateful for the opportunity to contribute their oral 
320 Watts, 1, 01. 
321 West, 1, 07-08. 
322 Majendie, 1, 83-84. 
323 Majendie, 1, 44-45. 
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histories,324 there is evidently a degree of tension between the important interpretative 
role which historians are recognised to play, and the desire for the veterans to have 
their stories told in the way they think is accurate. Bill Partridge makes clear his 
indignation that Antony Beevor disagreed with his interpretation of an incident during 
the fighting on Mont Pincon, where a tank stumbled into the Somersets’ position. 
Partridge argues that it was a German tank, Beevor that it was probably a British one 
from 13th/18th Hussars:325  
...that guy in his book says that I don’t know…Sergeant Partridge doesn’t 
know a German tank from a British tank. […] I did write to him and say 
‘You’re wrong’, but...there you go. Me, who provided so much accurate 
information, and there he says that I provided misleading [in]accurate 
information, so...it upsets me.326 
Beevor does not, in fact, question Partridge’s judgement in such a direct way, as he 
presents the issue as an entirely understandable mistake to make in a confusing 
situation, but Partridge’s sense of grievance is clear regardless. An impression that, in 
return for telling their stories, veterans are owed credence and a positive portrayal of 
their actions, is also evident in Stan Procter’s account: 
ML: Is there anything else you want to add, Stan? 
SP: Well I...only in one respect. The fact is, I appear in most of these 
books. Extraordinary thing! And what I didn't like was what Max Hastings 
wrote about me, because he picked up my book and he picked out that 
nast-, one of the nasty bits where [lowers voice] I looted a radio set 
from a German lady's house, and I thought-, well, it wasn't me- just me, 
it was we, and I, you know, it's a thing I've been ashamed of ever since, 
but he had the blooming cheek to write about it in his book [laughs].327 
324 Ekins, 1, 18-19; Dutton, 1, 92-96. 
325 Beevor, D-Day, p. 396. 
326 Partridge, 1, 46-47. 
327 Procter, 6-7. 
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The evident awareness of veterans that they are not merely telling stories but 
informing historical research means that attitudes to history can be another important 
influence on composure. Here the principle of intersubjectivity is important—the idea 
that the circumstances of the interview conversation and the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee have an influence on the way oral testimony is 
articulated.328 There are indications that the interviewees recognised that they were 
being interviewed by a university representative in a relatively formal setting—that it 
was ‘an “official”, rather than casual, conversation’—329and afforded the occasion a 
certain amount of respect. Colin Criddle and Mike Hutchinson appear to be reading 
from notes at the start of their interviews, although they soon slip into a more relaxed 
conversational style, and it would not be surprising if most of the interviewees had 
undertaken similar preparations. Some allowed their wives to act as fact-checkers, 
although this had little discernible impact on the testimony.330 Moreover, most 
evidently came to the interviews with pre-conceived notions of what makes ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ history, and an anxiety not to waste the opportunity to record their testimony. 
Often this is merely indicated by a reluctance to be boring, as in Barry Freeman’s 
description of his training:  
From there we travelled south to various places, which I- Aldershot was 
one we called in at, and we did some very heavy training on the South 
Downs and Salisbury Plain with the tanks...And then I think we moved 
again somewhere, but it was not really...good history, I don't think.331  
328 Abrams, Oral History Theory, pp. 54, 58. 
329 Ryan, ‘“I didn’t Do Anything Important”’, p. 35. See also Alistair Thomson, ‘Memory as a 
Battlefield: Personal and Political Investments in the National Military Past’, Oral History Review, 22/2 
(Winter, 1995), pp. 68-9. 
330 Dauncey, 2, 20; West, 1, 11-12; see also Sokoloff, ‘Soldiers or civilians?’, pp. 59-66. 
331 Freeman, 1, 1-2. 
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Similarly, Edwin Hunt states repeatedly that he is resisting the urge to go into more 
detail in what is already an extremely detailed account, lest he be too long-winded,332 
and immediately after telling one anecdote, Stan Procter is anxious to check ‘Am I 
doing the right thing?’.333 Eric Tipping asks for permission before using a swear word, 
while Robert Purver mouths one rather than say it out loud.334 Bill Partridge for one is 
quite conscious of the interview dynamics, saying at one point ‘I'm gonna pause for 
breath and you can ask me questions or tell me what you think.’335 In theoretical 
terms, the interviewees were aware that they were engaged in a performance which 
demanded a particular manner of speaking. 
If most of the time these gestures to formality appear only minimally to alter the 
meaning of the testimony, in some instances the impact is evidently more extensive. 
Ken Tout, a highly educated writer of several books on the war, evidently formulated 
his account according to his notion of good history-writing. His focus is thematic, 
rather than chronological, and he relates his experiences to the key historical issues 
as he sees them. Although Tout’s historical knowledge in some ways improves the 
usefulness of his testimony, it should also cause it to be approached with some 
caution. These are the much-contemplated words of an experienced historian, not the 
youth who went to war in 1944, and it is clear that Tout discusses issues which he 
judges to be historically relevant, not necessarily those most important to him 
personally. Due to the thematic structure, potentially there is a loss of information 
where personal incidents do not pertain to certain themes, whereas they might have 
332 Hunt, passim. 
333 Procter, 1, 11. 
334 Tipping, 1, 131-132; Purver, 2, 38-40. 
335 Partridge, 1, 58. 
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been included in a chronological account. Tout’s understanding of the historiography, 
not his personal experience, dictates the parameters of the discussion. 
A review of some of Tout’s writing provides evidence of this. He explicitly states that 
‘Military histories must in the main concentrate on the generals. Books like this one 
may find room to mention lower-rank officers and the occasional exceptional ‘other 
rank’, but the vast majority never achieve a mention.’336 Tout has a clear, if antiquated, 
notion of what constitutes proper military history, and it is an ideal which allows little 
space for the individual. It is therefore interesting to note the lengths Tout goes to 
expunge his personal viewpoint from his writing. During Operation TOTALIZE Tout 
was a tank gunner in C Squadron, 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry. As he makes clear 
in the acknowledgements of his book on TOTALIZE, Tout made use of the later 
recollections of his tank’s driver, Stan Hicken, and co-driver, Rex Jackson, when writing 
the book.337 This allows Tout to report certain incidents as being drawn from the 
recollections of Hicken and/or Jackson, even though he himself must have seen 
essentially the same thing. For instance: 
Rex [Jackson] and Stan Hicken were not too happy themselves. For 
some time they had been watching a ginger-haired man in a trench in 
front of their tank, where no Highlander should be. When the man failed 
to move they began to realize that it was not a man in a trench. It was 
a disembodied head standing on the ground on its own. For the rest of 
the day, amid all the turbulence of shot and shell, the head sat in the 
grass and stared at them.338 
In the interview Tout talks several times about the lulls in the TOTALIZE battle but 
makes no mention of this particular grisly sight, even though, being in the same tank, 
336 Ken Tout, A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise (Stroud, 1998), p. 18. 
337 Ibid., p. 177. 
338 Ibid., p. 93. 
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he must surely have been aware. Later on the same day, Tout reports, ‘Stan Hicken 
now noticed movement along the gully and alerted his commander, who ordered the 
gunner to traverse, in time to shoot and brew up yet another hunted hunter.’339 Again, 
Tout neglects to mention this incident in the interview, even though he himself was 
the gunner who fired the fatal shot! Incidents such as these, which might be expected 
to provide ideal anecdotes for an oral history interview, are not narrated in the 
interview by Tout, and are only, it seems, mentioned in the book where they can be 
presented as the experience of somebody else.  
As an aside, on the one occasion where an anecdote appears in the book as well as 
in the interview, it is presented in a subtly different way. From the interview: 
…on one occasion I remember jumping because the tank was on fire, 
and...on that occasion we grabbed our...fire extinguishers, feeling very 
brave because once you'd seen a tank explode you knew not to stay 
very near, but we felt we were very brave and put the fire out, and then 
we realised that what had happened was that we'd been hit by a mortar 
bomb on the front of the tank, which had sent...our camouflage on fire, 
and so the big bush that we'd transformed ourselves into with 
camouflage had gone on fire, and the tank itself was unhurt, so on that 
occasion we...survived…340 
Here Tout injects a sense of jeopardy, but in the book, this incident is represented in 
a more matter-of-fact way, re-arranged to remove much of the tension and any 
suggestion of the crew bravely fighting a potentially lethal blaze: ‘On the lip of the 
gully, 3 Baker were hit and seemed to be on fire, but to the relief of the crew it was 
only the camouflage of dry branches which burned; a fire extinguisher was adequate 
to that task’.341 Tout again expunges himself from the narrative. Although this example 
339 Ibid., p. 95. 
340 Tout, 2, 11-12. 
341 Tout, A Fine Night for Tanks, p. 98. 
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demonstrates the usual ways oral and written accounts can differ in style and 
emphasis, for Tout the circumstance of a formal oral history interview generally 
appears to strengthen his existing ideas of what makes good history and thereby 
causes his account to take the form of a thematic discussion rather than a simple 
description of personal experience. 
The testimony is therefore shaped in various ways by what the interviewees regard 
as ‘good’ history, and what performance they believe is expected of them. On the 
other hand, however, they are often very forthright and honest concerning issues 
which would usually be considered too crass for polite conversation. There is a sense 
that, while acknowledging the formality of the interview situation, more prosaic 
aspects of army life are part of the story and ought not to be left out. Furthermore, 
the passage of almost seventy years permits a frankness which may have been 
supressed earlier in life. Thus Bill Edwardes is willing to discuss his attempts to find a 
brothel in Bayeux;342 Denis Laws openly and enthusiastically describes the easy 
availability of prostitutes in occupied Germany, apparently encouraged by another ex-
serviceman who is present;343 Jack Eglington and Stan Procter admit to engaging in 
looting;344 and Luis Dimarco talks a great deal about drunken escapades and wartime 
girlfriends, as well as being stung ‘on me dick’ by a jellyfish while swimming in the 
Mediterranean.345 These sorts of recreational pursuit do not figure in the popular 
image of the reticent, virtuous and essentially wholesome British soldier, but are 
evident throughout the testimony nonetheless. From the point of view of 
342 Edwardes, 1, 31-33. 
343 Laws, 2, 11-13. See also Criddle, 1, 86. 
344 Eglington, 1, 17; Procter, 2, 07. 
345 Dimarco, 1, 20-21. 
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intersubjectivity, the role of a male interviewer is vital here; it is very difficult to 
imagine former soldiers, who have been noted as being very sensitive to gender 
dynamics in interviews,346 relating such experiences so directly to a female interviewer.  
When addressing another male some subjects can be presented as normal ‘manly’ 
conversation, whereas with a female listener there might, perhaps, be a well-
intentioned if condescending caution about over-sharing and causing discomfort or 
offence, along with a degree of scepticism about the listener’s ability to understand. 
Popular Culture and Composure 
Notably absent from many of the interviews are overt references to cultural 
representations of the war. This is surprising as these references have been remarked 
upon in a great deal of influential research. Alistair Thomson’s work with Anzac 
veterans found some who told anecdotes from the official histories, or from the film 
Gallipoli, as if they were their own; Penny Summerfield has discussed how the 
television comedy series Dad’s Army directly influenced the remembering of former 
Home Guard members.347 The use of images associated with the Home Guard and D-
Day has already been discussed. Colin Criddle refers to soldiers of the US 101st 
Airborne Division as the ‘Band of Brothers’, reflecting the title of Stephen E. Ambrose’s 
book and the television series of the same name.348 Likewise, Robert Purver’s 
description of the beginning of Operation MARKET GARDEN, with its mass briefing 
346 Sokoloff, ‘Soldiers or Civilians?’, p. 61. 
347 Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp. 7-8; Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure’, p. 71, 87; see also 
Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence.  
348 Criddle, 1, 40; Stephen E. Ambrose, Band of Brothers (London, 1992). 
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followed by the armoured dash up the road, appears reminiscent of similar scenes in 
the film A Bridge Too Far: 
...And the chief officers, the main officers, high-ranking officers, all 
seemed to be assembling in this sort of square where there was like...a 
community hall or something, and the place was absolutely swarming 
with generals, staff officers, and all high-ranking officers, and then our 
own officers came back to us and we was taken the next day to a field 
where they'd painted a huge canvas and some general, and I don't know 
his name, little fella, wore britches...jodhpurs rather [laughs], he was 
explaining to us that this operation was called 'Market Garden', and 'You 
must succeed at this, you must succeed, we've called on you 'cos you're 
experienced troops', da de da de da...'And you must succeed, and we're 
gonna start from Eindhoven, and you're going to go straight up the road 
over several bridges', which the Americans were being dropped on so 
that they would hold them open, 'but you must keep going because the 
airborne troops are being dropped at Arnhem', which I'll explain later, 
'dropped at Arnhem, and you must meet up with 'em, and in this way 
we can end this war in months', that was...that was his command. 
So there we go, we set off from Eindhoven, and our general, Sir Brian 
Horrocks, was standing on the roof of a factory, I think it was 
called...Siemens electrical factory, electrical factory of some sort, I forget 
the name of it now,349 and...we were sitting on tanks, in ducks [DUKWs], 
lorries, and this convoy, the tanks leading, we were sitting on the tanks, 
we just dashed straight up this road, straight through the enemy lines, 
and sure enough the Americans had taken the bridges, I can't name the 
bridges, and we just kept going.350 
However, popular representations are drawn upon only rarely, and do not seem to 
exert the hegemonic influence over personal memory which much of the literature 
would suggest. Moreover, there is evidence that the interviewees utilise popular 
images in a more complex manner than is usually allowed for, whereby they are used 
as a mental shorthand to assist the listener’s comprehension, without necessarily 
validating the accuracy of such images. The 88mm gun was feared during the war 
349 Purver appears to refer to the Philips factory in Eindhoven. 
350 Purver, 1, 14-16.  
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and has since become an iconic symbol of German technical prowess.351 However, this 
representation is used in a more complex way in Reg Spittles’ description of his 
regiment’s first action, during Operation EPSOM,  
Now I was watching number three troop steaming off up this cornfield 
to this slope, where there was bushes and things, thinking...how stupid 
they were at the speed they were going up. They were going up there 
about thirty mile, thirty-five mile an hour, the sort of thing you do on an 
exercise when you know there's no danger. You know that somebody 
will perhaps come up and say 'I'm sorry but you've been knocked out'. 
That's...different to being told you've [been] knocked out, casually, and 
getting a...dirty great big eighty-eight shell through the tank. And he 
don't tell you you're being knocked out. He just destroys you. And they 
were going up there at thirty or thirty-five mile and hour, at a speed that 
no commander could possibly be able to look round and survey where 
he was going, what was happening round him, and control his vehicle. 
But anyway, they went up, I naturally looked away at other things 
happening, and when I looked back, they'd reached the crest of the field, 
and two of the Cromwells were burning, they were brewed up, burning 
like haystacks. Black smoke pouring out. Now you can imagine the initial 
shock, I mean I hadn't expected to see tanks destroyed as soon as that. 
I mean all we'd gotta do was drive down to the river! And now, there 
was a troop with two of its tanks destroyed, and obviously people either 
killed...or wounded, or whatever...352 
In this instance the ‘eighty-eight’ is invoked as the extreme contrast to the bloodless 
consequences of tactical mistakes in exercises; the worst-case scenario which could 
befall careless crews. Spittles does not actually state who or what knocked out the 
tanks, and in a similar anecdote later in the interview he states, ‘whatever the gun 
was, I don't know’.353 Instead of arguing that the 88mm was literally more common 
or more lethal, he uses the image of the ‘eighty-eight’ as a convenient representation 
of the opposition, which is likely to have more impact than naming one of the lesser-
known German anti-tank guns. Bill Partridge references ‘Panzer Divisions’, and Mike 
351 John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (London, 2004), p. 123. 
352 Spittles, 3, 23-25. 
353 Spittles, 4, 0-4. 
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Dauncey ‘stormtroopers’ in the same way, as bywords for the quality of German 
troops.354 The Tiger tank also receives several mentions, although the interviewees 
more often use it as a shorthand for German armour than stress the quality of that 
particular design.355 If people sometimes draw on ‘public discursive constructions’ to 
substitute for experiences which are not directly recognised in public discourses,356 a 
subtler process can be envisaged in which the same process is used to clarify and 
streamline an account as a concession to the listener, the speaker being fully aware 
that the popular image is not a completely accurate one. Put another way, popular 
representations can enter testimony as a willing and conscious narrative tactic by the 
speaker, not only through the imposition of hegemonic popular discourses. 
Popular culture is also referenced in order to directly dispute its representation of the 
past: 
TH: And I was carrying the gun, there was a-, I said 'There's a German!', 
and he were running through the woods. Well, I can't...you see the films, 
I don't care how it is, I'll see somebody with a gun, they'll go drrrrrr, and 
they'll all drop down. You try running with a Lee-Enfield, loading a rifle, 
five bullets, put them in there, get it up, and try and shoot somebody, 
and then standing still. Or you're just down there and at 'im. You're 
carrying it, you're doing it, but...you can't! I don't care who it is, unless 
you're sitting in there-, now these others, the guns what they got now, 
they can put it on automatic or...single shot, so if they've got it on 
automatic and they're going across these fields and they see-, brrrt, they 
can do that. You can't do that that when you've got a... 
ML: So what weapon did you use more, the Bren or the Lee-Enfield? 
TH: Oh, I had a rifle, yeah, you had to remember the number of your 
rife and everything. And...a pick or a shovel, that were the main things, 
that was the best thing, tucked down in your pack at the back. And you 
got...gas cape rolled on top...And your pouches and your bayonet and 
354 Partridge, 1, 21; Dauncey, 1, 32. 
355 Purver, 2, 01; Spittles, 5, 54-56; Partridge, 1, 58-61. 
356 Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure’, pp. 89-90. 
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all that rough...stuff round your neck...And then you had your helmet, 
and the gas mask on the front. And then you try and...run, lay down and 
fire, you've got the thing pushing up there, the pack on your back...It's 
alright if you're dug in, and they're coming, but if you're attacking it's a 
different thing.357 
For Ted Howson popular representations of soldiering have not had the effect of 
dictating his account, but have in fact motivated him to set the record straight. He 
acknowledges that in modern warfare things might have changed—'they can put it on 
automatic[…]they can do that [now]’—but even so has no qualms recognising that his 
experiences do not accord with popular representations. It cannot reasonably be 
claimed that there is a ‘discourse of the impracticability of firing a rifle on the move’ 
upon which Howson is able to draw: his view is determined simply by what he 
remembers, and no discomposure, aside from perhaps a level of annoyance, is evident 
in his decision to dispute what he has seen in films. This point may seem like an 
obvious one, but it is worth stating as a corrective to views in oral history which all 
too often tend to see popular discourses as the ultimate arbiter of all memory and all 
oral testimony. 
Where popular imagery is invoked, this is not necessarily because it has the effect of 
dictating personal memory. If this does sometimes happen, the alternative, that 
interviewees choose to draw on certain representations, must be kept in mind. They 
may do this because the representation provides a useful reference point shared with 
the speaker’s audience, even though he knows it is a flawed or inaccurate one. 
Alternatively, it may be that the representation is a genuinely useful one which 
supports rather than overwrites the individual’s own memories; one must be wary of 
357 Howson, 1, 47-49. 
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identifying apparent subjective distortions when a simpler explanation would be that 
the interviewee is giving an honest appreciation of how he remembers it actually 
being.358 The key point here is the process of composure is a complex negotiation in 
which the individual’s own point of view is worth at least as much as popular memory. 
There is little evidence here that popular memory has a hegemonic influence, that 
veterans simply parrot things they have seen in films or read in books which have 
replaced their own recollections. As Jay Winter has pointed out, ‘the fact that we share 
and acknowledge common mediators [of popular memory]’—like films—'does not 
prove that we share common memories’.359 
It is evident that the role of the individual in their own remembering is a crucial one; 
popular memory, as influential as it is, is never hegemonic, and rarely dictates 
remembering or overwrites personal memory. In many of the interviews analysed, 
therefore, the influence of popular memory appears limited. Composing a narrative of 
one’s experiences is at bottom a negotiation between external social and cultural 
influences and internal ones bound up with the individual’s unique experiences, 
outlook and character. Given the depth of popular consensus on the Second World 
War, it is these internal influences which must be seen as the major factor in the great 
range of interpretations which can be seen in the interviewees’ testimony, as the next 
chapter will demonstrate. 
358 Roos, ‘“Reality or Nothing”’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff (eds.), Trauma, p. 213. 
359 Winter, Remembering War, p. 185. 
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Chapter 4 
Personal Memory and Composure 
 
If popular memory delineates the boundaries of the interview discussions as being 
about the war, provides convenient reference points shared with the audience, and 
invests in the interviewees the authority as veterans to speak and be heard, it does 
little appreciably to influence the interviewees’ specific stories: the individual’s 
character, outlook and personal experiences are far more important in this regard. 
Despite living through the same war, with a stable, distinct and widely-understood 
collection of popular discourses to draw upon, the interviewees do not produce thirty-
three similar accounts. Instead, they present a variety of interpretations of their war 
experiences. Popular memory provides an overarching framework which is flexible 
enough to accommodate a wide variety of views, but only rarely did the interviewees 
appear to incorporate popular motifs directly into their testimony in the way various 
scholars have extensively remarked upon. Each individual approached the war from 
their individual perspective, and their accounts demonstrate great variation even when 
discussing the same issues. It is not possible to divide these myriad narrative 
strategies into neat categories, but some general similarities can be observed. 
Narratives of Disillusionment 
As noted in the previous chapter, it is clear that composure need not be completely 
successful for an account to be produced; discomposure is rarely total and more likely 
to encourage seeking composure through alternative discourses rather than 
repression and silence. Indeed, some even turn apparent discomposure into the basis 
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of their accounts, emphasising their experience as one of anger and disillusionment. 
The notion of military service as an experience inherently unknowable to outsiders is 
widely recognised, and some adopt this discourse as the main prop in their search for 
composure.  These individuals can be equated with those Jay Winter has termed 
‘moral witnesses’, those who ‘retain a sense of anger, of outrage, of frustration to the 
lies, distortions, reworkings, or sanitisations of their painful past’, actively and 
intentionally contradicting perceptions of war service as admirable or meaningful, and 
purporting to instead reveal the forgotten or suppressed ‘truth’.360  
Michael Watts, for instance, a pre-war regular who served in an armoured car crew in 
Egypt and Palestine, begins his account positively:  
ML: So, what would you be doing, as a bandsman, on a day-to-day 
basis? 
MW: You'd be playing music in the mornings, afternoon it was sport or 
in bed, because it was Egypt you see, and in the evening we used to 
have an hour's music...and that was it. And I mean the band, they were 
all fairly good sportsmen, and I played tennis always...enjoyed it, I 
enjoyed it, I never-, never thought we're ever gonna be in a war.361 
This image of contentment is quickly broken down. Watts’ enjoyable life in the pre-
war army was rudely interrupted by a war he hadn’t signed up for,362 and unlike 
wartime conscripts he was not consoled by the knowledge that military service was 
an unavoidable obligation. After extensive combat in the Western Desert, Watts was 
sent back to England and transferred to the Inns of Court Regiment. At this point, 
eager to avoid being sent into action as part of a unit he regarded as amateurish, he 
360 Winter, Remembering War, p. 263. 
361 Watts, 1, 01-02. 
362 Watts, 1, 28-29. 
129 
applied to train as a glider pilot.363 He landed gliders in Normandy and at Arnhem, 
where he was taken prisoner. His attempt to avoid further combat therefore not only 
failed, but resulted in the even worse fate of seven months in the dire conditions of a 
prisoner of war camp: 
MW: I think we had four days on the train, all we had was a bucket in 
the corner...And as sergeant, we used to get a bit of-, we used to get-, 
we used to call it 'skinny'. Came up in barrels, you know, the soup...we 
used to get that a twelve o'clock, a tin of that, 'cos we all had tins on 
strings, didn't have any knives or forks or plates or anything like that. 
And then you had a piece of bread and a bit of butter, five o'clock, and 
then you got nothing then till twelve o'clock the next day. So I got a bit 
thin, I was seventeen stone, now I was seven when I came back 
[laughs]. 
ML: And what did you do as a prisoner of war? 
MW: Nothing. We were all senior, we were sergeants and above, so we 
didn't work...we just sat and talked about food [laughs]. 
ML: And did you get information and parcels from home? 
MW: We got one parcel between sixteen in seven months. That's all we 
saw of parcels.364 
Resentment and disillusionment seep out of Watts’ account at every stage. At Arnhem 
he piloted the glider containing ‘Brigadier [Philip] Hicks and all his cronies’.365 In the 
camp, he heavily implies he was jealous of the private soldiers, who were forced to 
work, since they were presumably given better rations.366 On his return to England, 
he drew unfavourable comparisons with German prisoners: 
363 Watts, 1, 07. 
364 Watts, 1, 17-18. 
365 Watts, 1, 13. 
366 Watts, 1, 46. 
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ML: Is there anything you would want me to pass on to the students 
about anything during your time in the service, or your time on- at D-
Day or at Arnhem. 
MW: Not really. I can-, my wife said to me 'What did you do for clothing 
when you were a POW?', I said 'Well I had it on, same clothing, for seven 
months.' We never had a change of clothing...Came back to this country 
and there's the prisoners of war, all fit and healthy...[7]Can't believe 
it.367 
Watts’ experience was also contradicted by accounts closer to home: 
ML: What stopped you talking about it before? 
MW: I don't know, we never-, never spoke about it. My brother knew 
nothing about it. He went to Canada and trained Canadians, he...he had 
a good war. I think you wanted to forget it, completely. 
ML: And how do you feel now, looking back? 
MW: Oh, I'm very interested now, [I'm] watching some tapes...368 
It was not until the 1990s, and his involvement in veterans’ organisations, that Watts 
felt able to talk about his war,369 and even though he came to do so willingly, his 
account is still at bottom a story of disillusionment which stands in contrast with both 
the ‘good war’ experienced by non-combatants, and the positive stories of 
comradeship and stoic endurance told by many who saw front-line service. He draws 
upon various discourses, particularly the notion prevalent after the Vietnam War that 
military service was inherently and immutably exploitative and damaging to those who 
went through it. 
Winter is careful to point out that the claims of moral witnesses to provide an objective 
truth cannot hold water: ‘their stories are as much social constructions as are those 
367 Watts, 1, 44-45. 
368 Watts, 1, 21-22. Doug Mayman makes a very similar point: 2, 19-31. 
369 Watts, 1, 24-25. 
131 
they reject or rebuke’;370 however, he nonetheless supports the notion that ‘moral 
witnesses have a story to tell, but it is frequently one which is constructed as against 
the grain of conventional wisdom’ as not just a way of negotiating difficult memories, 
but in fact a morally justified reaction against sanitised narratives of the past.371 Yet 
the point bears emphasising that these men do indeed draw upon popular discourses 
to turn their discomposure into composure. This is because the notion that war service 
is disorientating, damaging and essentially unknowable is, in fact, well-established and 
widely recognised. If the personal experiences of these men are in themselves difficult 
to compose, a popular discourse exists which validates such accounts completely. Far 
from courageously going against the grain of public opinion, as Winter suggests, these 
men merely draw upon a different facet of it. 
Another interviewee who draws upon aspects of moral witnessing is Joe Ekins, a 
former tank gunner and loader/operator in the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry who 
frames his account largely in terms of poor training and leadership. Much of this vitriol 
is directed at superiors: in his opinion officers and generals did not know how to train 
or command their men because they themselves were poorly prepared. Ekins also 
recounts a distaste for army life, discipline and ‘bullshit’ which he did not believe to be 
constructive. He places emphasis on the dire conditions in Normandy and the poor 
level of information afforded to the tank crews.372 Several farcical incidents are 
recalled, including accidentally leaving behind a crew member during a march, 
becoming trapped in no-man’s land in the freezing winter conditions, and, after the 
370 Winter, Remembering War, p. 270. 
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German surrender, a wasteful exercise in the Zuider Zee which resulted in the pointless 
loss of several Buffalo amphibious vehicles, followed by a near-fatal case of diphtheria 
which threatened to strike Ekins down at the moment of his final escape from the 
army.373 All of these add to the idea of blundering and incompetence among the 
powers that be, and the sense that Ekins’ army service was a waste of time. Even 
wholly innocuous events are tinged with negativity, so that, for example, his 
regiment’s uneventful landing in Normandy provides an opportunity to mention the 
high rate of sinkings among American DD tanks.374 Moreover, he supports this view 
with several additional examples of command incompetence which he evidently could 
only have learned of after the war. His overall view is summed up in one statement: 
‘...you know, oh God we were terrible. The Germans must have been awful because 
we beat 'em, and how we beat 'em I never know.’375 Like Michael Watts, it took until 
the 1990s until Ekins felt able to discuss the war, and then only so that he could reveal 
‘the truth’: 
Ken Tout was in our regiment, you see, and he decided he were gonna 
write a book, and...he got in touch with me and said, 'look, I'm gonna 
write a book' and I said 'well are you gonna tell the truth' and he said 
'yes' I said 'right well alri-...you know I'll tell you the-, my bit then', so 
that's how it started, and of course once his book got out 
then...everybody wanted to get in on it, and...[5] I thought well alright 
if the story gets out and I always make the point how bad war is and 
what not, that it's worth...and if you talk to kids and what not it's worth 
doing, so I did, and of course since then it's, it's it's...gone apace, people 
give me-, I mean all these pictures...what people have given me, that 
one there at the back there, Totalize, and...[5] and of course all these, 
have you seen these? All these come out and there's the Canadian one 
and...they all come...again I try to end them, the bit that I put in I try 
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to...make a, you know...tell 'em what...I thought it were worth doing, to 
do that, and that's really when I started to...to talk about it...376 
Ekins’ account, by questioning positive interpretations and proffering a less palatable 
‘truth’, therefore appears to conform to the style of moral witnessing. 
There are other influences on Ekins’ achievement of composure, however, which 
demonstrate again the way that composure is an individual process predicated on 
individual circumstances. On 8th August 1944, during Operation TOTALIZE, Ekins, as 
the gunner in a Sherman Firefly, was responsible for the significant feat of knocking 
out three Tiger tanks. SS-Hauptsturmführer Michael Wittmann, recognised as one of 
the top-scoring German ‘panzer aces’ of the Second World War, was killed in his Tiger 
in the same engagement, and Ekins was for many years credited with having fired the 
fatal shot (more recently, Brian A. Reid has demonstrated that Wittmann’s Tiger was 
almost certainly knocked out by a Canadian Sherman of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers).377 
Ekins himself, however, never claimed to have killed Wittmann, and was conflicted 
about the attention focussed on one day’s battle by people who seemed more intent 
on furthering Wittmann’s cult status or claiming the prestige of killing the famous ace 
than exploring the real experiences of the combatants: 
…'course when they found out about Wittmann, all the lies started to 
come out, all the stories you know, like we...the Canadians claimed him, 
the Swiss [sic] claimed him, I mean I never claimed him, ever! All I 
claimed that I knocked out three Tigers...with one Firefly, which I 
thought were good enough you know without any of the...but all these 
stories started to get about and what not and...people kept coming to 
me and asking me about them…378 
376 Ekins, 1, 78-80. 
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It was this in particular which motivated Ekins to break his silence on the war and 
contribute to Tout’s book. He therefore had very personal reasons for adopting the 
corrective stance of a moral witness, and distancing himself from the anodyne, 
romanticised view of combat implicit in popular depictions of the events of 8th August 
1944. 
It was also as a reaction to the Wittmann incident that Ekins chose, unlike the majority 
of other interviewees, to talk at length on his post-war life. Some interviewees move 
beyond the narrative frame of the war in order to bring war experiences into line with 
broader narratives about personal success. However, for Ekins, this is done to create 
contrast with the war, and to emphasise his disinterest in Wittmann. He discusses his 
successful career as a shoemaker and later shoe designer, his happy family life, trips 
to Papua New Guinea, the achievement of a black belt in judo, and his relationship 
with a Belgian family he had met during the war.379 Ekins therefore had no motive to 
look back on the war as a positive part of his life; that came later. Instead, he came 
to see the war as a wasteful interlude in a successful life. Furthermore, discussing his 
post-war life served to emphasise his reticence about the death of Wittmann—there 
was more to his life than simply being the man attributed with unknowingly firing the 
shot that killed the famous Tiger ace. 
A final example of moral witnessing is seen in the testimony of Victor Gregg. Here, 
again, the decision to make use of this narrative form must be seen as a consequence 
of the individual’s mindset. His testimony cannot be understood separately from his 
379 Ekins, 1, 71-94. 
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well-established life story, published as a memoir co-written with filmmaker Rick 
Stroud in 2011.380 Indeed, the interview is effectively a tie-in for the book; Stroud is 
present, and the conversation becomes a thematic discussion of the book rather than 
the standard chronological progression through the war. The fact that Gregg’s life 
story is so well-established possibly prevents the interview from being as fruitful as it 
might have been had the interviewers felt able to take a more interrogative stance. 
His testimony is representative of the type of war narrative that arises out of memoir 
writing with an overt focus on the individual, especially when encouraged by popular 
historians and an undiscerning audience. The story leads from his upbringing in poor 
but vibrant surroundings in King’s Cross, through joining the Rifle Brigade, action in 
the Western Desert, including driving for the Long Range Desert Group and fighting 
in the ‘Snipe’ action at El Alamein, joining the Parachute Regiment and invading Italy, 
to parachuting into Arnhem and being captured. After sabotaging a soap factory he 
was condemned to death but escaped execution when he was caught up in the 
bombing of Dresden and escaped to meet the advancing Soviets. Gregg’s colourful life 
continued after the war, as he joined the Communist Party and was involved in 
shadowy errands at the behest of both the Soviet and British security services. Later 
he carried packages between East and West across the Iron Curtain, and in August 
1989, having become involved with the Hungarian Democratic People’s Forum, was 
one of a party who cut the frontier wire between Hungary and Austria. 
As Gregg is able to draw upon such a phenomenally eventful life, it is no surprise that 
the focus of his testimony is on his own larger-than-life character. If most veterans’ 
380 Victor Gregg and Rick Stroud, Rifleman: A Front-Line Life (London, 2011). 
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testimony seeks to explain the war, albeit through that individual’s personal 
perspective, his testimony seeks to explain Victor Gregg. The essential feature of his 
character, we are told in both the interview and the book, is a profound individualism 
and mistrust of authority. At times, Gregg himself prompts Lucas to question him on 
certain episodes which serve this persona, such as falsifying his paybook: ‘Ask me how 
much of a crook I was!’381 The war is held to have strengthened these characteristics, 
and this is where moral witnessing becomes apparent, as Gregg draws on various 
discourses around command incompetence, the wastefulness of war and its impact on 
the individual. As he writes:  
I knew nothing about the rules of ordinary society, a society not 
governed by the soldier’s constant awareness of the need for survival. 
There must have been any number of similar casualties among the men 
who had served their time in front-line units—men whose minds had 
been brutalised by the killing and the terror of modern war. And it is no 
different for soldiers today.382 
Gregg holds the war responsible for causing the personal flaws which continued to 
determine the course of his life: his inability to settle on one career, his neglect of his 
first marriage and his reckless acceptance of clandestine missions into the Eastern 
Bloc. It is witnessing the bombing of Dresden, rather than any experience directly 
linked to his military service, which is identified as the key cause of Gregg’s 
disillusionment. In his view, the destruction of Dresden was worse than any of his 
battles: ‘This was genocide, ordered by high-ranking politicians, not by the armed 
forces. For myself, I will never forgive them. Never.’383 Gregg takes on the outraged 
stance of moral witnessing because he is able to align it with his mistrust of authority, 
381 Gregg, 2, 131-139. 
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a theme which runs as a constant through his entire life story. At times hindsight is 
evidently necessary for this theme to be upheld. MARKET GARDEN, Gregg claims, was 
clearly going to fail from the outset: 
ML: And what were you expecting at Arnhem? 
VG: Expecting? Experience told me that the British Army never wins a 
battle without a big cock-up first, so...on that basis, yeah, we was 
expecting the worst. We knew jolly well what we-, we had raised our 
suspicions that the-, had the-, when they called us all in the hall and told 
us about it. How did they expect us to-, who expects us to walk through 
a...an inhabited area, an urban area, some seven or eight kilometres, in 
a day? Probably take a week! It's street fighting! 
ML: And had you had specific training on street fighting? 
VG: No! No, of course not! Didn't have no training, all you had [was] to 
use your loaf. The obvious thing to do was not to go through the streets, 
not to go through Nijmegen on the way to Arnhem, just go round the 
outside of it. But nobody ever thought of that. 
Rick Stroud: And there weren't the roads to do that, were there? I mean, 
they couldn't do that. 
VG: They thought, well, the first lot went by the river, went through a 
little track which led by the river, the pathfinders and people like that, 
who dropped on the first day, the very first lot to drop, they made it to 
the bridge. Of course it was the surprise of their...and the next thing 
they used their loaf and kept of the main road. But...I mean Model was 
no idiot. He'd seen it all before.384 
One suspects, however, that the flaws in the MARKET GARDEN plan and the talents 
of Generalfeldmarschall Model were less obvious to Gregg during the war. 
One of the advantages of oral history is its potential to elicit an account which is 
franker and less likely to have been restructured than written autobiography. While 
the book provides quite a one-dimensional assessment, there are indications in the 
384 Gregg, 2, 58-60. 
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less structured interview that Gregg’s search for composure was more complex than 
simply criticising authority, since he somewhat oxymoronically also displays a strong 
sense of pride in his former regiment, a disconnect which is evident from the very 
beginning of the interview: 
ML: Vic, can I ask you, when you first joined the Army, what was the 
training like, in this period before the war? 
VG: Repetitive, repetitive, repetitive...The training was...programmed to 
turn unruly youths and young men, with very little education, into what 
you would call people who would obey orders...without hesitation, in 
other words to turn you into some sort of automaton...[8] Later on I 
would describe it as a psychotic automaton...because if you say 
psychotic in fact you was being taught how-, efficient methods of killing 
people, I don't know what other phrase you would use, but you don't 
think of things like that, naturally. It wasn't brutal, I never came across 
a situation where the training was brutal...[5] but I think that was 
probably due to the...to the regiment that I served in...I've been present 
at instances in other regiments where I would certainly describe the 
training as brutal, but it wasn't so in the Rifle Brigade, different attitude 
entirely, so in that case, in that event, my introduction into army life 
was...not too bad at all, really.385 
If the training was morally suspect, designed by the powers that be to turn youths 
into trained killers, Gregg was exempted from the worst of this programming, because 
his regiment was special. This example highlights one of the potential benefits of 
interviewing: that by placing the veteran on the spot, and limiting the opportunities 
for complex feelings and opinions to be actively flattened out into a ‘tidier’ narrative, 
it is likely to produce a more candid and nuanced account than a written memoir.  
As is common, Gregg’s sense of regimental pride is bound up with what it means to 
be a ‘proper’ veteran, and while it is usual, as a frontline soldier, to separate oneself 
385 Gregg, 1, 00-02. 
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from the rear-echelon troops, Gregg goes further, and places his unit a step apart 
from even frontline infantry regiments: 
It's the difference between-, well as I said, Matthew, if you talk to a 
person who's been in the same situation as I have, and there's not a lot 
of them about, I gotta be truthful about that, you'll get the line of 
answers that I'm giving you. If you talk to another bloke, who's been in, 
say, different circumstances, you'll get a completely different...[4] 
completely different line of answers. I think what the...I don't know what 
the common-, if you was to say, well, what's the common denominator 
between the two experiences, I don't know...They've been away from 
home...That's the only-, that's all I can think of-, that's all I can think of 
here, I can't think of-, because there's no relationship between a really 
perpetual front-line unit and the majority of army units which are 
brought up to tackle a battle when it starts.386 
The insistence that his testimony is unique because his experience was almost unique 
is repeated several times.387 For Gregg, it is important to emphasise that his regiment 
was one of the only true frontline units in the army; an assessment which is somewhat 
ironic considering that Gregg spent much of the Western Desert campaign driving a 
truck far from the front line. Moreover, Gregg identifies the Rifle Brigade, along with 
the King’s Royal Rifle Corps, as originators of the tactical doctrine of the modern British 
Army: 
To learn about the life of a British soldier in the Second World War, 
you've really come to the wrong bloke, because the vast majority of 
British soldiers were in-, were under the control-...Well because I 
considered that the regiment that I was in, I was lucky enough to serve 
in, was a unique regiment, not only in what they achieved, but in their 
method-, in the methods which they used to keep the regiment going. 
It was definitely unique, and thankfully that is being transmitted now 
right through the Army, right through the Rifles, which they turned into. 
The vast majority of the British soldiers were in a different sort of 
situation entirely. We never had to fix bayonets and go forward, that 
wasn't our job...or 'fix swords' as we would have put it. So what you're 
386 Gregg, 2, 128-129. 
387 Gregg, 2, 13-14, 72-74. 
140 
looking at now, well what you're asking questions about, is a...a small 
band of...of soldiers who were in a rather unique regiment, because 
there was no other regiment like it, as far as the way they...the way 
they...effected their discipline.388 
Gregg thus places his experience in the history of a regiment which, he argues, had a 
central role in the development of the Army from the Napoleonic period to the present 
day, and was uniquely innovative. It is this assessment which allows him to reconcile 
pride in his regiment with his wider mistrust of the power and authority which the 
Army otherwise embodied. Victor Gregg’s multifaceted search for composure is one of 
the more complex examples considered here, combining moral witnessing, regimental 
pride, various discourses around veterancy and soldiering, and, most important of all, 
his own maverick character. 
Narratives of Disorientation 
Other accounts parallel those of the moral witnesses, but differ since, rather than 
purporting to report a suppressed ‘truth’, they present the war as a chaotic event, 
equivalent to a natural catastrophe, which could only be endured, but not controlled 
or understood. Most veterans characterise events as beyond personal comprehension, 
especially when discussing combat, but certain individuals make this the main 
framework of their search for composure. In doing so they stress mutual assistance, 
including with erstwhile enemies and civilians, in the face of events which were larger 
than any individual. Geoff Young, for instance, presents himself as fully at the mercy 
of wanton and meaningless events with no ability to influence them. This may have 
had the potential to cause major discomposure; however, he is able to fashion a 
388 Gregg, 2, 16-17. 
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narrative by emphasising that, in such a terrible war, the best he could do was try to 
help others caught up in it. He was left out of battle during the fighting on Hill 112, 
for instance, so his memory of that battle is helping the wounded along with German 
medics.389 The crossing of the Rhine is described in similar terms, as he encounters 
some unprepared German militia who are disarmed, given biscuits and sent to safety; 
witnesses a family needlessly destroyed when they are caught in the crossfire; and 
then is forced to break regulations to try to save the life of a British soldier who had 
been accidentally shot.390 As the driver of a jeep, Young apparently spent more time 
than most dealing with the aftermath of combat; possibly it was his insulation from 
the very sharp end that permitted him to avoid the bitterness and hatred felt by many 
front-line soldiers, and regard even the enemy generously. As he met his wife in 
Germany Young seems to look back on his time there with some fondness, and his 
account concludes with a striking juxtaposition: 
ML: What overall, what motivates you, what keeps you there? You were 
saying obviously you don't think about running away but...why do you 
do what you do, what makes you stay, what makes you fight, what 
makes you...? 
GY: Well, we thought, if we'd been-, if the Germans had have won, what 
was going to happen to us, that's the only thing that...Whether they 
would have been any worse than they were, I don't know...And we must 
remember there was always some good Germans about, more so 
probably than you think, a lot were...not Nazis at all. That's the only 
thing I think-, that I can really remember about...I got on very well with 
the German children in her village, they used to support me in the 
football. Quite amazing, to go out in Germany to play and you had fifty 
or sixty youngsters following you, my company team actually. And we 
even took them on our coaches-, our lorries, into Celle when the big 
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teams came over, they came in with us, we took them in there to see 
the matches.391 
Young’s view that most participants in the war were victims is demonstrated as he 
points out that most German soldiers were not Nazis, and parallels them with the 
innocent children. The moral, in spite of his obviously disturbing experiences, is that 
there were good deeds to be observed even in incredibly trying circumstances which 
nobody could control. 
Bill Edwardes frames his account in a similar way to Young’s, though he struggles to 
maintain the same level of positivity. He is frank about the level of strain endured as 
a stretcher-bearer, with minimal ability to influence events but an especially strong 
obligation to do whatever the situation demanded: 
…when you got back in your hole and you sat down [after dealing with 
a casualty], then the shakes would start, and you'd look at each other 
and you'd say 'We don't wanna do that again', but the call comes and 
you do it again, because, again, I'm sure it's training, and I'm sure it's 
because you know somebody else is relying on you, but you've gotta do 
it, and you've gotta do it as best you can.392 
In the same way, ‘Some days were not active, some days were terribly active, so you'd 
never know what was going to happen, unless you were actually in a rest period.’393 
In spite of the strain, Edwardes evidently took pride in his work and could describe 
many aspects of his job at length. Such narratives of war as natural catastrophes in 
which all involved are victims are common currency in popular culture and thus offer 
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attractive frameworks for veterans who have difficulty demonstrating their personal 
agency but can present themselves as having focussed on helping others. 
That said, this was not the case for another medic, Harry Askew, who seems to have 
great difficulty composing a coherent account, possibly because he had difficulty 
coming to terms with witnessing so much death and injury in the large base hospital 
at Asnelles-sur-Mer. However, one anecdote seems to sum up the feelings of naïvety, 
cluelessness and isolation which characterise his memories of the war: 
When we got to Arromanches, they...they said, 'Anybody know anything 
about horses?' Like an idiot, put me hand up. They said, 'Well, there's a 
horse round the back, and a cart. We want you to go to-, about two 
miles away'...water, for a water tank, I think it was. Anyhow I got 
halfway there and I could hear these tanks coming, and they started 
coming and it was a narrow road, and I tried to...get on the side, 'course 
and the wheels were fitting like that, and the bloody horse and cart went 
over, in the middle of the bloody road! And this Army captain or 
whatever he was called me...everything under the sun to get it up. I said 
'I can't get it up, I've tried.' Anyhow he had to get some of his men, and 
they got it up again. I was on my own on that...that do.394 
 
Narratives of Personal Success 
Many, however, can make more sense of their own actions in the war. If moral 
witnesses and those who employ narratives of chaos generally argue that the war had 
a negative and damaging effect on their lives, others are able to incorporate the war 
into more positive narratives of personal development. Edwin Hunt, for instance, 
relates his success in the army to skills gained in civilian life as a waterman on the 
river Thames, opening the interview with an enthusiastic account of utilising ‘shearing’ 
394 Askew, 1, 12-14. 
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during a pontoon bridge-building exercise, a performance which earned him his first 
promotion.395 The interview is mostly a description of his rise through the ranks of the 
Royal Engineers from sapper in a territorial field company to major advising on river-
crossing operations at Second Army headquarters. After the war, he returned to 
London and lectured in watermanship, eventually being appointed Royal Waterman 
and serving as Queen’s Bargemaster from 1978 to 1990. Thus, the war is an important 
part of Hunt’s extremely successful career, and the emphasis throughout the interview 
on the skills involved in his work brings his wartime experiences into line with his life 
as a whole. Likewise, the construction of the bridge over the Maas at Gennep—the 
longest floating Bailey bridge of the war—acts as a focal point both of Hunt’s wartime 
achievements and his post-war reminiscence; an achievement to be proud of at the 
time, as well as one he felt gratified to see still remembered when he returned to 
Holland.396 His account is not free of troubling passages, but it is generally positive. 
Hunt draws primarily upon his personal success, rather than popular discourses, to 
validate his narrative of the war. 
Another interviewee who bases his composure on personal success is Bill Partridge; in 
his case, specifically his proficiency as a soldier and an instructor. Early in the interview 
he explains how he was personally concerned with improving the quality of training: 
‘...the training in the very early days, and there were no manuals, was so bad that, 
they just had to be better, and I had to do my bit towards it.’397 This foreshadows his 
success as an NCO and sometime platoon commander in Normandy and as an 
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instructor after being wounded, which is strengthened by unflattering comparisons 
with various officers and planners. Partridge is unusually honest about his own modes 
of thinking, both during the war, when he could apparently be impatient and intolerant 
of mistakes, and in retrospect—‘I'm so quick in criticising people when I shouldn't 
be’398—but his outspokenness is an important part of his sense of self as an expert 
soldier, which grants him authority to speak about the war. This identity does not 
require Partridge to purport that he relished the experience, and he freely admits that 
he found it personally preferable, as well as probably a better use of his talents, to 
teach recruits rather than continue to lead a platoon in action.399 
Spatial and temporal distortions, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, can also 
support individual searches for composure; this is demonstrated by Partridge’s 
description of being wounded during 43rd Division’s crossing of the Seine at Vernon: 
Our leading section...they were held up by machine-gun fire on the other 
side of a garden wall, so...I said we'll get the PIAT, and if it'll blast a hole 
in a tank it'll blast a hole in a garden wall, make it very uncomfortable 
for the machine gunners on the other side...So I thought what's all this 
anyway about being shot at, I'll go and have a look for myself. So I go 
round the corner, and the guy shoots at me. Now in the meantime, Major 
Garner had come up to me, and...so I said to him, you know, 'What are 
you doing this far forward? It's just letting you get killed, and then what's 
gonna happen to D Company, they'll go all to pieces just 'cos they 
haven't got a company commander. You've got no business being this 
far forward', I says, I mean he was new and I was an old hand at 
that...[inaudible 4] Well I couldn't really care less whether he came out 
of the 4th Wilts or not. So...I'd already been shot at...no, I hadn't been 
shot at, so I left him, I went round the corner, and I was shot at. So I 
turned around, and he hadn't really gone very far, so I decided to 
[inaudible], you see. Every time you gone round this corner you get shot 
at, I was trying to drive on together and he shouldn't be so far forward. 
Of course the guy shot again, and he was a better shot that time. So the 
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next thing I knew I was being dragged out of the line of fire by Major 
Garner, with my heels bumping along...along the ground...and got great 
difficulty in breathing. He'd smashed a couple of ribs. So...and 
that's...well, yeah, that's really the end of my fighting career.400 
Evidently, Partridge pieces together his narrative of the incident as he tells it; the 
effect is to emphasise that it was concern for the safety of Major Garner which caused 
him to stop after the first burst of fire and allow himself to be hit. However, another 
account of the incident is provided in Sidney Jary’s 18 Platoon: ‘Leading his platoon 
from the front, he rounded the corner into the narrow lane and was immediately hit 
by a burst of fire. Seriously wounded, he was rapidly removed by our stretcher-
bearers’.401 Although he presumably consulted other witnesses, and confirms Major 
Garner was in the front line at the time, Jary’s version is not necessarily any more 
reliable, as he was not a direct eyewitness and was also dependent on memory 
decades after the event; however, the difference is instructive. In Jary’s account, 
Partridge’s wounding was sudden and unlucky; in Partridge’s own account, he dallied 
and allowed himself to be hit due to an admirable desire to protect the newly-arrived 
major and preserve the command structure of the company—relating the incident to 
his own proficiency as a soldier. 
Narratives of Collective Success 
There is also a collective version of narratives of success and professionalism, 
particularly demonstrated by officers. Though most accounts touch on the matter of 
esprit de corps, officers’ narratives often exhibit rosy generalisations about the 
400 Partridge, 1, 70-72. 
401 Sydney Jary, 18 Platoon (Winchester, 1987), p. 24. Emphasis added. 
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indomitable stoicism or cheerfulness of the men, while neglecting to devote much 
attention to what the individual personally did, which reflects their actual concerns at 
the time: ‘The recollections of old soldiers correspond very closely to the different 
perspectives of their age and rank at the time of the combat they are describing’.402 
For officers, attending to their men offers a consistent theme for their accounts, a 
reason for pride (in their personal and collective performance) and perhaps, at times, 
a way to avoid dwelling on their personal responses to difficult situations. In this way, 
Mike Hutchinson aligns his personal actions during the fighting on Hill 112 with those 
of his men: 
Now, I had quite a number of casualties going up, but you know I don't 
know what it was, I couldn't pay an awful lot [of] attention because we, 
I had to keep the men moving, and I had to keep on going forward. And 
so...but when I heard that somebody had been killed, I'm afraid I had 
to say, 'Oh dear, I'm sorry, but I've got to go on'. And the men were the 
same. One of their pals would get killed by the side of him, and he'd 
probably make him comfortable if he could, and then...but he had to go 
on. And...nobody actually...broke down, as they say. Nobody sort of 
gave up and said, 'Oh, I can't go on'. It was incredible spirit. The men 
just knew that they had a job to do. And they all, they all did it 
together.403 
Hereward Wake interprets open questions as referring to his whole unit, rather than 
himself personally.404 Mike Dauncey also talks with great relish about the bond he 
formed with his men while training in the Cheshire Regiment, and even though his 
main war experience was as a glider pilot at Arnhem, which was more of an individual 
402 McManners, Scars of War, p. 136; Hutchinson, 3, 04, 16-17, 62-63; Wake, 1, 05. 
403 Hutchinson, 3, 12, 19-21. 
404 Wake, 1, 38, 40-43. 
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rather than a collective experience, he doggedly refers back to his formative 
experiences in the Cheshires several times.405 
Officering also shapes Sir Robert Ford’s account. Famous for commanding British 
forces in Northern Ireland at the time of the Bloody Sunday Massacre in 1972, he may 
have appreciated the opportunity to talk about his Second World War experiences 
instead. However, he provides a very broad overview with little in the way of specific 
incidents or experiences. The main focus is on his entire unit’s campaign experience, 
especially in terms of morale and logistics—aspects which, whatever his views during 
the war, he must have gained an appreciation of during a post-war career in which he 
eventually became Adjutant General. On the matter of medical treatment, for instance, 
Ford loudly announces his views: 
Normally there- within reach there was...a medical...attendant, that 
would be-, probably be a trooper, who was trained, and the casevac 
system was wonderful, actually, it really was. I mean, that was the one 
thing which the British army had learned, that to keep morale up, you 
must have a system [increases in volume] which everyone knows is first 
class. If you are wounded, you will be looked after in the best possible 
condition and as quickly as possible, and we all knew that, we had 
lectures on this before we went, part of our training of course was all 
this, I didn't mention any of that because there was so much training, 
so many aspects of life...[returns to normal volume] health and all the 
rest of it we had to be taught about and hear about.406 
These points are well-explained and instructive, though Ford’s personal view of the 
war remains something of a mystery. He devotes scant attention to his first six months 
in the ranks, simply stating it was ‘fine, and a very interesting experience’,407 perhaps 
405 Dauncey, 1, 15. 
406 Ford, 3, 15. 
407 Ford, 1, 02. 
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because his work as an officer better befits his sense of self. With few exceptions, his 
campaign is described as a collective experience. 
Another account displaying the understatement and sanitisation typical to officers’ 
testimony comes from Sir Hugh Beach, probably encouraged by the fact that as an 
engineer he was relatively isolated from the front line. His, however, is essentially an 
individual story, and draws particularly on a self-image of youthful exuberance and 
insouciance towards danger which is something of a cliché among the veterans:  
HB: …at that stage one regards oneself as invulnerable...oddly. 
ML: So it would never cross your mind that you would end up either 
being killed, or wounded as you were? 
HB: Yeah, well I mean, if you'd asked me, 'In theory, do you think you'll 
end this campaign alive?', I'd only have said 'Well I hope so', you know, 
and theoretically one realised because I mentioned the conversation 
earlier where you said 'Half of us won't get back', so...theoretical, but 
you know you regard yourself as, 'Won't happen to me'. It's odd 
psychology. Probably only happens to young people, I think the older 
you get the more...the more you become cautious and frightened and 
so on.408 
Having joined a field company with substantial experience in North Africa and Italy, 
‘all I can say is that I felt very small’,409 and accordingly the campaign is described 
through a series of anecdotes which invariably involve Beach being stripped of any 
heroic preconceptions—by having to share a slit trench with a dead cow, for 
instance410—or foolishly courting danger. At Mont Pinçon: 
…the infantry advanced, and when they got up to the crossroads they 
wanted their anti-tank guns, and my job was to lead a little party of 
sappers to clear the mines up to the-, up to the crossroads, and they did 
408 Beach, 1, 28. 
409 Beach, 1, 04. 
410 Beach, 1, 07-08. 
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so, and the first vehicle advanced and promptly went up on a mine. So 
there was a bad moment. So I took my life in my hands, and simp-...I 
sat myself down on the mudguard of the next vehicle and said, 'Drive 
on', ha! So we succeeded, but-...well, we succeeded.411 
All these anecdotes are delivered light-heartedly and accompanied by Beach’s 
distinctive guffaw at regular intervals. In the inevitable climax of the story, though, he 
receives his comeuppance. At the Belgian border, Beach reports, he unwisely picked 
a fight with a German patrol, was shot through the spine—'which was not a good 
moment’—and was lucky to be dragged to safety and subsequently recover.412 
Intriguingly, in describing his rescue and evacuation, having finally fallen foul of the 
war’s dangers and been disabused of his innocence, Beach shifts his perspective to 
that of an outsider looking in on events (quite unlike, say, Bill Partridge, who describes 
the painful process, like every other part of his active service, in all its gory detail).413 
Recounting his own naïvety seems to be important in Beach’s achieving composure, 
helping him to rationalise his decisions and distance himself from the more disturbing 
aspects of his experience. 
Narrating Non-Combat Roles 
Several of the interviewees, although they belonged to a ‘fighting arm’, served in 
supporting roles which largely insulated them from the dangers of front-line combat. 
Although memories of rear-echelon experiences abounded after the war, and arguably 
‘swamped the recollections of those who had endured the worst of times’,414 oral 
history interviewing still focusses overwhelmingly on combat veterans, marginalising 
411 Beach, 1, 09-10. 
412 Beach, 1, 15-18. This incident is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
413 Partridge, 1, 72-79. 
414 Ellis, ‘Reflections on the “Sharp End” of War’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, pp. 14-15.  
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more comfortable experiences. Robert Purver and Ted Howson both belonged to the 
5th Royal Berkshire Regiment, which formed part of No. 8 Beach Group, providing 
logistical assistance for the Canadian landings on Juno Beach. Both men later saw a 
great deal of front-line service, especially after they were transferred to the 5th 
Wiltshires, and neither, therefore, feels a need to focus much attention on their 
logistical work, other than stressing its monotony or noting the more interesting parts 
like guarding prisoners.415 
Others can claim no real combat experience. While these individuals appear happy 
that in their indispensable supporting roles they had ‘done their bit’, they nonetheless 
face the problem of aligning their experiences with popular notions of what constitutes 
a veteran, a status which usually assumes combat experience. In this, they 
demonstrate the way popular memory provides frameworks in which individual 
memory must fit. 
Denis Laws, for instance, worked as a Royal Engineers tradesman producing metal 
parts at a workshop behind the lines. He was motivated to enlist, despite being exempt 
from conscription, because he felt that he wasn’t ‘doing his bit’. As Juliette Pattinson 
has pointed out, many reserved workers felt dissatisfied with a societal position that, 
although it was fully affirmed by official propaganda, denied them the masculine 
prestige attached to military service: ‘Their desire to serve in uniform in a combatant 
role superseded the state’s avowal of their value.’ For example, twenty-eight of the 
fifty-six men interviewed for Pattinson’s study attempted to enlist in the armed forces; 
415 Purver, 1, 09-10; Howson, 1, 02, 29-30. 
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only six were successful.416 Laws was one of the relative few who managed to escape 
their reserved occupation, although, as noted in the previous chapter, he finds his 
motives somewhat illogical and difficult to explain in the light of modern attitudes to 
war and patriotism.417 
Laws is reticent about emphasising the importance of his war service and suggests 
several times throughout the interview that he is the wrong person to be questioning. 
From the beginning this uncertainty is established as the key theme of Laws’ account, 
as he establishes an ironic note when comparing his civilian and army work: 
DL: ...and I managed to get out of me apprenticeship and I volunteered. 
Well all I did was to go from one workshop, and I went in the Royal 
Engineers, and I finished up in another workshop, with a uniform on 
[laughs]. 
ML: And when was this, what year did you join up, what year did you 
volunteer? 
DL: 1943, and...from then onwards I was a-...in a army workshop, 
and...I went over to France, but...see I never saw any fighting, not real 
fighting. We got bombed a bit and shelled a bit, but apart from that you 
know, it was...it was almost like civvy street, in uniform.418 
Despite making the effort to contribute to the war effort in a more direct way, Laws 
was foiled by the army bureaucracy which assigned him a job largely indistinguishable 
from the one he had just left—he was still just making things for the army, and, as a 
non-combatant, could not fully claim the prestige of military service. In the end, the 
reality of his relatively comfortable position, largely free from both danger and 
overbearing discipline, must be acknowledged: 
416 Pattinson, ‘British Civilian Masculinity’, p. 717. 
417 Laws, 2, 00-01. 
418 Laws, 1, 00. 
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DL: ...and I...I can't say that...In fact I suppose really and truly, I...really 
well enjoyed myself, the weather was nice, I had a nice lorry, workshop, 
you know, lathe and everything, and...nice and dry, had a generator, I 
mean...it was...The thing was, I mean...if you did your job, and they let 
you...I was virtually left alone, you know...We had NCOs and that but 
they were all working as well. I mean we had staff sergeants that were 
still working. I think the only one that didn't work were the warrant 
officer and the captain. He were just driving around in his car all day. 
He must have a had a right-...chasing the women I think, he was. I 
heard before the war he was a salesman in a car sales room, but mind 
you he was easy to get on with, so I couldn't complain. 
ML: So what would a normal day be, what's your day-to-day activities, 
what would you be doing? 
DL: In the war? 
ML: In the-, yep, in the workshop, what are you gonna be-, what were 
you doing? 
DL: Well, you just...got up...When they...gave you a shout, you got up, 
you had a wash and a shave and...you went and got a bit of breakfast 
at the...cookhouse. You used to get your bacon and fried bread [laughs], 
you know, they had the bacon in tins and everything, and...and then I 
used to go into the workshop, my workshop that I had, and...if I was 
unlucky somebody, a sergeant, would come along and said 'We can't get 
a spare for this, can you make it?', and I'd get some metal and...and see 
if I could make it, you know, and...that was virtually it, you know, and if 
no-one come along I made a cigarette lighter [laughs].419 
The same anxiety about dishonestly claiming the status of veteran is also evident in 
the testimony of Frank Duckett, also of the Royal Engineers, who was engaged in 
battlefield clearance work. He tries, and fails, to align his experience of landing in 
Normandy with well-known images of the assault troops splashing ashore through the 
surf:  
ML: So when did you land in France? 
419 Laws, 2, 05-07. 
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FD: About D plus...at the end of June...We landed on the Mulberry 
harbour, we didn't...there was no jumping in the sea...420 
Duckett landed too late to have landed on ‘D plus something’, and by arriving at Port 
Winston missed out on the iconic experience of wading onto the beach. Later in the 
interview, he is careful to point out that his ‘was quite an easy job really’.421 At the 
same time, however, he does make an effort to explain that the work he was doing 
was worthwhile, and ‘quite interesting really’.422 Denis Laws employs the exact same 
phrasing concerning the bridging of the Rhine, which he was involved in, noting that 
‘it was quite interesting’,423 apparently with the same motive: to persuade the listener 
that it was not only the front-line soldiers who were involved in important work. 
Aside from defending the importance of their work, a narrative strategy especially 
prevalent among these men is to emphasise their soldierly credentials in order to claim 
membership of the veterans’ club. Barry Freeman, a private in the 1st Worcesters, was 
trained as an infantryman but assigned to drive a half-track into Normandy. On 
landing, however, his half-track was immediately commandeered, and Freeman was 
reassigned to a static job guarding a Canadian logistical unit.424 In order to explain 
such chaotic events while asserting his identity as a soldier, he combines three 
narrative frameworks: portraying the war as an uncontrollable phenomenon, as 
described above; stressing the arbitrariness of military organisation and his own 
unsuitability and discomfort as a soldier (the rough language used in the Army seems 
420 Duckett, 1, 03. 
421 Duckett, 1, 09. 
422 Duckett, 1, 04-06. 
423 Laws, 2, 09. 
424 Freeman, 1, 06-09. 
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to have made a particular impression and is mentioned several times); and 
emphasising the level of danger he was in. His account is worth quoting at length: 
...And...nothing much happened and then they came to me one day and 
they said, 'We understand you...understand water treatment', which I 
did, I'd done a little course. So they said, 'Well, you're still with the other 
three chaps guarding the unit', he said, 'but you're also in charge of the 
unit water truck'. So...they said, well he said, 'You must go out now and 
get that truck filled up with water, because we haven't got much'. So I 
said, 'Well where do I have to go?', and...'Oh', he said, 'It's only up the 
road'. He said, 'Go up the road onto the Bayeux-Caen road', and he said, 
'You'll find it up there'. Well, being nineteen, very gullible, I did exactly 
what he said, and I got onto the Bayeux road and there was no sign of 
a water point or anything to do with water at all. And I decided that 
there was a lot of heavy gunfire in front of me in the Bayeux area, but I 
think Bayeux had fallen by that time, I can't be sure about that, but 
there was a lot of our troops around and there was a...a first aid 
marquee at the side of the road and I went in there and there was a 
load of casualties in there. Anyway they said, 'Well we don't know 
anything about water', he said, 'but if you go any further you'll be blown 
to pieces'. So I didn't fancy that idea at all, so...I turned round and went 
back down the road for about half a mile.  
I thought, 'Well I've still not got any water', but on the right-hand side 
of the road the ground fell away down into a shallow valley, and I sort 
of thought, 'Well there might be water down there', because there was 
pumps on the water truck, you could pump water in. So I turned down 
this road, and I'd only gone two or three hundred yards, and I could see 
some of the-, our lads lying on the bank at the side of the road. And the 
next thing I heard on the other side of the vehicle, a sergeant came, he 
was banging on the side of the door. So I spoke to him, and he said, 
'Are you trying to commit suicide?'...[I was] nineteen years old, 
absolutely green. He said, 'If you go any further', he said, 'you'll run right 
into the Germans, and there's a Spandau down there'. He said, 'You'd 
better turn round and go back'. And I would emphasise at this point, he 
was speaking in the best army language that one could imagine. So I 
said, 'Well the road isn't wide enough to turn round, it's only a little 
track', sort of. He said, 'You back up the road, about ten, fifteen yards', 
and he said, 'There's a gap in the fence there and you'll find tank tracks 
into the field'. He said, 'You keep on the tracks and you can turn round', 
which I did. And just as I was starting to go back up the road I heard a 
thumping like you may thump the table, three or four times. I didn't 
know-, have a clue what it was. Anyway, long and short of it I went back 
to the camp where we were and I said, 'I can't find the water', and once 
again the chap in charge of the cook's wagon, he had a few more nice 
army words to say to me. But...he said, 'Where'd you get shot at?'. I 
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said, 'I don't get shot at'. And he said, 'Well go round the back, have a 
look at the wagon'. And on the back of the tank is a steel cupboard, and 
you could see, I think it was about four or five dents where I'd been hit 
by Spandau fire, so of course I then realised once again, there's a war 
on here!425 
Thus, Freeman’s first day on the mundane job of driving a water truck is turned into 
chaotic, confusing and death-defying excursion. Freeman continues to stress the level 
of danger he was in while describing the advance through France and Belgium after 
the Normandy breakout: 
It was constant driving, backwards and forwards and...the long range 
artillery was always trying to have a go at us, you see, and trying to 
block the road. Well they did once or twice. But their shooting wasn't all 
that accurate. But...the vehicle that I was driving...was hit several times 
by shrapnel. I was so lucky it never got me in the cab.426 
While the majority of the interviewees describe this advance as an easy period, and a 
relief from the dire conditions in Normandy, Freeman describes it as the most 
dangerous period of his war. As well as the long-range artillery fire, he also 
participated in hunts for snipers left behind by the retreating Germans, and spends 
much time discussing these:427 
...In a little Dutch village, don't know where it was...no I don't know 
where it was, but...Once again there was a sergeant who was very, very 
clever. I can't remember which unit he came from now, but he was an 
infantryman...with us. Can't remember...and I can't remember the 
village either, but the village was a T shape, the main road, if you can 
call it that, which would be less than a B-road as we know now, went 
off up the road, and the-, our unit stopped on the hill above, of all places, 
bloody stupid place to stop. Anyway they...they, I think one of the 
people, yeah that's right. Being on the hill they were silhouetted, and 
one of the snipers got one of the chaps, sergeant he was, and...killed 
him, so of course they got...got us infantry blokes and said 'Well the 
shot came from down in that village'. So we went back down, four or 
425 Freeman, 1, 10-16. 
426 Freeman, 1, 29-30. 
427 Freeman, 1, 20-24. 
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five of us. There was a couple of the ordnance people came with us. 
But...as we went down this road, bear in mind it's a very narrow road, 
little cottages, terraced houses, and about...halfway through the village 
was a T-road, well it was a-, went into a little square on our right-hand 
side. And there was a...an old woman in one of the houses, and she 
came out and pointed into the corner of the square, and from what we 
could make out that's where the snipers were...that's right. So we went-
, I was in front of our three, and I knelt down on my right knee, 'cos I 
was a left-handed shot. And I'd got the rifle poking round the corner 
ready to fire at these windows, but another shot came from somewhere, 
I don't know where it was, and it hit me on the knee. And...it was...it 
was quite painful. It only skimmed my kneecap, which was-, I was very, 
very lucky, but it just peeled the skin back off the kneecap and you could 
see the bone of the knee, but I was...I was in great pain over that, and 
they dragged me back from the corner of this building and they carried 
me back up to the camp. And...the funny thing was, there was no blood 
from this wound, none at all hardly, and they...I think it was the chap in 
charge of the stores, he came down and bound me leg up, you know, 
and that was me finished for a day or two.428 
Undoubtedly, the sniper hunts were some of Freeman’s most memorable and 
interesting experiences, and justify inclusion in his testimony for that reason; but they 
were also his main claim to the prestige of being a combat infantryman, especially 
since he was wounded in the process, and he eagerly returns to the subject later in 
the interview.429 
Non-combatants therefore employ seemingly contradictory narrative strategies, 
acknowledging their privileged position of relative comfort and safety at the same time 
as attesting to the importance of their work, their proximity to danger and their right 
to share in the veteran identity. There is ultimately, even among rear-area troops a 
notion that their war service was something important and unique, which sets them 
apart from others. Like the rest, they imply distance between the fighting front and 
428 Freeman, 1, 24-28. 
429 Freeman, 2, 02-06.  
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the home front. Despite downplaying the importance of his own war work, Denis Laws 
still participated in commemorations and is scathing about those he perceives as 
dishonestly claiming the prestige afforded to veterans: 
DL: ...and we used to go over round about the June the sixth time, 
or...and...they always have celebrations through the town there, every 
year now. The trouble was that, they used to get quite a few Americans 
come over but when we were there a few years back there was a lot of 
yobbos dressed up in uniform and pretending to be soldiers. They 
weren't, and I-, I felt 'I don't want to get involved with this', so we...we 
normally used to leave before the June the sixth, but...a nice little town 
that, Saint-Mere-Eglise [sic], and...we used to normally spend a day or 
two there, before we set off down to...perhaps down to the...Perigord 
or somewhere, but...I couldn't understand these young fellas, they 
weren't ex-soldiers, they were just yobbos, dressed up in army surplus, 
pretending. 
ML: I've seen them. 
DL: And yet they were getting away with it.430 
The ironic contrast between front-line combat and cushy life in the rear echelons seen 
in non-combatants’ testimony can also be utilised by some who saw the most intense 
combat. After enlisting in February 1942 Luis Dimarco, a radioman in the Headquarters 
Company of 1st Parachute Battalion, spent more than two years preparing for a period 
in the front line which ultimately lasted only nine days. Unlike most combat formations, 
which spent months in fighting that ranged from low to high intensity, the 1st Airborne 
Division experienced combat which was comparatively much more intense but much 
more brief; this was especially true for Dimarco, who had avoided most of his unit’s 
previous battles in North Africa and Italy. He arrived too late in Algeria to take part in 
the initial drops, missed the fighting in Tunisia as he was travelling by train with the 
430 Laws, 4, 02-04. 
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battalion’s baggage, and was unable to drop on Sicily as his plane had to turn back 
due to engine trouble. He arrived in Italy at Taranto by ship, where enemy resistance 
was minimal, and there was the opportunity for training and relaxation before the 
battalion was withdrawn to England. He thus provides a series of anecdotes which 
present the period of training as an enjoyable one of amusing japes, drunken 
escapades with his mates, womanising and stretching the limits of his officers’ 
tolerance for minor breaches of discipline, while his arrival in the Mediterranean was 
marked by monotonous camp life, plentiful rations, swimming in the sea and more 
drinking—the stuff of the rear-echelon’s ‘good war’, not the front-line fighting of 
combat units. 
This was all to change when the 1st Airborne landed at Arnhem on 17 September 1944. 
At this point, Dimarco’s testimony becomes a minute-by-minute account of his actions 
at the battle of Arnhem which lasts for more than an hour and is unusual in several 
ways. The narrative clearly becomes more disjointed. He evidently places much 
importance on recollecting his movements correctly, and expresses frustration that 
there are gaps in his memory.431 However, to have such a brief period to recall is a 
comparative luxury, as most cannot recall the numerous days of fighting which made 
up their war service in anything like as much detail. This preoccupation with providing 
a precise narrative may be an attempt to add a dispassionate aspect to a traumatic 
event. It is evident that in his short period in action Dimarco failed to come to terms 
431 Dimarco, 1, 62; 3, 108-110. 
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with casualties; while most eventually adopted a philosophical acceptance of losses, 
his attitude was to attempt to forget: 
ML: And when you thought about-, if you thought about Arnhem just 
after the war, is it the same, maybe because of lack of sleep, that it was 
disjointed, or...do you think it's now because of such a long time? 
LD: No, I don't think I-, I put it behind me, I don't think I-, you know, I 
was living my life, forget the war...It never stayed with me. Obviously, 
after Arnhem, it was with me for a while, obviously, but I...it soon went. 
I suppose again you push it out of your mind, and then over time it 
doesn't come back...[8]432 
Sticking to the emotionless facts may be one way of partially suppressing the 
disturbing aspects of remembering Arnhem. The contrast at the centre of Dimarco’s 
account is unusual, and again arises almost completely from his personal 
circumstances rather than popular memory. Unlike the other interviewees who 
enjoyed generally ‘good’ wars, Dimarco at no point feels the need to stress the 
importance of or danger inherent in the rear-area work he was doing. Instead, by 
stressing the amount of time he spent enjoying himself during the war, the battle of 
Arnhem is presented contrastingly as an intense experience which in the end more 
than earnt Dimarco his veteran credentials. 
The Importance of Individual Subjectivity 
The interviewees demonstrate a range of strategies for translating their memories into 
spoken accounts. All demonstrate subjectivity throughout, but it is not shared 
collective subjectivity, but peculiar individual subjectivity, which is most apparent. 
Although popular memory is thought to be crucial to the theory of composure, it seems 
432 Dimarco, 2, 02-03. 
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to be of limited influence here. It has the—arguably critical—effect of delineating the 
boundaries of the conversations, and respondents usually find it useful to align their 
memories with popular discourses. However, popular representations are rarely drawn 
on as directly as many oral historians have argued is common in other contexts. The 
interviewees demonstrate a range of different narrative strategies, some of which are 
seemingly dissatisfying, although by and large this does not inhibit the testimony, 
demonstrating Peniston-Bird’s point that ‘discomposure is a reflection of honesty, not 
dissemblance, of negotiation, not complicity. It is a reminder that the individual is the 
best authority on their own experience’.433 Moreover, the accounts are not informed 
primarily by popular memory, which is generally consistent, but by individual 
circumstances, experiences and character, which are much more varied. This explains 
why many of the same events and issues are discussed from many different 
standpoints, a fact that will remain evident throughout the rest of the thesis. Rather 
than repeating a shared understanding of the past, the interviewees seek to explain 
their own personal views of the past, often with the assistance of popular discourses, 
but sometimes without. This means that where the accounts do concur in spite of 
differing perspectives, this can be interpreted as enhancing the historical validity of 
the statements made. Before assessing the historical usefulness of the testimony, 
however, a further important influence on individual composure, trauma, must be 
assessed, and this is the subject of the next chapter.
433 Peniston-Bird, ‘Patriotism and the ‘People’s War’’, p. 78. 
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Chapter 5 
Trauma in Veterans’ Testimony 
 
In the popular imagination, soldiering and veterancy are inextricably linked with the 
psychological damage perceived to be an inevitable consequence of war experience. 
It is commonly claimed that war constitutes an experience wholly dissimilar in 
intensity, stress and horror to anything experienced in civilian life, ‘by far the most 
traumatic “life event” that any human can experience, a damaging combination of 
danger, uncertainty and horror’.434 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD] is a well-
known, albeit often misunderstood, condition.435 Any attempt to analyse veteran’s 
testimony must therefore confront the debates over trauma and its influence on oral 
accounts. 
Academic Approaches to Trauma 
It is surprising that such a well-known issue as trauma, subject to such a strong 
consensus in popular discourse, is so poorly understood in academic research. In oral 
history, which often examines those such as survivors of genocide, refugees, and 
soldiers, who are likely to have been traumatised, trauma has been an unavoidable 
subject but one which has largely defied objective understanding. Partly, this 
confusion is a reflection of the state of the psychiatric research. Psychiatrists, too, 
have found it extremely difficult to produce coherent explanations for traumatic 
syndromes: ‘It is because there is no Holy Grail or obviously right way of doing things 
434 McManners, Scars of War, pp. 2, 5; Winter, Remembering War, p. 62. 
435 Johnston, ‘Culture, Combat and Killing’, p. 260; Shephard, War of Nerves, p. xxi; Hautzinger and 
Scandlyn, Beyond Post-Traumatic Stress, p. 16. 
163 
that the subject [of military psychiatry] retains its interest and complexity.’436 
Nonetheless, it is concerning that major assessments of trauma in oral history struggle 
to properly define the term,437 while some scholars have cited such confusion as a 
reason to abandon it altogether.438 
This is not to say that trauma is uncharted territory for academics, ripe for exploration; 
on the contrary, the sociological and historical study of trauma is characterised by a 
concerning attachment to a ‘discourse of the unrepresentable’, in which ‘The idea that 
any narrative reflects lives experience is rejected as naïve’, and which brings into 
question the very possibility of discussing trauma.439 While the study of trauma from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards was essentially the study of war neuroses, the 
major focus since 1945 has been on survivors of the Holocaust,440 and it is this focus 
on Holocaust experience which has driven the idea that trauma cannot be 
communicated to the non-traumatised. Naomi Rosh White writes that ‘the Holocaust 
can never be written or spoken about directly…it is impossible to testify directly from 
inside the Holocaust world’, and ‘One is confronted with the implications of the limits 
of language’.441 It is unclear, this being the case, why scholars attempt to write about 
the Holocaust at all, or whether any experience can be knowable to others.442 As 
436 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. xvi. 
437 Selma Leydesdorff, Graham Dawson, Natasha Burchardt and T. G. Ashplant, ‘Introduction: Trauma 
and Life Stories’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff (eds.), Trauma, pp. 1-26. 
438 Tim Cole, for instance, uses the terms ‘difficult stories’ or ‘difficult pasts’ instead, although the 
adjective ‘traumatic’ seems to be too apt for him to avoid: see Cole, ‘(Re)Placing the Past’, pp. 30-49. 
439 James Berger, ‘Trauma and Literary Theory’, Contemporary Literature, 38/3 (1997), p. 573, 
quoted in Dodd, ‘Childhood “Trauma”’, pp. 39-40. 
440 Leydesdorff, Dawson, Burchardt and Ashplant, ‘Introduction’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff (eds.), 
Trauma, pp. 3-4. 
441 Naomi Rosh White, ‘Marking Absences: Holocaust Testimony and History’, in Perks and Thomson 
(eds.), Oral History Reader, First Edition, pp. 173-4.  
442 For a critique of such essentialist approaches see Evans, In Defence of History, pp. 213-215. 
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Joanna Bourke dryly notes, ‘The trope of unspeakability is always negated the moment 
it is uttered…By naming “trauma”, it is represented’.443 
Some have also chafed at the reverential approach imposed by the tendency to equate 
‘a traumatised person with a victim who is awarded a high moral authority’ or 
caricature perpetrators as ‘omnipotent demons, scarcely human’ while victims become 
‘single-dimensional cardboard cut-outs…relentlessly innocent’.444 Mark Roseman, 
having used letters, diaries and memoirs to identify inaccuracies and distortions in one 
survivor’s testimony, feels obliged to state that:  
where it is possible to compare survivor testimony with other sources, it 
is no disrespect to the survivors to do so. Such an exercise does not 
imply a wish to or an expectation of challenging the fundamental veracity 
of their testimony. On the contrary, it helps illuminate the very processes 
of memory which we are seeking to understand.445  
The Holocaust has, of course, its own discursive culture which encourages certain 
narratives, so that ‘what survivors originally attribute to the Holocaust often turns 
out—according to their own retelling—to have other life-historical roots, many having 
nothing to do with the genocide’,446 but much of Holocaust oral history is concerned 
more with deferentially reporting the ‘unrepresentable’ stories of survivors rather than 
analysing subjectivity in depth. 
443 Joanna Bourke, ‘Why History Hurts’, in Peter Leese and Jason Crouthamel (eds.), Traumatic 
Memories of the Second World War and After (London, 2016), pp. 285-6. 
444 Dodd, ‘Childhood “Trauma”’, p. 40; Bourke, ‘Why History Hurts’, p. 284. 
445 Roseman, ‘Surviving Memory’, in Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, pp. 230, 242. 
Original emphasis.  
446 Henry Greenspan, ‘The Unsaid, the Incommunicable, the Unbearable, and the Irretrievable’, The 
Oral History Review, 41/2 (2014), p. 231. 
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When the Vietnam War refocussed attention on the relationship between trauma and 
war, academic responses employed many of the same assumptions and drew many 
of the same conclusions as studies of the Holocaust: for instance, it was studies of 
concentration camp victims which first suggested  trauma was something which could 
have a delayed effect on entire groups of people,447 while critics of the war such as 
Robert Jay Lifton came to similar conclusions that ‘speaking about trauma may, in 
some cases, prove altogether impossible’.448 In Jay Winter’s view anything that 
renders war tolerable or ‘thinkable’ must be misleading, because war is always 
intolerable and unthinkable.449 In his formulation, there is a highly questionable 
tendency to treat war, combat, military service, repression, persecution and even 
genocide as phenomena which can be treated interchangeably in terms of morality, 
motivation and cause. Such conceptions risk downplaying the fact that, as Henry 
Greenspan has pointed out, ‘even within survivors’ anguish, there is a great range of 
different agonies that may or may not be bearable to recall and thus retell, for different 
survivors, at different times.’450 In another recent study, Lindsey Dodd notes to similar 
effect that while ‘individual responses to trauma depend on the context of the 
traumatic event and its interpretation’, current understandings of trauma tend to 
negate individual subjectivity and establish ‘a set of structures for remembering which 
exclude individuals whose experiences fall outside the grid’.451 However, these recent 
acknowledgements of the range of possible reactions to trauma remain relatively 
447 Shephard, War of Nerves, pp. 359-61. 
448 Leydesdorff, Dawson, Burchardt and Ashplant, ‘Introduction’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff, Trauma, 
p. 13. 
449 Winter, Remembering War, p. 238-9. 
450 Greenspan, ‘Unsaid’, p. 239. Original emphasis. 
451 Dodd, ‘Childhood “Trauma”’, p. 39. 
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underdeveloped in comparison with the ‘discourse of the unrepresentable’. It is still 
the case that ‘much of conventional discussion of these issues reduces to some version 
of “trauma” making retelling either impossible or allowing it only in emotionless 
“depersonalised” ways [whereas] the actuality is enormously more complex’.452 
Moreover, approaches drawn from Holocaust studies may function in that context but 
are not necessarily applicable to war veterans. Dori Laub frames the process of 
narrating trauma as a search for closure, in which the victim can ‘re-externalise’ the 
event and re-evaluate it:  
The victim may have felt personally responsible for the traumatic event, 
or guilt over it having happened. Re-externalisation means that one 
“puts it back into the outside world where there is a perpetrator who 
one has not provoked, and who has carried out the atrocity, and should 
be held responsible and guilty for it”…There can be anger directed at 
the perpetrator, and no sense of guilt or responsibility for having taken 
part in it.453 
This model simply cannot be transferred to traumatised soldiers, who are unavoidably 
active participants in the violence of combat,454 usually willingly out of a sense of self-
preservation and obligation to comrades, and who, if they refuse to participate and 
truly act as passive victims, risk shame and guilt at shirking their duty.455 Current 
conceptions of trauma allow too little space for the fact that ‘perpetrators may also be 
traumatised’,456 and this may, in fact, be an important motivation for veterans to 
downplay their agency in combat and visualise hostile action as a natural phenomenon 
452 Greenspan, ‘Unsaid’, p. 238. 
453 Dori Laub, personal communication, quoted in Mark Klempner, ‘Navigating Life Review Interviews 
with Survivors of Trauma’, in Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, p. 201. 
454 Suzanne Vees-Gulani, Trauma and Guilt: Literature of Wartime Bombing in Germany (Berlin, 2003), 
p. 20. 
455 Shephard, War of Nerves, pp. 221-4. 
456 Dodd, ‘Childhood “Trauma”’, p. 40. 
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which cannot truly be confronted. Causing veterans to acknowledge their trauma as 
inflicted by a human perpetrator may be counter-productive, reminding them that the 
violence they themselves inflicted was directed against other human beings and 
breaking down the metaphorical distancing which allows many to talk about their 
experiences. New approaches to war trauma incorporate ideas such as ‘moral injury’, 
which visualises trauma not as a matter of being victimised or psychologically 
damaged but of engaging in or witnessing actions which contradict the individual’s 
‘core moral values and behavioral expectations of self or others’, resulting in shame 
and disillusionment.457 However, such concepts remain novel and are yet to be 
adequately incorporated into oral history. There is a need for better theory to explain 
how veterans’ traumatic narratives function. 
Understanding Trauma Among Veterans 
This study does not purport to resolve the disputes over how psychological trauma 
should be understood: the concern here is with its effect on testimony, which has 
proved a more fruitful avenue for research. Gadi BenEzer, for instance, has identified 
thirteen narrative ‘trauma signals’, which have been applied by scholars such as 
Lindsey Dodd.458 ‘Trauma’ seems a useful term, provided it is understood merely as 
the posited psychiatric consequences of war or combat, which undeniably do exist, 
even though it lacks both a solid aetiology or a consistent set of symptoms. Graham 
Dawson’s definition is as good as any: ‘the psychological impact of some violent or 
457 ‘What is Moral Injury’, The Moral Injury Project, < http://moralinjuryproject.syr.edu/about-moral-
injury/> [accessed February 2018]. For a critique see Susan Derwin, ‘Moral Injury: Two Perspectives’, 
in Leese and Crouthamel (eds.), Traumatic Memories, pp. 269-289. 
458 BenEzer, ‘Trauma Signals’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff (eds.), Trauma, pp. 29-44; Dodd, ‘Childhood 
“Trauma”’, pp. 37-48. 
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otherwise shocking event, producing deep-rooted effects which are difficult to come 
to terms with’.459 The inherent selection bias in this study, which only included those 
who were willing to talk about the war, precludes any evaluation of the prevalence of 
trauma among veterans. However, those who refuse to discuss the war are not 
relevant here: this study is concerned solely with those who do discuss the war, and 
how trauma affects their testimony. This is an essentially descriptive matter which is 
much easier to assess than how the trauma itself functions. 
That said, some attention must be paid to the current understanding of war trauma, 
because this provides the essential cultural context in which the veterans provided 
their testimony. Most important is the consensus on the existence of PTSD, which 
entered the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. PTSD describes a condition 
in which a traumatic experience results in re-experiencing of the event through dreams 
and flashbacks, along with other symptoms such as depression, irritability and hyper-
vigilance which can hinder the sufferer’s ability to function socially.  PTSD was 
developed to describe the problems experienced by American veterans of the Vietnam 
War after they returned home. Psychiatric casualties in Vietnam were in fact extremely 
low, and it was not until after the war had ended, in the fraught atmosphere of post-
Vietnam America, that it came to be viewed as a psychiatric failure.460 Ending the 
Vietnam War was an overt and well-intentioned aim of campaigners for the recognition 
459 Graham Dawson, ‘Trauma, Memory and Politics: The Irish Troubles’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff 
(eds.), Trauma, p. 184. 
460 Ibid., pp. 129, 212; Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, ‘Psychiatry and the “Lessons of Vietnam”: 
What Were They, and Are They Still Relevant?’, War and Society, 22/1 (2004), pp. 90-1; Shephard, 
War of Nerves, pp. 349-53. 
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of PTSD,461 and this meant that the condition entered the psychiatric canon obliquely, 
without a basis in detailed research:  
Despite the limited nature of the evidence, the existence of any veterans 
who were alienated, angry or disaffected was considered compelling. 
These were essentially clinical observations, which by their very nature, 
cannot be used to generalise to the entirety of the veteran’s experience 
of Vietnam. Yet that is precisely what occurred.462 
Almost all studies into PTSD followed rather than preceded its recognition in DSM-
III,463 but by the time this research, with its ambiguous findings, began to appear, 
‘the media and Hollywood stereotype of the Vietnam veteran as a person who had 
become traumatised and marginalised by their service, rejected by society, prone to 
antisocial behaviour including drug taking and violence, and most probably suffering 
from severe psychopathology, had taken root.’464 The perception of the Vietnam War 
as an immoral war which victimised soldiers as much as it did civilians curiously led 
veterans—even those who had never seen combat or gone to Vietnam—to admit to 
committing atrocities which had never taken place.465 PTSD ultimately had as much to 
do with the social climate of 1970s America as it did with the Vietnam War itself.466 A 
significant feature of PTSD is that, for the first time, war alone was blamed, rather 
than pre-existing character or psychological flaws being considered a contributing 
factor to long-term psychiatric conditions;467 this made the condition more acceptable 
and broadened the number of possible victims, especially once it was also 
461 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 211. 
462 Jones and Wessely, ‘Psychiatry and the “Lessons of Vietnam”’, p. 95. 
463 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, pp. 131, 135. 
464 Jones and Wessely, ‘Psychiatry and the “Lessons of Vietnam”’, p. 97; Shephard, War of Nerves, 
pp. 365-6. 
465 Ibid., p. 96, n. 27; Wessely, ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, 
pp. 280-1. 
466 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 212. 
467 Wessely, ‘Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, pp. 281-2. 
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acknowledged that even those who had survived battle with no mental ill-effects could 
experience symptoms at a later date.468 In society in general, PTSD seemed to herald 
the opportunity for long-suppressed traumas to be revealed, discussed, and potentially 
resolved. 
A common impression therefore exists that the process of understanding war trauma 
began in the First World War, proceeded in a linear fashion, and was completed with 
the ‘discovery’ of PTSD after the Vietnam War.469 However, it is more accurate to say 
that each conflict motivated its own particular theories and advances, of which PTSD 
is only the most recent, reflective of current cultural and social trends, equally 
temporary and transient, and in no way definitive.470 As Edgar Jones, Simon Wessely, 
and Patrick J. Bracken have convincingly argued, there is little reason to believe that 
a ‘universal trauma reaction’ exists.471 It is more accurate to say PTSD was 
constructed, to describe a particular set of symptoms, than discovered, and ‘It is a 
mistake to assume that because PTSD has a case definition…then this “proves” the 
existence of the disorder as an independent entity.’472 Traumatic syndromes are 
mediated by culture, as ‘human reactions to adversity are subject to immense cultural 
shaping’,473 and it is only in the context of late-twentieth and early twenty-first century 
Western society that the syndrome known as PTSD has come about. 
468 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 138. 
469 Wessely, ‘Combat Motivation and Breakdown’, pp. 269-70. 
470 Ibid., p. 286; Shephard, War of Nerves, p. xxii; Bracken, ‘Post-Modernity and Post-Traumatic 
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Stress Disorder’, pp. 733-5, 742. 
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This is evidenced by the intriguing range of symptoms which have arisen from war 
trauma throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—most of which ‘were 
simply not the same as PTSD’.474 Soldiers of the American Civil War experienced 
lethargy and apparent heart conditions. First World War shell shock was characterised 
by psychosomatic symptoms (those arising in the mind but manifesting in physical 
symptoms) such as tics, tremors, headaches, fatigue and what became known as 
‘Disordered Action of the Heart’, as well as nightmares and amnesia.475 In the Second 
World War somatic syndromes were reduced compared with psychoneurotic ones such 
as anxiety, although partially this seems to have been a result of diagnostic decisions. 
High levels of dyspepsia, although attributed to army life, could have been 
psychosomatic in nature, especially since peptic ulcer was a widely feared condition.476 
PTSD, meanwhile, is characterised almost entirely by psychic symptoms, particularly 
flashbacks. These were exceedingly rare among First- and Second World War 
veterans, and Jones and Wessely suggest that ‘cinema and video technology have 
exercised an important influence on the organisation of memory by providing new 
templates for expressing distress’.477 However, this does not mean that physical 
symptoms have disappeared: ‘Gulf War syndrome’ appears to be related to fears 
around toxins such as sarin gas and depleted uranium.478 Jones and Wessely found 
that while these various conditions were not necessarily confined to particular wars, 
there was an association between particular wars and particular conditions.479 They 
474 Ibid., p. 735. 
475 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 193. 
476 Ibid., pp. 195-8. A similar trend was identified by German doctors: see Shephard, War of Nerves, 
p. 306. 
477 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 174. 
478 Ibid., p. 207. 
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argue that war neuroses should be classified as medically unexplained syndromes 
which can cause a range of culturally-mediated physical conditions through no simple 
biomedical cause.480  Consequently, there is little reason to assume that PTSD can be 
extrapolated to encompass past conflicts, or to assume that the Second World War 
veterans interviewed for this study experienced modern PTSD; although some studies 
have done just this.481 
A further important point is that wartime trauma does not inevitably lead to lasting 
psychiatric disorder: as Ben Shephard notes, enthusiasm over PTSD has obscured the 
basic fact that ‘not everyone does suffer in the wake of trauma’.482 It is possible to 
acknowledge the horrific nature of combat and the life-changing legacy of military 
service while also drawing the crucial distinction ‘between the vast majority of combat 
veterans, who may continue to have troubled memories of war for the rest of their 
lives, but function perfectly well in all spheres of life, and the minority who have 
psychiatric disorder that impedes social, family and occupational function.’483 While 
the precise proportion is notoriously hard to measure, Jones and Wessely cite a study 
of former Harvard students which found only 5 of 256 veterans had any symptoms of 
PTSD, and of the 152 who had been in combat, most suffered no lasting psychological 
ill-effects—‘The memory of combat appeared to have been indelibly imprinted in many 
men’s lives but this did not appear to have…seriously impaired their functioning’.484 
480 Ibid., p. 191. 
481 Nigel Hunt and Ian Robbins, ‘The Long-Term Consequences of War: The Experience of World War 
II’, Aging and Mental Health, 5/2 (2001), pp. 183-4. 
482 Shephard, War of Nerves, p. 391. Original emphasis. 
483 Jones and Wessely, ‘Psychiatry and the “Lessons of Vietnam”’, p. 96, n. 29; Jones and Wessely, 
Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 181; Johnston, ‘Culture, Combat and Killing’, p. 257. 
484 K. Lee, G. Vaillant, W. Torrey and G. Elder, ‘A 50-year Prospective Study of the Psychological 
Sequelae of World War II Combat’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 152 (1995), pp. 516-522, cited in 
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Nigel Hunt and Ian Robbins found that nineteen per cent of their sample of 731 Second 
World War and Korean War veterans reported the rather broad criterion of ‘war-related 
psychological distress’ after fifty years.485 It seems clear that those with full-blown 
psychiatric conditions are certainly in the minority.  
Here it is also useful to draw a distinction between Combat Stress Reaction (CSR) and 
PTSD; although they are often incorrectly equated, the former is a short-term 
condition experienced during or immediately after combat, the latter a long-term one 
which can arise many years after the traumatic event occurred.486 CSR is a strong 
predictor of later PTSD, but PTSD may develop in someone who never experienced 
CSR at the time of the original trauma.487 Nor is it the case that since CSR and PTSD 
correlate, more than a minority of cases of CSR develop into PTSD: ‘If a person comes 
home from their war service psychologically robust, the chances are that they will 
remain robust’.488 It is not necessarily the case that CSR can be applied to the Second 
World War either, as like PTSD it is also culturally mediated; it merely serves to 
demonstrate that the relation between traumatic reactions which occur in combat and 
those which develop later in life is not a straightforward one.  
It should not be assumed that all or most war veterans are psychologically damaged, 
or that there is a simple correlation between the intensity of combat experienced and 
was their high socio-economic status; this illustrates how war experiences are rarely the sole cause of 
psychiatric conditions. 
485 Hunt and Robbins, ‘Long-Term Consequences of War’, p. 188. 
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the intensity of psychological problems. Reading the literature on war psychiatry, it is 
easy to forget that the damaged veterans under discussion are a minority. 
The Prevalence of Trauma in Second World War Veterans’ Narratives 
Hugh McManners has written that: 
After the Second World War the members of an entire generation were 
personally affected by their experiences. Afterwards, they put the war 
behind them and concentrated on winning the peace—no mean task. 
They were all in it together, and this may partly explain the reluctance 
with which they as individuals admit to having been adversely affected 
by it…Perhaps an entire generation were burnt out by the emotional 
experiences of the Second World War, never to regain their zest and 
youthfulness?...Today, psychiatrists are discovering that the suppressed 
emotions of the war generation are giving way to a very delayed PTSD, 
forty years on…Many Second World War veterans are seeking medical 
help with PTSD problems now, as their memories catch up with them.489 
The veterans interviewed for this study simply do not reflect this assessment. Indeed, 
their frankness in discussing traumatic experiences stands in sharp contrast to the 
popular assumption that veterans never talk about their wars. Most of the veterans 
willing to be interviewed experienced things they would rather forget, but are happy 
to discuss them, and few, even those who evidently suffered short-term ‘battle 
exhaustion’, show any indications of lasting psychological problems or difficulty 
speaking. On the contrary, the testimony examined here is often extremely direct, 
often to the point of being uncomfortable to hear. Multiple accounts demonstrate this. 
Geoff Young recalls discovering civilians who had been caught in the crossfire: 
So I carried on into this village, and a lady, German lady, came and 
stopped me, so...and I was with the company commander as well then. 
She said, 'Could you help?', in German, and of course she spoke a bit of 
489 McManners, Scars of War, pp. 9-14. 
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English, 'Could you help me?' So, company commander said, 'Look Geoff, 
you look out, now you watch out, I'm gonna- I'll watch on, you see, and 
you watch out', so she took me to a bungalow, about fifty yards away, 
and in the bungalow was a small boy ten years of age, she told me he 
was ten, and he was laid on the bed, two legs gone, blood, and I saw 
the trail of blood going out and one of our tanks had fired, saw 
movement, and there was a father and three children there. The mother 
was going to go, she'd locked up the-, she told me she'd locked the door 
to go afterwards, and up went this...It was the worst thing I've ever 
seen, they were all killed, but this ten year old boy was on the outside 
and she carried him, you saw the blood going up into the bungalow, and 
I didn't honestly know what to do, 'cos I had to get on, and all I had was 
a few words, and I could say was 'entschuldigung bitte', 'excuse me', 
was all I could say [laughs], I couldn't do anything about it. There was 
nobody else in the village, only four German soldiers...[10] That 
was...that was bad.490 
Eric Tipping describes witnessing the death of a comrade at close range, after his 
platoon had been pinned down in an ambush: 
So, we were just absolutely-, you couldn't move. And...and they 
continued firing too, so...Smithy's dad said to me 'What can we do Tip?'. 
I said 'I'm not sure yet what we can do, at all'. And at that...somebody 
was crying out, like, 'I'm bleeding to death, I'm dying, I'm dying', one of 
our chaps or something...So I could hear Smithy next to me, he said 
'What can we do?'. I said 'Hang on, I don't know yet.' He said 'We've got 
to help them out that's wounded', I said 'I know but’, I said, ‘if you move 
you've had it', I could tell, whether he couldn't see the bullets, but I was 
on the end here and the way my head was I could see the, see the 
bullets coming, and I knew if I'd have lifted...Anyway, for some unknown 
reason, I don't know why, he lifted his head...I mean he only just, 
whether he was going to go forward or not I don't know, but he lifted 
his head, and he got hit straight in the throat, shot in the throat, and I 
knew from the sound he made that it was fatal. And I tried to 
whatsname, I said 'Smithy, Smithy', I got no reply, so I shouted [for] 
stretcher bearers, and eventually they came and confirmed he was 
dead...491 
Robert Purver remembers his unit being shelled by friendly artillery: 
490 Young, 1, 48-50. 
491 Tipping, 1, 90-91. 
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My particular unit, B Company [5/Wiltshires], was instructed to take this 
hill, and I got the impression now that the hill was called 361...We went 
up at night time and by dawn we had reached almost to the summit of 
this hill, and we was told to stop, and we stopped there in a farm track, 
and on the top of this hill it was a bald hill with a field, and by dawn...the 
artillery opened up to lay a stonk in front of us, that's what the idea was. 
The trouble was, it landed right in amongst us, and...I lost six of my 
section, they got badly wounded. One bloke, I won't name his name for 
fear of the family, had his head blown off completely, so we didn't know 
what the body was until we took his paybook out and found out who it 
was, this young lad, his head was blown off completely, but anyway...492 
Bill Edwardes recalls consoling the fatally wounded: 
But the times also when you were in similar situations with wounded, 
them saying to you, 'Oh god, put me out of my misery, shoot me, shoot 
me', and because we didn't carry our weapons, I think according to 
regulations we were supposed to, but again you had to sling them 
because they were little Sten guns and they would swing round and get 
in the way anyway, but it was a good reason not to be...to be able to 
say to a guy, 'I'm sorry, I can't do it, I don't have a weapon'. 'Use my 
rifle'. 'No I can't do that, it's...', and you then try to console them, and 
even if they, you know, don't ask to be wiped out, you console them, 
you say, 'Ah you lucky bugger, you've got a blighty, you'll be home 
before tea time', knowing full well probably within an hour they'd be 
dead. But you had to just cope with it and get unpersonal about it.493 
Ian Hammerton, commander of a troop of flail tanks, felt obliged to discover the fate 
of a missing subordinate: 
ML: Now before Le Havre you were telling me earlier you'd found out 
what had happened to your corporal...that had gone off the road [during 
Operation TOTALIZE]. 
IH: Yes...Many years later-, no, sorry...Three days after the start of the 
night attack, may have been four days, my squadron commander said 
'Don't go and look at the tank', but I...they were my chaps, so I went, 
and I found they'd been through a bit of a minefield, they'd broken the 
track, and a self-propelled gun had fired an AP shell right through the 
tank from side to side. Although a small fire had started there was still 
petrol in the tanks. There was still petrol in 1947, when I went back 
again...but the first time, I looked in through the turret, or through the 
492 Purver, 1, 12-13. 
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driver's hatchway, which was open, and all that was left of the co-driver 
and the driver was from the middle downwards, just their legs, and it 
was a seething mass of maggots...so, I've never forgotten that, 
obviously.494 
All of these incidents were evidently impactful and highly disturbing at the time and 
remained so throughout the rest of the veteran’ lives; none were recalled with relish, 
and trauma is potentially evidenced by hesitancy, changes in tone and nervous 
laughter. Yet none clearly demonstrate any of BenEzer’s ‘trauma signals’, and 
evidently none of these disturbing experiences were ‘untellable’. 
Some actively emphasise disturbing experiences. For Jack Eglington, who drove a 
Universal Carrier in 4/Somerset Light Infantry, a key memory was witnessing two men 
being killed at very close range by an armour-piercing shell during the fighting on Hill 
112. Far from trying to forget this, Eglington was in fact in contact with the son of one 
of the men. This is described very early in the interview, along with several other 
disturbing incidents: 
...I joined up April [1938] and went all through the war...unscathed, 
never had nothing wrong with-, no, a few, a few near misses, I'm just 
writing that letter now because it missed me by that much and killed the 
other two...on the other side [of] the carrier, officer and a wireless 
operator, killed them, I'm just trying to write this letter to his [son] now 
to explain what happened, how he [was] killed, but it's [a] bit of a job I 
mean, between you and me when I looked at 'em they had all of their 
inside blown out, both of 'em, and they were backing heads like this...but 
I can't tell him that really, I'll have to describe it sort of a bit different, 
but...that was it, and then I, another time I was driving along up near 
the...Reichswald Forest, and...there was a Bren gun carrier. Well, being 
a bit nosy, I, I thought to myself-, I was on me own, I don't know why 
or...I was on me own driving, and I thought 'Ooh I'll stop and have a 
look in there', see if there's any junk in there you could pinch or anything 
like that. The only thing I saw in there was a bloke's leg, complete leg 
in there...After I pulled away I thought, 'That's a bit stupid', he had his 
leg blown off, maybe there were some mines around there, but you don't 
494 Hammerton, 1, 82-84. 
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think see, you don't think in that time, do these sloppy things. 
And...another time, that was the Reichswald Forest, yeah, we we 
captured a, one of, no...one of our blokes got wounde-, shot, between 
where we were, a copse, and the edge of the forest, got shot, one of-, 
they sent a Bren gun carrier down to pick him up, with a stretcher 
bearer, and...they shot the stretcher bearer. So, of course our blokes 
were real right mad, but in the meantime they captured a, a young 
German, about sixteen, and they, they were gonna shoot him, see, so I, 
I said 'no no no no', I said- this young lad, he was crying and showing 
us photographs of his mum and dad and all the rest of it, I said 'No no 
no no', I said 'You can't, no no don't shoot him', and I often wonder to 
this day if that bloke knew that I really and truly saved his life, although 
he was a German but...you, you just can't do, some things you can't do, 
some things you can't do, you know, but I'm sure if I'd been there when 
he was shot and...they was so mad about it, but...I dunno, it's one of 
them things I suppose, facts of war...495 
Eglington too shows a certain amount of agitation—one can almost observe him 
composing his narrative while speaking—but like the others demonstrates none of 
BenEzer’s ‘trauma signals’. He returns to the key incident on Hill 112 several times, as 
well as recollecting other occasions of witnessing shattered limbs and the dead crews 
of burnt-out tanks.496 Evidently these sights were imprinted on Eglington’s memory, 
but he discusses them freely and at no point breaks down. 
It is questionable how deeply affected Eglington was by these disturbing events, but 
in addition to the remarkable ability of the veterans to come to terms with and later 
calmly talk about disturbing and potentially traumatic incidents, in several cases there 
is clear-cut evidence that experiences which were traumatic in the most obvious sense, 
which resulted in actual psychological breakdown during the war, can also later be 
discussed with relative ease. In each of these cases, the breakdown is acknowledged 
somewhat obliquely, but not concealed. Tom Dutton’s occurred during a period of line-
495 Eglington, 1, 02-04. 
496 Eglington, 1, 9-13, 20-21; 2, 00-02. 
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holding near the Reichswald, while he and his trench-mate were preparing to go out 
at dusk and man their slit trench, as they did every night. Dutton builds up tension 
before this in a lengthy description which evokes a predictable and relatively 
comfortable routine but also implies a gradual build-up of stress due to the proximity 
of the enemy and unpredictable mortar fire. The breakdown was presaged in particular 
by a night patrol two days prior in which Dutton recalls being the most scared he had 
ever been.497 
So, this evening come along and we'd had our tot and we'd had our 
orders and we'd got to go out and hope it'd be a quiet night and dash 
down and jump into our slit-, anyway, this night it was quiet, mortar 
bombs-, we could hear mortar bombs going in other areas, but, but 
this...So he said, 'Are you alright Tom', this bloke said, I said 'Aah mate', 
he said, 'Shall we go?' I was just about to make a dash when two bloody 
great explosions on the building up above me. Must have been eighty-
eights, they come so fast, and all the debris falling…Frightened the living 
daylights out of me, I shit blue lights I did. I fell down and me rifle went 
anywhere and the bit was falling all on the back of me legs and all of a 
sudden I felt somebody grab hold of me legs and drag me in. He said, 
'Bloody hell!', he said, 'What happened there?' I said, 'Well I dunno...I 
think it were bloody eighty-eights, took half the building down! Anyway, 
shattered me nerves, it done me in, and the chap said, this lance 
corporal said, 'Give me your Bren magazines and your grenades', he 
said. 'I'll go out with Whitey', he said, 'and take your job for the night'.498 
Dutton was wrapped in a blanket and given a mug of tea, before being sent to the 
rear to recover: 
Then this officer said, 'And what I want you to do', he said, 'is take this 
man Dutton to the regimental aid post', he said, 'He's had a bit of a time 
up here', he said, 'and he ain't no good to me as he is'. I said, 'Alright 
then'...[7] So they took me back and took me to the hospital and I 
had...treatment, suppose you could call it psychiatric treatment really 
couldn't you? Don't remember much about it. It was like an old 
monastery, the hospital, it was nurses and some of them was 
497 Dutton, 1, 47-56. 
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poor...wrecks, you know, poor chaps. I thought, 'Christ, has I come to 
this?' Anyway they got me fit.499 
Dutton’s description of his recovery is brief, and a sense of shame at his personal 
failure may well account for this, just as it explains the way he distances himself from 
the other psychiatric casualties and stresses the fact that, even though he was 
medically downgraded and therefore could not return to his unit, he retained his 
Worcestershire Regiment cap badge.500 This feeling seems more likely a matter of 
culture—a common sense of guilt at letting down the military group which had become 
the focus of his entire life—rather than necessarily indicating any long-term 
psychological wound.501 
John Majendie presents a similar but even more dramatic example. He had clearly 
reflected on the war extensively, and one of the themes of his account is correcting 
misconceptions. A special concern, which Majendie calls his ‘hobby horse’, is disputing 
the idea that anyone can be held responsible for what occurs in chaotic battle 
situations, and it is while describing this that his key traumatic experience is first 
mentioned: 
But, the only time I ever had a letter published in the paper, I...a few 
years ago I wrote to the Daily Telegraph about friendly fire, which 
irritates me enormously because, there's no such thing as friendly fire, 
people fired in order to hit somebody, they didn't do it for a friendly way. 
They, the journalists love getting hold of this...and I quoted, and I 
remember four occasions in our own battalion within the space of a very 
short time of friendly fire, none of them were reported further back than 
battalion headquarters and I think...at least one of them wasn't even 
reported that far, it, it's bound to happen, people get shot...I know 
myself I shot a, one of our own chaps...I was told there's a Boche up 
that tree over there, I could see him...[4] He came down, and I 
499 Dutton, 1, 59. 
500 Dutton, 1, 59-61. 
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discovered afterwards that he wasn't, he was one of our snipers, and 
the extraordinary thing, looking back in my head, I thought he was a 
Boche, I had no feeling of...success, or wasn't that a good shot, or a 
lucky shot, or anything. Completely...as if somebody had said, 'Oh, throw 
that stone into the river and watch it splash' sort of thing, extraordinary. 
We had a...when we were digging in over the road that night and D 
company had the debacle and the chap hit in his...paunch,502 some of 
their blokes came back in front of us, and the leading platoon, Bren 
gunner, saw these shadowy figures, they were in the wrong place, 
weren't supposed to be there, shot them all...I don't think we even 
reported that...we had casualties on the start line of Jupiter from our 
own guns...it happened all the time, and they get hold of it now, they 
always want to blame somebody...I bet at the Battle of Hastings the 
archers up the front had arrows in the back of their necks from the 
blokes behind...The other thing is, funnily enough the same day, that I 
had this letter published in the Telegraph somebody wrote about 
inquests, why they have inquests, a chap gets blown to bits by a mine 
in Afghanistan and then they have an inquest back here, accidental 
death, well...and the chap wrote and said, 'What would happen if they'd 
had after the Somme...they'd still be having them now.' It doesn't do 
anybody any good...503 
Majendie admits to shooting a fellow British soldier in very candid terms, with no 
prompting or persuasion required. Undoubtedly, being able to relate the incident to 
his larger aim of telling the ‘real story’ and busting misconceptions was helpful—
indeed, the traumatic event may have been the motivation for this narrative tactic. 
Majendie returns to the incident later, to explain his breakdown and evacuation during 
the fighting near Briquessard just prior to Operation BLUECOAT: 
The moment we started the...very very close country, these sort of tiny 
fields...there were casualties from...you couldn't tell where they were 
coming from, people were getting shot and I got to the hedge into a 
field to try and see what was going on, and I think I laid down with my 
field glasses to look, and a chap, interesting a pi-, an ex pilot officer from 
the RAF, the RAF had a sup-, a lot of superfluous flying people and they 
drafted them straight into the infantry, and we had actually two in the 
company, and he came running up to me, and said there's a... And then 
502 Majendie here refers to an oft-reported incident, described in Sydney Jary’s 18 Platoon and also 
mentioned by Bill Partridge, where a bullet hit and detonated a phosphorous grenade attached to one 
man’s webbing during a night attack on Hill 112. 
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there was a...crack [claps] and a puff of dust where he was hit and he 
went down, poor chap screaming his head off, and...for a moment you're 
just sort of stuck almost dumb. Anyway I helped him off with his 
equipment and...he managed to make his way back to the hedge for the 
stretcher bearers, and I picked up the rest of his equipment and ammo 
and stuff and went back, and I called a, an O Group as they called it, 
and...I don't remember a great deal, what I know is that my second-in-
command, a chap called John Scammell, who became an army padre 
eventually, he was very badly wounded on Mont Pinçon, he said to me...I 
remember I was giving orders out of some sort, he said 'Are you feeling 
okay', and I said 'Well I am a bit, feeling a bit woolly', he said 'Would 
you like me to carry on for you', and I said 'Yeah, fine', and anyway we 
advanced on down through...and that was there this chap said to me, 
'There's a bloody- a Boche up that tree there', about a couple of hundred 
yards away, and we all, I'd armed myself with a...rifle from a dead 
Fifteenth Scottish [Division] soldier, when we took over, lots of weapons 
around we'd all armed ourselves with rifles and bayonets, and lucky shot, 
the chap came down, never-, I didn't have any feeling at all. 
Subsequently I was told he was a, one of our snipers, and...I'm told that, 
I think the...CO or somebody said or sent for John Scammell, I can't 
remember what happened and...I went back to see the CO and we came 
under a very heavy stonk there and I don't remember a great deal but 
they all went to ground and I stayed sitting on the bank watching it. And 
I think one had gone a bit...anyways I went back to the MO and he gave 
me a shot...pills or something and I know I slept for twenty-three hours, 
that's non-stop, and I think, in retrospect, if I'd had a few days of sort 
of...rest, relaxation, but...then I saw another doctor and they put me 
into a hospital at Bayeux and then they banged me back home and I 
had six weeks in hospital...504 
The fact that Majendie uses similar phrasing both of the times he describes shooting 
the British sniper indicates that he was able to achieve composure: this is no traumatic 
intrusion but a well-rehearsed part of Majendie’s life story. His case appears to be a 
typical result of extreme strain which allowed the wounding of the ex-pilot, the 
friendly-fire incident and the artillery ‘stonk’ together to trigger the breakdown. 
Majendie is typically contemplative: 
...when you, it's very easy to be wise after the event, I think the trouble 
is we were all...knackered through lack of sleep...when you're that age 
504 Majendie, 1, 59-63. 
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you do need your sleep, I don't think, I didn't get any sleep the night 
before, and...we were in...a private house by this...little chapel and I 
think one had about...several nights with a...minimal sleep and it all 
catches up and I suppose one has a ration of...[4] and when the ration's 
run out, you need renewing...It's almost...been on my conscience ever 
since because I've wanted to get back again...505 
It seems likely that Majendie’s ability to think calmly and carefully about his war in this 
way is vital to his achievement of composure. Yet this is not totally successful and, 
like Dutton, a feeling of guilt for failing to keep going is evident. 
Doug Mayman likewise describes a particularly difficult day in which, if he did not 
suffer a sudden breakdown, the effects of battle fatigue and the benefits of some time 
spent out of the line to recover are heavily implied.506 Mayman’s achievement of 
composure, just like Majendie’s, seems heavily dependent on incorporating the trauma 
within his main argument about the improved conditions compared with the First 
World War. The fact these men who apparently became psychiatric casualties during 
the war could talk about this frankly in their old age confounds popular assumptions 
about the unrepresentability of trauma and provides further evidence that that 
breakdowns in combat do not necessarily lead to long-term psychiatric problems or 
inhibit narration. 
Two of the interviewees did show clear signs of emotional discomposure due to 
trauma, as would be regarded as predictable. However, they nonetheless both make 
the effort to speak. Stan Procter’s interview is the most straightforward. For the 
505 Majendie, 1, 63-64. 
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majority of the interview he is well-composed, though he seems to dwell on the deaths 
of friends from early in the interview: 
...a friend of mine in the signals was in a-, he was with the artillery, and 
he was in a scout car like mine, just a few yards away and a...thing 
dropped right into his and killed him. Dick...oh I've forgotten his-, I know 
his name but it'll come to me sometime, and that was my really-...No, 
the first...casualty I remember was when we were stuck in these ditches 
and somebody came up to me and said-, oh, I wish I could remember 
names, old thingummybob's just been killed, and he was a young friend 
of mine, you know, and this was within the first two or three days, 
so...wasn't a good start.507 
However, it is only when questioned directly about dealing with casualties that Procter 
becomes outwardly emotional: 
ML: So how did...casualties affect you? You've already mentioned some 
friends being killed. 
SP: Yeah. Well...I think, I can't remember thinking anything other than, 
'My God, that's what it's all about', you know, 'it's gonna happen'. I'm 
sorry to lose but it didn't, I don't know, it's very extraordinary though 
[bangs table], I can't quite figure how I thought. I mean I didn't get-, it 
didn't get me dejected for some reason, I don't know why, but that's it. 
ML: And have you ever thought about it after the war? 
SP: What I remember of being- friends being killed? Yes I have...[6] 
[bangs table] Stop. 
ML: Sorry.508 
After the interviewer changes the subject, Procter quickly regains his composure and 
continues in the same matter-of-fact way for the remainder. 
The other example is Ray Gordon, who served as a Churchill tank loader/operator in 
9th Royal Tank Regiment; his account is more unusual and worth assessing at length, 
507 Procter, 1, 07-08. 
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because the trauma he experienced is the main event of his war narrative and, far 
from hindering his composure, forms the basis of it. Gordon’s tank was knocked out 
mere days after his arrival in France, during his first major engagement in Operation 
EPSOM. He was the only survivor and was badly burned. The fact that Gordon’s 
campaign experience was so short and culminated in one key traumatic event 
evidently had major effects on the way he relates it. The interview starts with a longer-
than-usual discussion of training, since Gordon does not have much actual 
campaigning to talk about. This part of the interview focuses on two themes, the 
naïvety and enthusiasm of the young recruits—there is little suggestion the training 
was particularly arduous—and the good esprit de corps and inter-rank relations, 
demonstrated especially by Gordon’s description of his tank’s commander: 
...I was in A Squadron and I was put into 2 Troop...and we had a 
sergeant in charge of us, Sergeant Jock Smith....He really had come from 
Scotland, I can't tell you whereabouts now, and he was a lovely 
man...here am I at...aged eighteen, nineteen, and he I suppose would 
have been about thirty-five, and he was like a father to us, he really was, 
he was a lovely man, and really respected by his crews...his crew...509 
Gordon’s first description of arriving in Normandy continues these themes. He first 
discusses the attitude of his crew: 
ML: So what's going through your mind at this time? 
RG: Isn't life exciting? Well you're eighteen, and...it's an adventure. 
You're going abroad! You've landed in France! So then you think, 
'Oh...the Germans are here, aren't-, oh, gotta be careful'...[laughs]. I 
know it sounds silly...510 
509 Gordon, 1, 06. 
510 Gordon, 1, 23. 
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This is then followed by a description of some German troops who were captured, 
who appeared to Gordon and his mates to be even younger than they were.511 At this 
point, Gordon requests a break, and on resuming the interview talks about his feelings 
on arriving in Normandy again; this time, he more strongly emphasises that his 
positivity took little account of the very real danger: 
I think what one has to realise now is that at this particular time in my 
life, I, and several others of course, apart from the tank commander, 
were just boys aged eighteen, and therefore...this was a wonderful 
adventure as far as you as an individual was concerned. Going across in 
the boat, to start with, was exciting, and landing on France, and you 
think 'We're going to meet some Germans soon, isn't it going 
to...[laughs]...isn't it going to be exciting!' Of course, at eighteen, 
you...and I think all eighteen-year-olds are like this, nothing will ever 
happen to you, it will happen to everyone else, but never to you, but life 
proves that's not a true statement by any manner or mean, but there 
you are, you're full of hope, you know you're going to get through, and 
I think this is one of the things that helps you on and covers up any 
initial worries you might have, as 'I wonder if I might get injured?' I don't 
think that, at eighteen, applies to you at all. So you go forward, nothing's 
gonna happen, let's enjoy life.512 
Unlike the incident with the German prisoners—which illustrates the innocence of the 
soldiers on both sides—this is followed by a recollection which demonstrates the 
antithesis of that innocence, the indiscriminate violence which those soldiers had to 
face: 
I remember we went into-, when we had to move forward on one 
occasion, we...[went] through this field, and up against a high hedge on 
the right-hand side, we were quite close to that hedge, and we had to 
move forward to the end of the hedge to get into the next field, and 
there was suddenly this dreadful hissing noise, awful hissing noise, and 
from the other side of this hedge came out this huge...flame. It was [a] 
ghastly looking thing, I don't know, it must have been...fifty feet long or 
more, and with a dreadful hissing noise, this flame stuck on a stone 
511 Gordon, 1, 25. 
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cottage which was just ahead of us, and it splattered on, stuck and 
splattered on that cottage. Nobody ever came out, I can only hope that 
people had got out of that cottage at the rear side sometime before, but 
as far as we’re concerned it was an empty cottage, and that was one of 
the flamethrowers that I think were used by Churchill tanks, not our 
particular regiment but another regiment had these flamethrowing 
tanks, they were absolutely terrifying, this dreadful hissing noise as this 
huge jet of flame came out forty or fifty feet and splattered on this 
building. God help anyone who'd been in there. That's one thing I do 
remember and if anyone was frightened, I certainly was, because I've 
always been frightened of fire, strangely enough, and...but yes, that I 
found a very worrying experience, and that was equipment that was 
being used by our own side.513 
As well as being a shocking demonstration of violence, this incident also clearly 
foreshadows Gordon’s tank being set alight. He dwells on the imagery of the flames 
and expresses a hope that those in the cottage made it out, as he made it out of the 
tank. Arguably, the difference between the first and the second description of arriving 
in Normandy indicates Gordon building up to describing the key traumatic event. There 
are other indications of foreshadowing too—in the first session Gordon describes the 
tense experience of manoeuvring the tank across a road, something which happened 
just before his tank was hit, and he also mentions seeing dazed crewmen from his 
regiment making their way to the rear after their tanks had been hit. The key incident 
is described after another break, which was perhaps necessary for Gordon to compose 
himself, and indeed there are indications that he may have talked about it off-the-
record before the recorder was switched on again:  
We went forward and we came to this road, only a single track road, 
and we thought 'We've got to get across this', so we dropped down, shot 
across this road and up onto the hedge the other side and into the field. 
'Ah', we could take a breath of fresh air for a moment or two, but in 
actual fact it was shortly after that...we were hit, something came in 
from my side of the tank, in from...yeah, my side of the tank, in, and we 
513 Gordon, 2, 01-03. 
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just shuddered to a stop, and it was instantly hot...The nearest I can 
explain that is if you're ever been in a sauna, that is how it felt. I didn't 
know this for many years later until somebody said 'Try a sauna' and I 
did and I said to him afterwards, 'You won't believe this but...this puts 
me right to...back in my tank when it was set on fire'. That was the sort 
of heat, it was instant there, obviously some shell had come in and set 
the thing going, so...I remember sitting down on my seat, which was 
just behind where I would normally stand, and thought, 'Ooh, it's hot in 
here, I think I'd better go home'. And I stood up, and turned round, and 
put my foot on...the bar of metal there, because I needed to do that to 
lift myself up so I could push open the flaps of the turret, and-, which I 
did, and then I literally threw myself out and landed on the track at the 
rear of the tank with enough...motion in that action of throwing out, 
landing on the track, and rolling sufficiently to drop on the ground at the 
side of the Churchill tank, by which time the ammunition started 
exploding, and unfortunately no-one else got out of that tank. And I had 
to lay there, hearing those dreadful screams, which...thank god didn't 
last very long, and then not long afterwards, along, crawling along, came 
my officer from his tank. He had obviously had to get out of his tank, 
reasons I don't know, and he came along, he looked down at me, and 
he said 'Who are you? ', and I was a bit annoyed at that because he'd 
given me orders about two hours earlier, but of course I didn't realise, 
my face was completely black...I found out later that most of my hair 
had been burnt off, and...I had a glove on the right hand, but I'd taken 
the glove off on the left hand and the left hand, when you held it up, 
the skin had-, which was absolutely white, hung down in a great strip. 
It didn't-, it wasn't painful at all. I think possibly that the depth of the 
burn to the hand had burnt away the nerve endings, this is only my 
guess, I don't know, so as far as I'm concerned, my left hand was there, 
fingers in the normal shape, with this strip of hand-, skin hanging down, 
and I managed to...totter, I suppose, somewhere, not very far, and I 
came across a chap...[sighs]...and...[sighs and chokes up]...the look of 
horror on his face when he saw me...[choking up]...when he saw me, is 
something I've never forgotten...never forgotten. He took me by the arm 
and he got me to...a first aid something or other, I don't know, anyway, 
for first aid, and I can only assume they must have injected me and I 
passed out, because that's all I recall is getting to this first aid, and not 
even going into it, but getting to it, and then, end of story.514 
It is noteworthy that Gordon becomes outwardly emotional not while describing the 
fire, or even listening to his friends dying, but when remembering the reaction of the 
man who helped him; this is presumably because it was the moment that Gordon 
514 Gordon, 3, 01-06. 
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realised the extent of his disfigurements and the destruction of his normal appearance. 
The matter is rendered even more intriguing by the fact that Gordon reports being 
blinded for several days afterwards.515 Like Procter, Gordon regains his composure 
very quickly, and then retrieves a model tank to illustrate the incident further.516 
In the way his account foreshadows the traumatic event and then goes on to analyse 
it in such precise detail, Gordon certainly demonstrates ‘trauma signals’,517 while the 
repeated imagery, reminiscent of what have been called ‘flashbulb memories’,518 is 
surely a prime example of the sort of vivid and durable memories which are likely to 
result from war experiences. By encouraging recollection and analysis the reaction to 
trauma here is in fact a help, not a hindrance, to the oral historian. Gordon himself 
has been able to establish an identity as a damaged veteran and discuss his short 
period of active service with great sincerity. The remainder of Gordon’s interview is an 
interesting description of his burns treatment and rehabilitation, with a moral of 
making the most of what one has. Evidently Gordon did not attempt to repress his 
traumatic memories, but instead subjected them to precise and repeated analysis, and 
although they clearly remained emotionally raw this ultimately did not prevent him 
from speaking about the war. 
Although these two accounts are the only ones which involve emotional reactions 
when recalling traumatic events, it is also worth considering some less obvious 
indications of trauma: along with such long silences, overt displays of emotion, 
515 Gordon, 3, 13. 
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changes in voice and body language, and an inability to continue telling the story, 
BenEzer suggests also that traumatic memories might appear as ‘hidden’ events which 
emerge only ‘during the probing phase’, or, similarly, intrusive images which appear 
unbidden and disrupt the narrative.519 The closing part of Bill Partridge’s account 
provides what seems a clear example of this sort of intrusive image: 
I still considered that teaching recruits was probably more important 
than my shooting Germans, or trying to, or commanding a platoon...later 
on...[4]and...I suppose too that frankly, I probably had enough 
but...Normandy was a terrible experience which I don't think...Well we're 
all made differently aren't we, I have a sensitive nature so...I don't think 
that really I wanted to go back, start losing all my friends and seeing 
them shot at, and beaten down, you know, being in a...a dug out and 
start moaning and shouting. 'Do us all a favour mate and die, please, 
die', you know, it's awful, yeah...[8]so...[8]520 
Thinking back to Normandy, Partridge seems to suddenly recall the image of a dying 
comrade. Yet a connection can be observed here with the general tendency for 
interviewees to become more forthcoming later in the interview, as they think more 
deeply about their life stories and perhaps become more relaxed. It seems that 
sometimes interviewees work up to confronting a key traumatic event, gradually 
including more detail before acknowledging it in its horrific entirety. This parallels a 
point made by Corinna Peniston-Bird that ‘in exploring the ramifications of 
discomposure, perhaps the most important factor is the duration of the 
interview…Dominant cultural constructions are most likely to be reiterated, even 
apparently accepted, at the beginning of the interview.’521 This appears to apply 
equally to discomposure arising from war trauma.522 John Majendie reports shooting 
519 BenEzer, ‘Trauma Signals’, pp. 34-5. 
520 Partridge, 4, 00-02. 
521 Peniston-Bird, ‘Patriotism and the ‘People’s War’’, p. 78. 
522 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 77. 
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the British sniper around thirty minutes into the interview, as an example of the 
realities of war; it is another thirty minutes before he returns to consider the personal 
repercussions of that event as part of his psychological breakdown. Ray Gordon, as 
already noted, seems to build up the more negative themes of his story as the 
interview goes on. Tom Dutton shifts to a more confessional mode in the latter stages 
of his interview, where he ruminates on comradeship and discusses the death of one 
admired NCO and the wounding of another. These men had been referred to by rank 
throughout the interview, but near the end Dutton reveals first their surnames and 
then their given names.523 Ted Howson mentions the death of a friend early on, before 
returning to discuss it in more detail later.524 Colin Criddle, Syd West and Doug 
Mayman also open up about dead and wounded comrades later in their interviews, 
adding detail and names.525 Yet most of the interviewees appear to become more 
forthcoming after some time, whether they are talking about trauma or not. It is 
natural that interviewees should feel a reluctance to share emotionally-charged 
memories straight away, and instead find their feet by focussing on the basic narrative 
of their war experience at first; it would be a mistake to attribute this reticence to the 
psychological impact of trauma when it simply indicates that ‘memories must be 
granted space to unfold’.526 
One can suggest that in relating their traumatic memories most of the veterans show 
subtle ‘trauma signals’—changes in tone and pace, and nervous laughter are common 
features—but the fact remains that they can and do speak. It seems that although 
523 Dutton, 1, 81-87.  
524 Howson, 1, 04, 42-44. 
525 Criddle, 1, 47-50; West, 1, 35-36, 56-58; Mayman, 1, 19-24. 
526 Peniston-Bird, ‘Patriotism and the People’s War’, p. 78. 
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most experienced traumatic things, this did not necessarily leave them traumatised. 
They are not forced into silence by their traumatic memories; nor do most break down 
when they do speak. While the stereotype is that veterans cannot articulate their 
traumatic experiences, among those who are willing to be interviewed this is simply 
not the case. It should not be surprising that those who are willing to talk about their 
war experiences are precisely those who have come to terms with traumatic 
memories: in fact, several have suggested that ‘the most effective way of dealing with 
traumatic memories is to develop some kind of story or narrative about the event’.527 
Arguably, historians of trauma are often too eager to identify potentially innocuous 
features of oral narratives as evidence of deeply repressed, inaccessible trauma. Yet 
as Lindsey Dodd argues, ‘there are more or less traumatising events, and more or less 
traumatised responses…Instead of conceptualising trauma as unrepresentable, it 
seems more fruitful to understand the ways humans can share experience’.528 
Motivations for Narrating Traumatic Experiences 
Now that it has been established that veterans can and do discuss trauma frankly, it 
is fruitful to explore the reasons why they choose to do this. Since trauma is ‘laden 
with social meaning’,529 and as subject to composure as any other recollections, then 
its expression is a subjective process as much to do with culture as with psychology. 
Lindsey Dodd has illustrated the potential impact of such discourses, pointing out how 
527 Nigel Hunt and Ian Robbins, ‘Telling Stories of the War: Ageing Veterans Coping with their 
Memories Through Narrative’, Oral History, 26/2 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 62-3; Alison Parr, ‘Breaking the 
Silence: Traumatised War Veterans and Oral History’, Oral History, 35/1 (Spring, 2007), pp. 64, 68; 
David W. Jones, ‘Distressing Histories and Unhappy Interviewing’, Oral History, 26/2 (Autumn, 1998), 
p. 50. 
528 Dodd, ‘Childhood “Trauma”’, p. 40. 
529 Ibid., p. 38. 
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the ‘elision of trauma and victimhood’ causes French victims of Allied bombing to 
refuse to acknowledge their trauma because they cannot claim the status of victims.530 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, ‘People came to be seen—and to see 
themselves—as passive victims of, not as active participants in violence’, an attitude 
which is extended even to soldiers.531 Trauma came to be regarded as an inevitable 
consequence of war service, to the extent that it became intrinsically linked to the 
identity of veterans. Fighting had, of course, always been a prestigious pursuit, but 
simply being in combat now became prestigious, as it involved facing both the danger 
of death or wounding and the seeming likelihood of long-term psychological 
consequences.532 If soldiering is thought to invariably result in trauma, the soldier who 
did not endure trauma seems scarcely capable of being called a veteran. It is such 
‘victim-veteran constructions’533 which can be attributed with exacerbating the 
epidemic of trauma in the aftermath of the Vietnam War—even though only a small 
proportion of soldiers saw combat,534 a much higher proportion regarded themselves 
as having been in combat,535 and reported cases of PTSD also far exceeded the 
number of frontline combatants.536 More recently, it has been suggested that one 
reason American Iraq War veterans report a PTSD rate four times as high as British 
veterans of the same conflict is a greater expectation among Americans that their 
530 Ibid., p. 40; Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 134; Schacter, Searching for Memory, p. 
209. 
531 Bessell, ‘Violence and Victimhood’, in Echternkamp and Martens (eds.), Experience and Memory, 
pp. 230-1. 
532 Harari, ‘Martial Illusions’, pp. 45-7. 
533 Lembcke, ‘War Trauma’, p. 49. 
534 Jones and Wessely, ‘Psychiatry and the “Lessons of Vietnam”’, p. 91. 
535 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 76. 
536 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, pp. 134, 185; Sally Satel, ‘Returning from Iraq, Still 
Fighting Vietnam’, New York Times, 5th March 2004, <nytimes.com/2004/03/05/opinion/returning-
from-iraq-still-fighting-vietnam.html> [accessed November, 2017]. 
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troops will return home traumatised.537 In relation to the process of achieving 
composure, avoiding traumatic stories may have a deleterious effect on veterans’ 
identities, while discussing trauma strengthens them. In a more positive sense, it is 
also likely that modern discourses provide frameworks for veterans to discuss trauma 
in a way which was not possible previously, for example when Hugh McManners was 
writing in the early 1990s. Moreover, simply the passage of time may have given some 
of the interviewees time to come to terms with their memories. 
Another possible motivation to discuss trauma is the aforementioned desire to tell put 
the whole story on the record, including aspects which might have been self-censored 
earlier in life or in more casual situations for fear of causing upset or offence, 
particularly to family. A reluctance to discuss the war has often been identified as one 
of the key psychological consequences of war experience, and this is undoubtedly true 
in many cases. Hunt and Robbins point out that relationships with family may be 
detached from trauma; speaking to them may threaten that security, which makes it 
safer to tell disturbing stories to outsiders.538 Yet it is possible to explain this behaviour 
in a way unrelated to trauma, because also important is the expected reaction of the 
veteran’s audience. A veteran may be more willing to talk to other veterans or 
historians rather than wives or children for the simple reason that they wish to avoid 
causing the latter pain or upset. This does not necessarily have anything to do with 
protecting oneself from trauma, as a veteran who has been able to completely come 
537 Lembcke, ‘War Trauma’, p. 49. 
538 Nigel Hunt and Ian Robbins, ‘World War II Veterans, Social Support, and Veterans’ Associations’, 
Aging and Mental Health, 5/2 (2001), p. 180. This is a useful overview of veterans’ social support 
networks, but, as it focusses on those with lasting mental injury, cannot be extrapolated to all 
veterans. 
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to terms with his traumatic memories may still self-censor in this way. Speaking to a 
stranger in the more formal environment of an interview appears to encourage more 
frankness. This is why Jack Eglington explains that he is happy to describe people 
being killed in gory detail in the interview, ‘between you and me’, but when it comes 
to writing to the son of one of those men, ‘I can't tell him that really, I’ll have to 
describe it sort of a bit different’.539 
For veterans, discourses of trauma provide a motivation for focussing accounts on 
combat and moments of danger, intensifying the natural desire to tell an exciting 
story. As noted in the previous chapter, non-combatants find the lack of danger in 
their war narratives to be problematic, and find ways either to justify their relatively 
safe role, acknowledge that their position was a privileged one compared with others, 
or stress their proximity to danger. This last tactic, however, is a common one even 
among men who saw significant combat. Indeed, ‘near misses’ are one of the most 
common narrative devices seen in veterans’ testimony, distinctive of the wider genre 
of military memoirs, as well as being a cliché in popular representations like war 
films.540 Parallels can be drawn here with the ongoing ‘spatial turn’ in oral history, 
which acknowledges the ways in which narrators distort space, as well as time, in 
order to stress the meanings of their stories. For instance, Mark Roseman and Tim 
Cole have both explored the ways in which Holocaust survivors utilise time and space 
to ‘assert control over their narratives’, create distance from traumatic ordeals, and 
emphasise their inability to influence events.541 In veterans’ testimony, however, the 
539 Eglington, 1, 02. 
540 Thomson, Anzac Memories, pp. 39, 77. 
541 Roseman, ‘Surviving Memory’, in Perks and Thomson (eds.), Oral History Reader, pp. 238, 241; 
Cole, ‘(Re)Placing the Past: Spatial Strategies of Retelling Difficult Stories’, pp. 30-49. 
196 
tendency is the opposite: distances and timeframes are compressed to emphasise that 
death or wounding was an immanent possibility, which consequently supports the 
identity of the combat veteran. This is not to dispute that such stories are basically 
truthful, merely to suggest that the details can be misremembered and subconsciously 
distorted to accord more closely with popular clichés and discourses around veterancy. 
Veterans make the most of the opportunity presented by events which encapsulate 
the way they wish to interpret and communicate their war experiences. 
Jack Eglington is quite vocal about his desire to emphasise ‘near misses’, which are 
almost the first thing he mentions.542 During his most memorable experience, when 
his carrier was hit and the two passengers killed: 
the shot came from Evrecy, that...direction of Evrecy, down on the right 
hand side, came through, it must have missed me, it must have missed 
me by a fraction, it must have been a fraction, it missed me, it went 
right the way through, and that's when it killed Ron Groves and the 
officer I was driving.543 
Also discussing Hill 112, Stan Procter utilises three separate ‘near misses’. At the 
beginning of his account of the battle comes a recollection of being caught in a 
bombardment—' that's when I nearly met me lot’.544 This is followed by several 
minutes describing his relatively mundane work as a signaller, where Procter quickly 
runs out of things to say and resorts to other experiences to keep the story interesting, 
stressing firstly that he had some exciting experiences of his own, and secondly that 
his day-to-day role was also dangerous: 
542 Eglington, 1, 02-04. 
543 Eglington, 1, 10-11. 
544 Procter, 1, 07. 
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ML: So what could you actually see of the fighting at 112? Obviously you 
were busy but... 
SP: Yeah, busy, yeah, but I mean I particularly remember looking out 
and seeing them walking up that wheatfield towards the hill, towards 
the hill and...Of course mostly I was in-, stuck in my scout car, or in the 
ditch, and I was too busy. I noticed [what was] going on around me but 
I couldn't-, didn't see it all, you see. And I, of course I...the daftest thing 
I did, well, the...dispatch rider, friend of mine who was unfortunately 
killed a bit later on, my wireless set packed up, and so he...I asked him 
for a new one to come, but he said-, they told me it'd be delivered but 
they didn't deliver it to me...he must have dropped it-, he didn't like 
where he was, he dropped it halfway up the road to Hill 112 you see. 
And there I was walking around, I don't know whether it was dusk, it 
was...not daylight, but I don't know whether it was dusk or morning 
now, must have been dusk, and an infantryman looked up from his 
foxhole, he said 'I should get down if I were you mate', and of course at 
that moment these tracers came towards me, and the only reason I think 
that saved me was that they couldn't traject it down low enough...so 
that's one of my closest...experiences, yeah. Am I doing the right thing? 
ML: And what-...Absolutely, that's just what we're after Stan. So what 
happened then? You were at Hill 112. Were you at the chateau the whole 
time? 
SP: No, no, we were there for about three or four days, then we moved 
back down the hill and we were still on the hill but on the lower slopes, 
yeah. 
ML: And what sort of things would you be doing then? 
SP: All the same thing, just sitting at the wireless set and keeping 
everybody in touch with each other, that's really all the time. You could 
hear what was going on around and, and of course, my truck was hit 
once or twice, but...Fat lot of good the armour plating was, there was a 
piece of shrapnel went straight through the side, 'course it was the White 
scout car, you know the White? Your head was above-, your head was 
above the armour plating, just a canvas roof. And of course the canvas 
roof got riddled to bits and so that when it was raining the rain came in 
[laughs].545 
545 Procter, 1, 10-12. 
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Eric Tipping, meanwhile, recalls an incident when his battalion carried out a ‘mad 
minute’—firing all weapons in an effort to shock the enemy: 
And the time came, mad minute, we all fired, bang bang, and...it was 
[a] crescendo, you know, I bet Jerry wondered what the hell was going 
on. But anyway, we knew, we knew that we was gonna suffer for it 'cos 
soon as we'd done the mad minute. So I was due to come out of my 
trench and this other chap come in. And...he was, strange enough he 
was, it was a German Jew, this chap was, he'd got away from Germany, 
probably before the war, into-, out of Germany into England and joined 
up...Anyway he took over from me and I, I started-, but by then Jerry 
had started shelling, and I hadn't moved out of me trench, just along, 
and...a whasname bomb landed straight in the trench and killed this 
chap. I mean, two minutes and I'd have been in there in, and he'd have 
been coming out.546 
In recalling a patrol in the Reichswald Geoff Young demonstrates a less common form 
of ‘near miss’, in which the culprit is not an impersonal shell or spray of bullets, but a 
group of enemy soldiers: 
So when we got there, they got out the jeep and they were gonna to do 
their patrol. I had to camouflage up. Directly they got into the German 
lines a dog barked, upset the apple cart. At the same time the Germans 
had sent a fighting patrol out, about thirty men, and they were coming 
towards me, this water tank, and they came on the one side, I never 
opened fire, I let them go. And as they came up, I came round the back, 
because our four chaps were coming back to get on the jeep, so we- 
they got on the jeep and I took them back to our company then. So that 
was a near miss.547 
In this description it is possible that Young may have exaggerated the number of 
enemy as well as their proximity to his hiding place. It is also interesting that he airs 
the possibility of opening fire; it is difficult to imagine that Young seriously considered 
initiating a firefight with thirty enemy soldiers, but apparently the discourses around 
546 Tipping, 1, 59-60; see also 1, 98. 
547 Young, 1, 58. 
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veterancy demand that the possibility of a fight against the odds be at least 
mentioned. He also recalls, more conventionally, a direct hit on the battalion 
headquarters ‘where I'd just had a cup of tea an hour before’.548 
Barry Freeman’s emphasising of danger as a corrective to his relatively mundane 
driving job has already been discussed, but one extract provides a very clear example 
of a ‘near miss’ story. Freeman had been ordered to move his truck off the road due 
to a blockage ahead: 
But as I pulled into the lane there was a-, I could see the chaps just 
down this track and one of them came up and he said, he said, 'Leave 
the vehicle there', he said, 'and come down and have a...have something 
to eat', which I did, but I'd only got as far, oh ten or fifteen yards from 
the vehicle, and something came over, I never heard it, but it must have 
landed right on the top of the vehicle, because...I never heard a sound, 
but it blew me onto my face, I lost me glasses, and these-, one of these 
chaps came over and lifted me up and said 'Are you alright?', and do 
you know, I had not got a scratch on me, not a scratch. But he said, 
'You've lost your vehicle', and I turned round to look, and the vehicle 
was an absolute wreck, absolute wreck, so what I was carrying in the 
vehicle I don't know, but they reckon it was ammunition, but...I felt 
pretty awful and dizzy after being blown off my feet, but...the lads who 
came up to see if I was alright, 'You're bloody lucky you are!', and...that 
was it more or less, for that little episode.549 
Furthermore, Tom Dutton’s description of the shelling which triggered his breakdown 
can also be considered a ‘near miss’.550 Tellingly, none of these interviewees reported 
being wounded—a far more obvious indication of the dangers associated with 
soldiering which renders temporal and spatial distortions unnecessary. Yet these 
548 Young, 1, 86-87. 
549 Freeman, 1, 34-6. 
550 Dutton, 1, 56-57. 
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examples demonstrate that the narrative technique of the ‘near miss’ is an extremely 
common one. 
A similar narrative technique dependent on discourses around veterancy is comparing 
attitudes before and after commitment to battle for the first time. A naïve enthusiasm 
is contrasted with a cynical and fatalistic attitude after the dangers of combat become 
apparent. While many soldiers undoubtedly did react in this way, it is also true that 
most people ‘know’ from popular representations that soldiers start as callow youths 
and become jaded, and veterans likewise understand that it is an aspect of war 
experience that will be recognised by their audience; the cultural circuit is again at 
work here.551 Again, this is not a matter of making things up, but of emphasising 
certain aspects, or framing experiences in a certain way, to accord to the audience’s 
expectations due to discourses around veterancy. 
Limitations of Narrating Trauma 
Composure can, of course, also have the effect of sanitising testimony. While it is clear 
that many veterans do speak very frankly about traumatic incidents and are 
encouraged to do this by discourses around veterancy, this is not to suggest that they 
always tell the whole story. A particular subject which is especially sanitised is the 
infliction of violence by the interviewee, not only because this breaches obvious social 
taboos, but because victimhood and killing are incompatible. Descriptions of killing will 
be discussed in the next chapter, but here it is sufficient to note that the act of killing 
551 Harari, ‘Martial Illusions’, pp 45-7. Uses of this trope by Ken Tout, Ray Gordon and Hugh Beach 
have already been noted; see Tout, 1, 9-10; Gordon, 1, 23; 2, 00-01; Beach, 1, 04-05, 15-18, 27-29.  
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is evidently still heavily stigmatised in a way which being frightened no longer is, so 
discussions of killing are rare, brief, and hesitant. 
Some interviewees are clearly more willing to discuss death and violence than others. 
It is evident that on many occasions an interviewee could have gone further in his 
description but chose not to. In many cases, abstract language is used to avoid fully 
confronting trauma: friends ‘disappear’ rather than being blown to bits, or are ‘caught’ 
by machine-guns rather than shot.552 With significant understatement, Hugh Beach 
remarks of one man fatally wounded by shrapnel that ‘he was obviously extremely 
ill’553; one can only imagine what this meant in reality. Reports of dead bodies are 
significantly more common than descriptions of those men actually being killed, or of 
the presumably more numerous, and potentially more disturbing, wounded. The 
obvious explanation for this is that it is often easier not to talk about disturbing things. 
The stereotype of the traumatised veteran who remained silent until becoming 
involved with a veterans’ organisation in later life is in some instances absolutely 
accurate, as in the case of Michael Watts: 
ML: How do you, or how did you cope, or still...when you think about 
casualties, either at the time or after the war? 
MW: I think this is why you- we didn't talk about it. You see all these 
horrible things, people's heads and their arms...This is why you don't 
want to talk about it. 
ML: So you never talked about it at the time? And that's still bits that 
you don't want to... 
MW: No I didn't. It was fifty years before I started to talk about it at all. 
552 Tout, 2, 53-54; West, 1, 16-17. 
553 Beach, 1, 27. 
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ML: And how did you start talking about it? 
MW: Normandy Veterans, that was it, I couldn't think of the name, that's 
when I first saw something about Normandy Veterans and thought 'Oh 
I'll join that', and when I was in that I then heard about 'Oh, the glider 
pilots, they had one as well', so I went to Blackpool the next year, and 
met up with the glider pilots, and after that I always went to the glider 
pilot dos.554 
Bill Edwardes’ story is remarkably similar: 
I got home, got demobbed, got some work, and the last thing I wanted 
to do was talk about the war, and what happened...certainly wanted to 
put it behind me, got married, had a family, developed a career, and 
didn't do anything until the fiftieth anniversary, when we went to- down 
to Southsea, to where the D-Day Museum is, and there was a big do 
going on down there, and they had a computer, where you could put 
your details in and get connected to people, and...The reason why I 
didn't want to be involved is that I thought that if I talked about it I 
would bore people to bits, because they wouldn't wanna know, and they 
wouldn't know what you were talking about anyway, but Jean said to 
me, 'You should put your name on that register and see what happens'. 
[…]And then I heard very quickly from the Wessex branch of the 
Normandy Veterans' Association, inviting me to come along to meetings, 
which I did, and...then I discovered that I could talk to other people who 
knew what I was talking about, and weren't bored with your stories, and 
knew things that you knew, you had things in common, and I found 
great...great comfort in that.555 
Hunt and Robbins have argued that other veterans can provide an important audience 
for traumatic stories, or ‘can serve as a means of socially developing narratives about 
the war’ which provide an alternative to discussing traumatic stories. However, shared 
narratives can be problematic if others had different experiences or recall events 
differently.556 The tendency for veterans’ organisations to enforce a uniform 
interpretation of events is illustrated by Alan Hitchcock’s account: 
554 Watts, 1, 24-25. 
555 Edwardes, 1, 49-52. 
556 Hunt and Robbins, ‘World War II Veterans, Social Support, and Veterans’ Associations’, p. 178. 
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...now, when I go up to reunions and that, I'm very proud to be, [have] 
been in the Worcestershire Regiment, I always will be proud. I feel that 
though it's a country regiment, was a country regiment, it is something 
to be proud of, very much so. They uphold the name and I uphold the 
name as well, though I'm a Surrey man, [inaudible 7]...I've never known 
any of them to turn their backs or anything like that, you know. When 
they got over the other-, tell you, when they got over the other side of 
the Seine, they had to go up through a road, and...they got to, in a bend 
in the road there...There's a monument there. This German tank came 
along, because they put up machine-guns on one side and machine-
guns there, and...the Germans came along, and they thought they had 
us, you know, but...they stood their ground, they really stood their 
ground up there, and got-, sent them back...557 
This section of the interview directly follows Hitchcock’s recollections of being 
wounded and evacuated during the fighting on Mont Pinçon: he was never present at 
the crossing of the Seine, but the day is remembered, in Bill Edwardes’ words, as ‘a 
great battle for the First Worcesters’,558 mentioned by all of the other former members 
of the battalion who were interviewed, and Hitchcock seems to have picked up the 
shared story at post-war reunions and felt able to share in the prestige attached to it. 
If some memories are easier not to narrate than others, other possible explanations 
for sanitisation should also be considered. Once again, the individual’s control over 
their own narrative must be remembered, and at times death and violence are simply 
not relevant to the point the interviewee wishes to communicate. Edwin Hunt’s 
account of landing on Gold Beach is sanitised in the sense that he mentions casualties 
were incurred but does not describe them, but this simply seems to reflect the fact he 
is more interested in describing the way ‘Rhino’ ferries were used in the landing.559 
Similarly, Ian Hammerton mentions the casualties on Juno Beach, but generally 
557 Hitchcock, 1, 24-25. 
558 Edwardes, 1, 71. 
559 Hunt, 1, 113-117. 
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contents himself with describing what he and his crew did to breach the defences, 
aside from remarking ‘as I walked along I passed an injured Canadian soldier 
whose...face was...very badly damaged, being comforted by the padre’.560 These 
matter-of-fact narratives could be interpreted as strategies to avoid acknowledging 
traumatic memories; however, this risks invoking trauma where it is simply not a 
relevant factor, and as both Hunt and Hammerton discuss disturbing sights elsewhere, 
such an interpretation does not seem justified. 
Understanding Trauma in Veterans’ Testimony 
Paradoxically, the strong consensus in Western culture on the interaction between war 
and trauma has, if anything, only hindered efforts to understand the relationship 
objectively due to the cultural and moral sensitivities involved. This analysis indicates, 
however, that when dealing with Second World War veterans one can suggest a more 
plausible understanding of trauma than applying the ahistorical model of PTSD. During 
the war, battle exhaustion was poorly understood, although ‘suggestions that 
psychiatric breakdown was due to a failure of personal morality or social degeneration 
had largely been abandoned in public at least’.561 The Battle of Normandy began with 
most psychiatric cases evacuated, but due to alarming wastage rates ‘forward 
psychiatry’—first developed during the First World War and based on the principles of 
proximity (to the front line), immediacy (after the appearance of problems) and 
expectancy (of return to active service)—had been reintroduced by the end of June 
560 Hammerton, 1, 52-58. 
561 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 119. 
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and rates of return to units increased from ten to sixty-five per cent.562 Battle 
exhaustion cases were usually treated with rest: 
On arrival at the Field Dressing Station, the exhausted man would be 
told to wash himself, be put into pyjamas, sedated with a light dose of 
barbiturate and left to sleep on a stretcher for a day or two. After waking 
up he was transferred to another tent and given a day to recover from 
sedation and to sort himself out. Finally, he went to a third tent where 
he became ‘a soldier once more’.563 
Recovered soldiers returned to their units within five to six days.564 
After the war, there was little in the way of psychiatric support and former soldiers 
were advised to forget about what they had seen and move on: ‘society in the 1940s 
did not place great emphasis on the problems of the returning ex-serviceman: there 
wasn’t time, money or energy to spare’.565 The idea of receiving counselling was 
stigmatised in a way which today is difficult to imagine, but, Ben Shephard suggests, 
‘In many ways, it was precisely the old buttoned-up British tradition of suppressing 
emotion which got people through the wartime experience; switching off the anger 
and hatred could not be done quickly’. Overall, he argues, British military psychiatry 
was fairly successful.566 Robert Dale has argued that Soviet veterans proved 
remarkably successful at coping with wartime trauma due to the validation provided 
by national myths of collective sacrifice and national rebirth; it is likely that British 
veterans benefitted in a similar way from their own national myths.567 
562 Shephard, War of Nerves, pp. 250-1, 255. 
563 Ibid., p. 255. 
564 Ibid., p. 255. 
565 Ibid., p. 327. 
566 Ibid., pp. 323, 325, 328. 
567 Robert Dale, ‘“No Longer Normal”: Traumatised Red Army Veterans in Post-War Leningrad’, in Leese 
and Crouthamel (eds.), Traumatic Memories, p. 136. 
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The Vietnam War and the recognition of PTSD led to a reassessment of trauma 
throughout the Anglophone world, encouraging veterans to reassess their traumatic 
wartime experiences in light of the new developments. This created a potentially 
problematic association between trauma and veterancy in the public perception, and 
risked ‘taking the responsibility for the problems away from the victims, medicalising 
and pathologizing them’,568 but also provided new frameworks through which trauma 
could be expressed. Veterans find it possible—indeed, advantageous—to discuss 
trauma, and make use of strategies like describing ‘near-misses’ to emphasise their 
proximity to danger. 
This study cannot indicate what proportion of veterans overcame their wartime 
traumas, and what proportion never came to terms with the things they witnessed. 
Nor is it possible to determine whether trauma increased or decreased the likelihood 
of speaking—is it the heavily traumatised who remain for the most part silent, or was 
it the unaffected who left the war behind and the traumatised, unable to forget, who 
have in old age found it therapeutic to speak publicly about their experiences? Alistair 
Thomson believed that in the context of his investigation into war memory, non-
speakers ‘are significant by their absence’.569 In oral history terms, however, the 
important point is that a substantial number could achieve composure, and were 
eventually willing and able to speak about disturbing experiences. This is reassuring 
for the oral historian of war and acts as a corrective to stereotypes of veterans as 
silent, brooding, and jaded individuals never willing to discuss their disturbing pasts. 
568 Hunt and Robbins, ‘Telling Stories of the War’, p. 58. 
569 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 231. 
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The historical usefulness of such potentially traumatic memories will be considered 
further in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 6 
Combat Experience and Morale 
 
The previous chapters have laid out the various considerations in the way veterans’ 
oral testimony can be analysed. This and the subsequent chapter focus on the end 
goal of such analysis, the application of oral testimony to military history, and also 
deal with the question of usefulness. The first chapter outlined how reliability and 
validity can be used to measure a source’s probable veracity. However, it is a separate 
issue whether this evidence can be historically useful. The real problem with oral 
history is not its veracity per se, but how the peculiar type of personal, subjective, 
often emotional information provided by oral history can contribute to wider, 
generalised interpretations of those issues which are of interest to historians. 
Usefulness is not as simple as merely corroborating that an event occurred, or an 
attitude existed—the fact in question must also be relevant to the issues the historian 
wishes to illuminate: in this case those surrounding the British Army in Northwest 
Europe in 1944-5. This chapter will assess the contribution oral testimony can make 
to understandings of combat experience and morale, while the next chapter will tackle 
doctrine and conduct in battle. Both aim to employ the testimony according to more 
conventional historical objectives, accounting for subjectivity in order to assess what 
it reveals about past events—thus marrying together oral history and military history. 
That said, while there is a place here for factual and chronological information, military 
historians are usually less dependent on oral history for such basic information than, 
say, historians attempting to piece together Holocaust survivors’ journeys or trade 
unionists’ activities, since military bureaucracy generally produces a great volume of 
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records. Extracts of testimony particularly useful here are recollections of less well-
defined experiences and attitudes, whose usefulness is usually not intrinsically related 
to specific incidents, but rather to what things generally were ‘like’. All the interviews 
contain at least some of this nuanced, reflective evidence, which through careful 
analysis can be identified, compared and contrasted.  
One danger in using personal sources in this way is to become entranced by 
eyewitness impressions to the extent that their internal assumptions are absorbed and 
repeated;570 in particular, to assume that wartime events were as disorganised in 
reality as they seemed to participants. On the contrary, it is the job of historians to 
derive useful generalisations out of events which were far too complex for any one 
individual to understand at the time, and present interpretations of the past which 
adequately encapsulate what occurred while necessarily being simple enough for 
readers to understand. It is possible to observe order and coherence in warfare, even 
if eyewitnesses could not perceive this. To acknowledge that events were perceived 
incompletely and/or imperfectly does not demand constraining historical study 
according to the same limitations. 
Often, then, the concern here is not with obvious fact but with the perception of what 
took place; yet since all experience relies on culturally mediated perception,571 
subjective perceptions of experience, even if incorrect, are as much facts of history as 
570 John Murphy believed that ‘Having been both privileged to rummage through someone’s personal 
memory, and complicit in articulating what was found there, the oral historian’s critical faculties are 
partially paralysed’; Murphy, ‘The Voice of Memory’, p. 171. While it would be unfair to suggest that 
oral historians’ impartiality is invariably undermined, there is certainly a recognisable tendency in the 
oral history of war to privilege lamentations of the ‘pity of war’ over meticulous and objective analysis 
of the historical reality. See, for example, Field, ‘“Shooting at Shadows”’, pp. 75-86. 
571 Summerfield, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, p. 12; Bourke, Fear, pp. 75-6. 
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anything else, as Alessandro Portelli has influentially argued.572 In drawing attention 
to such processes, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the cultural context 
within which people have experiences, and the discursive context in which they relate 
those experiences. Oral historians are for the most part loath to suggest that past 
experience and present subjectivity can ever truly be separated, and some decline to 
draw any distinction.573 However, to employ a reduction ad absurdum, it is undeniable 
that at least some of what people recollect reflects past experience: if this were not 
so, there would be no correlation between physical events and the memories thereof, 
and memory would be worthless as a cognitive function. If all experience is perception, 
that does not mean all perception is incorrect. It follows that people can relate 
information about the past just as a letter or document, although biased, can contain 
evidence of historical value.  
It is therefore possible, albeit difficult, to distinguish between subjectivity at the time 
of the event, which influenced the way experiences were perceived, and in the 
present, which influences the way experiences are remembered and related; these 
are referred to here as ‘historical subjectivity’ and ‘retrospective subjectivity’. It is the 
latter which has largely been the subject of the thesis so far, and the former which is 
the focus here. 
The experience of battle is the most obvious candidate for assessment through this 
sort of oral history research, being as it is one of the most mysterious aspects of 
military history, characterised by human factors poorly recorded in the documentary 
572 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, p. 50. 
573 See, for instance, Summerfield, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives, p. 12. 
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sources. There is no suggestion that the testimony provides an unadulterated record 
of past experience or tells us the whole story about what combat was like; however, 
it can add valuable pieces to the puzzle, especially where practical factors interact with 
human behaviour. Peter Simkins suggests that oral history can help illuminate ‘the 
tactical and sociological factors affecting the conduct of units in battle’.574 Combat 
itself is a contested term—the closer a soldier is to the enemy, the narrower his 
definition of combatant tends to be575—but it invariably presumes exposure to physical 
danger due to enemy action; this is the definition used here, although it may 
encompass events a substantial distance away from the front line. It is hardly 
necessary to demonstrate that battle was horrific, unpleasant and terrifying. Fear is 
certainly the most important ‘emotion-label’576 in the testimony, and, presumably due 
to the modern-day openness about war trauma, few had any qualms admitting they 
were frightened577 (although some stress that if they felt scared this did not equate to 
acting scared).578 Nevertheless, it is more productive to focus on what the testimony 
indicates about combat experience aside from the obvious. 
Agency in Accounts of Combat 
Popular representations of combat tend to visualise soldiers as victims enduring a 
threat which is arbitrary and indiscriminate. Paddy Griffith’s assessment of the 
574 Simkins, ‘Everyman at War’, in Bond (ed.), The First World War and British Military History, p. 312. 
See also de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 363. 
575 Allport, Browned Off,, p. 212; Holmes, Acts of War, pp. 76-7. 
576 Bourke, Fear, pp. 73-6, 287-8.  
577 Criddle, 1, 13; Edwardes, 1, 45; Tout, 2, 22-23. 
578 Young, 1, 08. 
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conditions which seemingly pertained during the American Civil War provides a useful 
illustration of this: 
We thus have a numbed, sightless and vulnerable regiment in the open 
confronting an unidentified and invulnerable murder machine. This is 
scarcely a ‘sporting’ way to fight a battle—if ‘fighting’ is the appropriate 
word to use at all in the context—since the attacker is deprived of much 
of his free will by the hostile environment into which he is plunged. His 
chances of defeating the enemy appear remote, and he takes on the 
quality more of a victim than of a warrior. He becomes a pawn to be 
sacrificed in a game which he does not understand and which we suspect 
his commanding officer does not understand either.579 
In Anthony King’s words, war becomes not only unbearably horrific, but a situation in 
which human relationships dissolve, ‘a force majeure beyond human agency’.580 This 
image defines both the experiences of soldiers in much of modern warfare and popular 
assumptions about those experiences. It is not necessary here to draw an absolute 
distinction between discourse and fact, since the cultural circuit causes real 
experiences to be incorporated into and re-presented by popular cultural products, 
which in turn prime veterans to comprehend experiences in particular ways and 
subsequently to narrate them in particular ways. 
Therefore—perhaps contradicting the idea that oral history allows respondents to 
place on the record what they personally did—the primary impression gained from the 
interviewees’ accounts of combat is that they were almost entirely passive and without 
agency. At times interviewees can present others as showing agency, but usually 
relegate their own role to that of a passive onlooker; few accounts give much 
impression of being able to influence the situation, and instead respondents present 
579 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the American Civil War (Marlborough, 1989), p. 17. 
580 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First 
Centuries (Oxford, 2013), pp. 1, 7, 12. 
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themselves as impotent victims of whatever is thrown at them, even in cases where 
this was evidently not the case. Two accounts from former members of 4/Somerset 
Light Infantry, as well as Sydney Jary’s book, make quite clear that Mike Hutchinson 
was a talented and dynamic infantry commander;581 his own interview testimony, 
however, provides no clue of this. Fred H. Allison, who analysed interviews with 
Vietnam veteran Mike Nation, remarks that the veteran ‘equates combat with an act 
of nature’582; in the same way the interviewees picture the enemy, unless they were 
within sight, as a largely inhuman entity, a natural force, or even, like Luis Dimarco, 
comparable to the weather: ‘I mean, the bloody mortaring, just like it's starting to rain 
again, you know…’583 Although the interviewees are quite capable of acknowledging 
that theoretically speaking the enemy soldiers endured similar travails to themselves, 
it is also the case that during combat accounts the enemy are usually characterised 
as possessing a collective will—as Eric Tipping recalls of life in the front line, ‘any noise 
made and Jerry would open up on you’584—apparently with the sole objective of 
victimising the British soldier. 
This level of abstraction is only natural given that, in the conditions of the ‘empty 
battlefield’ the enemy were seen so seldom—usually there was no perceptible target 
against which to act.585 As Colin Criddle remembers of Hill 112, ‘amongst all these 
casualties that everyone, we were suffering, I never actually saw a German fire...firing 
machine guns and that, so...they were so...the forward positions were so 
581 Criddle, 1, 56-58; Partridge, 1, 68-70; Jary, 18 Platoon, pp. 109-10, 131. 
582 Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight’, p. 81. 
583 Dimarco, 3, 127. 
584 Tipping, 1, 57. 
585 Ellis, The Sharp End, p. 111; French, Churchill’s Army, pp. 151-2. 
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concealed.’586 Furthermore, it is scarcely conceivable that an individual could 
comprehend the complexity of battles and operations involving thousands; rather, ‘for 
the individual, war is a very parochial, localized experience, almost impossible to relate 
to a battle or campaign as a whole’,587 which makes any individual contribution difficult 
to perceive. John Majendie describes how, ‘Nobody really...knew an awful lot exactly 
what was going on...probably say your...horizon is the rim of your steel helmet, and 
anything above that or to either side, you don't know what's going on, you're not 
terribly interested’.588 Bill Partridge remarks that ‘you are very very limited as to what, 
what is, knowing what is going on. You followed your tank and then when it stopped 
you went down in the corn and when it moved on you got up and on again.’589 
Similarly, Bill Edwardes recalls conversations with his wife in which:  
Jean would often say to me, 'Well what was it like generally?', and I'd 
say, 'Well apart from my vision forward, I dunno'. I could see-, and that's 
how you concentrated, you didn't know what was happening in the next 
field, unless some infantry sergeant or corporal came rushing across 
and, 'Get the hell out of here, come back' or 'Go forward' or whatever, 
just did as you were told, concentrated on what you had to do…590 
It is therefore unsurprising that ‘the listener gets an impression of fragmented 
perceptions’, in which individual agency is downplayed.591 
The way in which the individual soldier is cast as the victim of overwhelmingly large, 
impersonal and perilous events results in a greater emphasis on hostile than friendly 
actions. As Stan Procter remarks of Hill 112, ‘The fact is that what I remember most 
586 Criddle, 1, 13-14. 
587 McManners, Scars of War, p. 8. 
588 Majendie, 1, 14-15. 
589 Partridge, 1, 18-19. 
590 Edwardes, 1, 21-22. See also Ford, 3, 06. 
591 de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder, Time to Kill, p. 365; Ellis, The Sharp End, pp. 108-11. 
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about is the nebelwaffes [sic], because at- apparently that was the most intensive 
nebelwaffe [sic] campaign of the whole war.’592 Shelling had a substantial moral effect 
on its recipients, which is reflected in the way much of the testimony emphasises its 
ubiquity. Tipping provides a typical description: 
I found the shelling, sometimes it could be quite...quite disturbing, and 
especially continuous shelling, it...sort of breaks you up, you know, and 
sometimes you found it a job to keep yourself as yourself, you know, 
you could easily crack up […] the Germans were really shelling, they 
were...I mean they were top notch at it, and...I mean there's no doubt 
our artillery were brilliant, but I mean, they...sometimes they had a job 
to beat the Germans and sometimes when we used to take these 
positions and see these Germans, like white and shaking from our shells, 
you know, you can understand the repercussion of heavy shelling.593 
In contrast, little mention is made of the British artillery, which in reality was far more 
ubiquitous and, in most cases, highly effective:594 the extract above uses it merely to 
demonstrate the psychological effects of enemy shelling. Unlike their wartime 
counterparts, who were greatly appreciative of the Allied firepower advantage,595 the 
interviewees speaking today report an ambivalent attitude to fire support, which they 
valued but nonetheless recognised as often posing as great a danger as enemy fire.596 
Since accounts are largely self-centred, focussing on the trials of the individual soldier, 
they deliver an impression that danger could come from any quarter and there was 
‘no such thing as friendly fire’.597 
592 Procter, 1, 06. 
593 Tipping, 1, 127-129. 
594 Buckley, Monty’s Men, p. 118; A Borthwick, Battalion (Stirling, 1946), quoted in Stephen Bull, Second 
World War Infantry Tactics: The European Theatre (Barnsley, 2012), p. 196. 
595 Allport, Browned Off, pp 233-4. 
596 Tipping, 1, 133-134; Partridge, 1, 53-54. Hereward Wake cites the RAF as one of the most 
terrifying aspects of battle: Wake, 1, 08. 
597 Procter, 1, 28; Majendie, 1, 35-38; Purver, 1, 12-13. 
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The key subjective aspect of the testimony on combat experience is therefore the way 
the interviewees cast themselves as victims of events with little agency, with the 
enemy visualised as an invisible, inhuman and homogeneous force. However, 
exceptions to this rule are certain cases where interviewees describe being wounded. 
Victims of artillery and mortars have little choice but to ascribe their woundings to 
random chance, but being felled in this way seems narratively unsatisfying, perhaps 
demonstrated by Alan Hitchcock’s disjointed and evasive account of his wounding, in 
which it is initially unclear what injured him, and in which he simply falls back on citing 
the best-known German artillery systems: 
ML: So what wounded you, was it small arms fire or mortar fire? 
AH: I think it was...an eighty-eight actually...It could have been one of 
these...what do they call them, Moaning Minnie things, you know, 
and...That's what happened, it just-, don't know, it was all of a sudden, 
bang, crash and... 
ML: And where were you hit? 
AH: In the legs and thigh...under the chin a bit.598 
Being wounded is framed differently where the circumstances permit veterans to 
humanise the enemy and exert agency by casting themselves as sporting losers in a 
contest against a skilful and cunning adversary. Robert Purver, for example, describes 
a combat in Tripsrath in November 1944: 
RP: …there was troops of another platoon, were trying to get into the 
end of this house, and each time, I saw 'em, coming out from behind 
the houses, trying to get into this house, and each time they came out 
a Spandau opened up on 'em, that's a machine gun, and...they couldn't 
get in, so I took the Bren to the further-most window and, I was looking 
at an angle at the end of this house, and I was firing my Bren gun at the 
598 Hitchcock, 1, 20-21. 
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windows and the doors of this house, and I called across to them, 
[Lieutenant] Tarrant, called across to 'em, 'I'll give you covering fire! 
When I stop, go!', so when I stopped firing they tried again to get in, 
but the firing was so terrific, so heavily defended, so I went back to the 
other room in this house that I was in, facing the chateau, making the 
narrowest possible target of myself, looking out of the window. I was 
looking up there trying to see if there was any movement, and it was at 
that time, pow, I got shot. It must have been a marvellous shot, 
absolutely marvellous, 'cos there must have only been about two or 
three inches of actual window that I was looking out at an angle, and 
I'd got me arm on the upright of the left-hand side of the window like 
that, and I'd got me Sten gun in my hand, and that was there...it hit the 
actual corner of the wall and took a load out of me arm, so it shattered 
me arm, look. 
ML: That's what that's from, yep. 
RP: Yeah. It went in here and the bullet finished up in that hole there, 
up in there. So it was a marvellous shot, whoever it was who did it, he 
was an expert, I thought in one minute I thought 'Thanks very much' 
and on the other word 'Ooh, bloody hell!' [laughs].599 
Rather than attributing his wounding to random chance, Purver regards it to have 
been ‘a marvellous shot’, almost flattering to have been on the receiving end of. For 
Hugh Beach, this same narrative strategy suits quite neatly his self-image as an 
exuberant but sorely amateurish young officer who, during a mission to reconnoitre a 
bridge, sets himself up as the quarry of the more capable Germans: 
…I had the wit not to just doddle straight up to the bridge, but went off 
to one side, perhaps a couple of hundred yards with my driver and staff 
sergeant, we parked the car behind a hut and I walked forward and 
looked as best I could through field glasses and it looked okay, but of 
course we were quite a long way away, and then, this is the bad part, I 
saw a couple of people or three on the other bank of the canal, pottering 
about, who looked as though they were German soldiers, so I thought 
'Here's my moment of glory, I'm engaged with the enemy', dear lord, 
honestly. Well you see, I had a-, do you know what I mean by a Sten 
gun? Hopeless, it jammed after about a couple of rounds, so all it did 
was alert them, and seeing this-, the contest had grown rather unequal, 
I lay down instead, and I should have explained that there was a railway 
599 Purver, 2, 08-12. 
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line running parallel to the canal on a low embankment, so I crawled 
along on my hands and knees behind the railway line, intending to get 
back to my vehicle, and they put a very clever shot just skimming the 
rails which also skimmed my spine, which was not a good moment. So 
there I was, paralysed from the legs down, lying in the turnips, and my 
recce staff sergeant, [the] chap I told you about earlier, came and pulled 
me, probably at considerable risk to himself, I think he undoubtedly 
saved my life, pulled me onto his vehicle and drove me off hoping to 
find a medical unit, and as I passed the headquarters of the...of the 
Cherry Pickers [11th Hussars], who'd told me to do this job, I made a 
report of a kind, which was to the effect that, as far as I could see the 
bridge was okay. Well of course it wasn't, and they put a vehicle on it 
and the bridge collapsed, so that was a black mark...600 
In Mike Dauncey’s case, by contrast, he is initially put on the back foot, but ultimately 
outwits his opponent and escapes to fight another day: 
That's when we moved…to the Weverstraat, and that's when I was 
caught by a sniper, who...tried to kill me, and he put a...I was wearing 
my red beret and he put the shot too high so it only made my skull 
bleed, 'cos when it's thin like that you bleed quite a lot. I think that was 
the first time, and that's when I...[4] had been walking over the road 
from my house to...to the other side where the guns were, and it caught 
me out really, but I think in fact the chap must have been frightfully 
angry 'cos he thought he'd got me dead and I just lay on the ground, 
and I...'cos I was walking over the road to talk to Chalky and...the bullet 
went out, and I said-, no, Chalky White, and I said to him 'I'm not going 
to move for about twenty seconds to make him think I'm going to-...that 
I'm dead, I won't move at all, but get ready for me to come rather 
suddenly into your slit', and I waited and-, and then it was about twenty 
seconds and I think he thought that he'd got me, but he hadn't, and 
that's when I made a dive across...over to him, and he let out a shot, 
but of course it was far too late, so that was our first escape.601 
Bill Partridge’s description of being wounded, quoted in full in Chapter Four, is another 
example of humanising the enemy, in which, after Partridge dallied in the street, ‘Of 
course the guy shot again, and he was a better shot that time’;602 as he gave his 
600 Beach, 1, 15-18. 
601 Dauncey, 2, 55-57. 
602 Partridge, 1, 72. 
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opponent the opportunity—'getting shot was my own fault wasn't it?’603—he is able to 
imply a level of control over the event. Undoubtedly, in the chaotic circumstances of 
a battle these incidents could easily have occurred by random chance, but the 
interviewees prefer to characterise themselves as losers in a sporting contest—in 
which they are an active player and consoled by losing to a more skilled opponent—
rather than victims of an impersonal enemy envisioned as a natural force. This 
indicates perhaps that the more common narratives of victimhood and impotence may 
not be a particularly desirable narrative form, but rather one the interviewees are 
forced into by a combination of their emasculating memories of combat and discourses 
around veterancy. 
Violence and Killing in Accounts of Combat 
It is these victim-veteran discourses that presumably ensure that, if veterans are eager 
to characterise being shot at as a game—and although Joanna Bourke in particular 
has made much of analogies between wartime killing and sport604—none frame the 
opposite situation in this way. Personal aggression is in fact rarely mentioned, but 
when it is, it is more common to describe firing as a token gesture of defiance rather 
than an act of skill. For Doug Mayman the situation was undramatic: ‘we met other 
tank units who fired and us and we fired at them, and it was a question of just who 
was quickest.’605 Where a veteran might have been expected to claim the prestige 
attached to certain skilled and romanticised battlefield roles, this is not done. Partridge 
603 Partridge, 3, 03-04. 
604 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare 
(London, 1999), pp. 14, 62, 140, 232-5; Holmes, Acts of War, p. 376. 
605 Mayman, 1, 05-06, 09. 
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is proud of his success as a leader, but as John Majendie notes has always downplayed 
any suggestion that he was a killer.606 Syd West remembers being employed as a 
sniper after finding a scoped German rifle, but quickly remarks, ‘That only lasted two 
days, it was a dangerous job, so I got shot of that. I only fired two shots’.607 Possibly 
this is related to the belief among British soldiers that sniping by the enemy was an 
underhand tactic—whether they viewed British snipers in the same terms is unclear. 
It is possible to acknowledge the active infliction of violence by others: so Partridge 
speaks little of his personal actions at Briquessard on 28th July 1944, for which he was 
awarded the Military Medal,608 but can recall that ‘there was a couple of Germans with 
a bazooka and they couldn't depress for the tank gun so the commander shot them 
with a Bren gun-, with a Sten gun, he shot 'em with a Sten gun’.609 Another example 
is Eric Tipping’s description of the 1st Worcesters’ attack on the village of Elst, near 
Arnhem, on 24th September: 
Anyway, off we goes on this attack. We'd gone over a couple of fields 
and we were into about the second field and we came under fire from 
our right...the chappie next to me was Corporal Palmer, and as a 
corporal he had a Sten gun. The rest of the section had a rifle. And as 
we moved along we came under fire again from right, and I was trying 
to fathom where this fire was coming from...but we kept slowly moving 
forward. And...suddenly Corporal Palmer, he run forward, and there was 
a hedge in front of us, and sprayed this hedge back and forward like 
that, and he must have spotted it, but I didn't spot it because I 
was...concerned that we were coming under fire, where the- I couldn't 
fathom where this, where this fire was coming from, and it was coming 
from our right...Anyway, when we gets through the hedge, he'd killed 
the whole [German] section, and he'd shot every one in the head. We 
went, we went along them, every one had been shot in the head. And, 
606 Partridge, 4, 00-02; Majendie, 1, 84. 
607 West, 1, 11. Bourke discusses how a ‘warrior myth’ allowed some combatants to view their sniping 
as a sporting and chivalrous act: Killing, pp. 44-68. 
608 Jary, 18 Platoon, p. 24. 
609 Partridge, 1, 55. 
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and he won the MM for that. He deserved it really because, you see, had 
he had not done that, they were letting us get a bit closer, and once-, 
and we were exposed in the field, it'd have been us that had all been 
dead, not...not them.610 
Some have uncovered vivid descriptions of killing in the memoirs of participants,611 
Joanna Bourke in particular arguing that, ‘What is striking is the extent to which 
combatants insisted upon emotional relationships [with those they killed] and 
responsibility [for killing]’, and ‘such stories were of immense personal importance 
with combatants constantly emphasizing (and exaggerating) any rare moments of 
intimate killing’.612 However, in this study it has been difficult to find any accounts of 
killing at all, let alone examples of exaggeration; personal involvement in violence is 
rarely acknowledged. By and large the interviewees only imply inflicting violence 
where the plot of the story makes this unavoidable, and some demonstrate clear 
discomposure in attempting to avoid overtly acknowledging such acts. 
Robert Purver is typical in describing the closing stages of an attack like so: ‘So we 
went in and for the last hundred yards we just had to charge in, so we did, got the 
charge, and we went in, and...we took La Chapelle anyway, and so, there's another 
little story. End of story [laughs].’613 Yet although he completely avoids discussing the 
violent details of that occasion, Purver is unusual because later in the interview he 
admits actually firing at and killing the enemy; however, this was only after being 
directly prompted and thereby receiving the interviewer’s approval. He frames the 
610 Tipping, 1, 33-34. 
611 Bourke, Fear, pp. 197-9; French, Churchill’s Army, p. 152; Holmes, Acts of War, pp. 376-80; Ellis, 
The Sharp End, p. 112; Allport, Browned Off, p. 262. 
612 Bourke, Killing, pp. 4, 7. 
613 Purver, 2, 26. 
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issue firmly as one of unavoidable self-preservation, from which he derived no 
pleasure, and ultimately reminds the listener that he was also a victim of events: 
ML: And how...do you ever get affected by German casualties? Obviously 
you're firing at them, they're dying, how does that affect you, either at 
the time or afterwards? 
RP: It's, it's...it's a mental thing...you've got your target, they're coming 
for you, you've got to shoot him and you hit him and you see him go 
down, you know, but it...you don't want to kill anybody. You know...you 
just wish they'd sort of put their hands up and surrender or something 
like that, go away, you don't want to shoot anybody, I mean...although 
you don't think of it at the time, all you think about is 'If I don't get him 
he's gonna get me' type of thing, you see, but he's some mother's son 
or somebody's husband, it's the same as we were anyway, you see. 
But...when you get-, I mean myself...I mean, I could describe myself as 
a gentle man, I had no aggression, I got no hostility, I'm there because 
I'm told to go there, I've been recruited...against my will, I don't want 
to be there, I don't want to shoot anybody, but you've got to, you can't 
do anything else, you can't just sort of clock off and go home at five 
o'clock or anything like that, and...as I say you was just open to all the 
weather, and whatever comes at you really. And it's...a constant mental 
thing all the time. I can remember sitting in-, I can remember sitting at 
the bottom of a trench and they were shelling and shelling and shelling 
and just hoping that the next one wouldn't come in your trench, and...I 
was thinking, d'you know it'd be lovely if I could just sit there with a little 
baby on me knee, and I'm gonna get a car and a caravan and I'm gonna 
tour the country when I get out-, if I get out of this.614 
It is impossible to know, if the interviewer had asked this question of all the 
interviewees, how the majority would have reacted, but Robert Purver is the only 
interviewee to describe killing outright, albeit only very briefly. 
There appear to be clear retrospective reasons for the silence on killing in the 
testimony: killing of any sort remains highly taboo, while in discourses of veterancy 
victimhood and killing are largely incompatible. Yet if discourses of soldiering 
614 Purver, 2, 35-37. 
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discourage the telling of certain narratives, this may not necessarily function by 
denying distasteful aspects, but rather by allowing them to safely be left unsaid. As 
Fred Allison notes, Mike Nation illustrates the devotion to comrades implicit in his 
identity as a veteran by emphasising treating the wounded; whereas the presence and 
actions of the enemy demand less attention: ‘There is more focus on his fellow 
Marines, supporting, affirming, and caring for them, than on dealing with the enemy, 
a perfectly natural state for combat Marines’.615 Since most people know combat in 
the Second World War involved firing and killing by both sides—certainly, the 
interviewer and interviewees shared this understanding—it is not always necessary to 
emphasise this state of affairs or explain why it was the case. The same effect perhaps 
also facilitates some instances of what might be seen as typically British 
understatement, as when Syd West describes the uncomfortable situation of dealing 
with a jammed weapon while ‘somebody was having a go at you’.616 
Reasons to downplay killing may also date from the war itself: British soldiers were 
not, it seems, natural killers.617 S.L.A. Marshall—the American military theorist who 
controversially suggested that only one-quarter of infantrymen fired their weapons in 
combat—618made much of the fact that the American soldier ‘comes from a civilization 
615 Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight’, p. 80. 
616 West, 1, 34-35. 
617 French, Churchill’s Army, pp. 151-2. 
618 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York, 1947), p. 50. A range of studies have sought to 
evaluate Marshall’s research methods, and his conclusions have received both support and criticism: 
see Roger J. Spiller, ‘S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire’, RUSI Journal, 133/4 (1988), pp. 63-71; 
Engen, ‘S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire’, pp. 39-48; Hugh M. Cole, ‘S.L.A. Marshall: In 
Memoriam’, Parameters, 8/1 (1978), pp. 2-; John Whiteclay Chambers II, ‘S.L.A. Marshall’s Men 
Against Fire: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios’, Parameters (Autumn, 2003), pp. 113-21; Kelly C. 
Jordan, ‘Right for the Wrong Reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea’, Journal of 
Military History, 66 (January, 2002), pp. 135-62; Fredric Smoler, ‘The Secret of the Soldiers Who 
Didn’t Shoot’, American Heritage, 40/2 (March, 1989), <americanheritage.com/content/secret-
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in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable. 
The teaching and the ideals of that civilization are against killing’.619 Whether or not 
this social conditioning against killing really prevented most American soldiers from 
firing, Marshall was surely correct to highlight the gulf between expectations of 
behaviour in civilian and military life. In British society too killing was, and is, 
stigmatised, and if public opinion and state propaganda valorised fighting this was 
something quite different from celebrating cold-blooded killing, even of Germans; 
indeed, revelling in violence was something much more likely to be associated with 
the enemy than one’s own side. Forced into circumstances which necessitated close-
range killing, soldiers seem likely to have experienced levels of disillusionment 
reminiscent of what has in recent years been termed ‘moral injury’, which arises not 
from psychological injury but from participating in, or witnessing and failing to prevent, 
acts which contradict one’s deepest moral principles.620 There is certainly likely to be 
a traumatic aspect to the silence, in that memories of killing are difficult to think about 
or articulate, or perhaps even suppressed as a psychological defence mechanism. 
Yet practical historical factors support these retrospectively subjective motivations to 
downplay killing. Many soldiers never found themselves in the position of being able 
to knowingly kill an enemy; the sort of close-range, face-to-face killing emphasised in 
war films was rare.621 The conditions of the modern battlefield, where most combat 
took place at extreme range and artillery was the biggest killer, ‘meant that while 
soldiers-who-didn’t-shoot> (accessed March, 2018); Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological 
Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston, 1995). 
619 Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 78. 
620 Jonathan Shay, ‘Moral Injury’, Intertexts, 16/1 (2012), pp. 58-60; Derwin, ‘Moral Injury: Two 
Perspectives’, in Leese and Crouthamel (eds.), Traumatic Memories, pp. 269-289. 
621 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 376; Bourke, Killing, p. 4. 
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people could regularly be seen dying, it was rarer to actually see them being killed’.622 
Undoubtedly, some of the interviewees never saw or (even unknowingly) harmed an 
enemy soldier. Most firing—even by infantrymen—was speculative and few were 
consciously aware of having killed, unless they overran an enemy position or their own 
positions came under close-range assault; even in that case the chaos of battle meant 
a degree of plausible deniability was achievable over the possibility that one was 
personally responsible for the enemy dead. These circumstances permitted veterans 
to absolve themselves of blame for the taboo of killing. In this way practical and 
subjective factors interact to produce the testimony recorded in the interview. 
Barry Freeman’s account of hunting snipers is worthy of some deeper analysis here. 
Although it is evident to all involved how these missions must have ended, he avoids 
quite acknowledging what took place, and prefers to focus on the tactics involved: 
ML: And you were talking Barry about obviously going after the German 
snipers. How did you actually do that? 
BF: Well usually, you'd get to know they were there because they'd had 
a shot at somebody. And usually, you got into the habit of sort of 
listening and [inaudible] so you knew approximately where they were, 
you see. So you'd go, like on that occasion when I got hit on the knee, 
round the corner of that building, we knew they were up in that top 
corner of that little square, we didn't know which house they were in, 
so...One of the tricks was that, you'd say...one window there, one there 
and one below, or thereabouts, and although he didn't know where we 
were, you'd fire a round into each of those windows, which in turn 
confused the sniper, because he knew, or thought he knew, that you 
didn't know where he was. So usually by tricks like that, and...running 
up, even running into the buildings we'd caught them before now. But 
once you can see him and...it didn't bother me, I could hit him quite 
622 Ibid., p. 6. 
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easily. Quite easily, yeah. But that one when they hit me in the knee, 
they got away with it. I didn't hang about. Yeah.623 
Freeman states that he could hit the snipers, even though this was evidently not a 
hypothetical circumstance, but one in which real face-to-face killing took place.  
In the next section of the interview, despite the shared understanding communicated 
by the phrasing of the question, Freeman struggles for a moment to avoid stating 
outright that the snipers were killed where they could have been captured, and that 
he and his comrades kept this secret. Possibly the transgression from proper military 
conduct is the source of his discomposure, rather than the killing itself; he regains his 
confidence when justifying his actions, proving the truth of Alan Allport’s assertion 
that ‘Snipers were loathed by regular infantrymen and rarely had their surrenders 
accepted’:624 
ML: And did you ever take them prisoner or was it...you were just there 
to finish them off, really? 
BF: No, we didn't take 'em prisoner. Technically, you should have done, 
but...there was only me and three others that used to go after the 
snipers and had an unwritten rule that...that we would say, we wouldn't 
let them know that we'd-, what had happened, you know. So...no, 
it's...when you see them, you know that they are cowards. They hide 
away to kill some of our blokes. So if you hit them, you get satisfaction 
from it. Say, 'Well you won't hit any more of our lads'. Yeah.625 
One can observe here popular understandings of sniping—any lone rifleman tends to 
be labelled as a sniper, a signifier which has far more to do with emphasising the 
seriousness of the threat in the eyes of the targeted individual and justifying retaliation 
than making an objective judgement about the enemy’s tactical specialism or 
623 Freeman, 2, 02-04. 
624 Allport, Browned Off, p. 263. 
625 Freeman, 2, 04-05. 
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weaponry. Freeman’s account is typical in the way that killing is implied but not directly 
acknowledged, and how even while the respondent refuses to wholeheartedly admit 
to killing, the act is justified as self-preservation or retribution for contravening the 
unwritten rules of war. 
Patterns of Narration in Accounts of the 1944-5 Campaign 
An important effect to consider when analysing accounts of combat is the way speech 
reflects experience, so that confusing and disorientating combat experience produces 
confused and disoriented testimony about combat. This effect particularly influences 
descriptions of the various distinct phases of the ‘campaign to victory’. It is a powerful 
reminder of the importance of analysing each recording as a complete product and, 
during the interview, providing sufficient time for the narrative to develop. The clearest 
example is the sense that the Battle of Normandy was one homogeneous and unvaried 
experience, characterised by bodies, foul odours, debris and destruction, in which it is 
largely futile to identify changes over time or distinguish between periods of action 
and inaction. As Syd West notes, it is difficult to remember specific incidents as the 
battle ‘was continuous all the time.’626 Gabriele Rosenthal has suggested that German 
memories of the Western Front in the First World War are disorganised because the 
experience itself was chaotic and difficult to make sense of,627 and the same effect 
seems evident in the interviewees’ recollections of the Normandy campaign. This is 
only untrue in cases where the individual has researched his wartime activities 
particularly well, or where he can draw upon an established regimental chronology of 
626 West, 1, 35. 
627 Rosenthal, ‘German War Memories’, pp. 34-6. 
228
operations; although major changes in terrain, tactical approaches and actual 
battlefield success took place between the start and end of the Normandy campaign, 
most describe the entire period in an entirely undifferentiated manner. In this the 
interviewees, worth quoting at length, mirror a pattern observable in memoirs of the 
campaign, such as that of David Holbrook, who wrote that Normandy ‘stank of dead 
cattle and dead men, of burning tanks and stores, of stale cordite fumes, of 
phosphorous and other chemical stenches and of human hatred’.628 
Ian Hammerton’s narrative is typical of the way a number of negative images from an 
extended period of time are concatenated with little attention paid to the specifics of 
geography or chronology: 
So we linked up with the Canadians, at Ranville, where the cemetery is 
now, or nearby where the cemetery is, and they were very pleased to 
see us. They were in their-, still in their slit trenches, and in front of them 
there was just bodies af-...bodies after bodies. You couldn't help driving 
over them, which was not very nice [...] We were held there, being 
stonked by the enemy, in a field, for some couple of days or so. We 
made a tentative advance...I got a message over the radio which said 
'Tigers in Escoville', so I took a quick look, my gunner said 'Where's 
Escoville?', I took a quick look at the map, and it was just a few 
kilometres to our left, but...nothing came of it, I'm happy to say, 'cos we 
were no match for Tigers and I don't think they were Tigers anyway. We 
knocked out a German...tank, and...then we had to pull back. I 
remember, when I walked up there...in front of the position that the 
Highlanders were in, there was a dead German, and over the days that 
followed his body got larger and larger and larger, and the stench was 
awful, because obviously there hadn't been any battlefield clearance at 
that point, not yet. Then we were pulled back from there and for the 
rest of our time we were on...constant alert, being used as troops rather 
than as a squadron by all and sundry, whenever they thought there were 
mines or enemy tanks they called up for some flails, and so we dashed 
hither and thither, Tilly-la-Campagne and all sorts of places.629 
628 David Holbrook, Flesh Wounds (1987), pp. 233-235, quoted in Bond, Britain’s Two World Wars, p. 
82. 
629 Hammerton, 1, 63-67. 
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Ranville was liberated on D-Day, whereas Tilly-la-Campagne, over eight miles away, 
would not be captured until 8th August. In a similar way, Geoff Young’s ‘first 
impression’ becomes an unvarying weeks-long experience, lacking specifics. 
ML: What do you remember of the first time you were actually in action? 
GY: Well...the first time I went into action, 130 Brigade, when consisted 
of us, the Hampshires and the Dorsets, they were a good one as well. 
They had so many casualties in their first attack, when we came up to 
take over from them, I couldn't believe it! And...after a fortnight, the 
bodies were still around, and I know that I had to help dig some dirt up 
to put on the chaps' faces because of the flies, and I thought 'This is 
terrible', it was really terrible, there's no doubt about that. That's my first 
impression. Nobody could pick them up in any case 'cos the barrages 
that came over were colossal. They had so much ammunition, the 
Germans...[10] […] we were stuck in our trenches, you see, just talking 
it, what was coming. We didn't know who was who, it was awful 
really...[4]but there's so many casualties, and I were- you were helping 
each other as much as you could, yes it's...[4] it was really a bad time, 
there's no doubt about that.’630 
For Joe Ekins too, the experience of his first two months in Normandy before the 
TOTALIZE night march can be summed up in one brief and non-specific overview: 
...I mean it were, there were...bodies all over the place, until they 
got...and there were more people coming into the bridgehead so the 
bridgehead were...getting packed, you know, so there were less place 
for you to, to move, and...we would sit there and of course we were 
being shelled all the time, and...you could hear the eighty-eights coming 
or the Moaning Minnies, and...you'd put mates under, my best mate 
were killed the second day we were over there, you were losing people 
all the time, and the stench...some of the tanks were terrible, there were 
dead animals lay there on their back with their feet blown, all blown up, 
you know and...and probably...the most distressing thing, more 
distressing perhaps than the bodies, was you'd see a hedgerow where 
the infantry had been fighting, and...all that were left there would be all 
their personal kit. There were photos laying around, bits of letters, 
perhaps a couple of mess tins, cigarette packets, all in the bottom of a 
630 Young, 1, 07-09. 
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hedge, which were all that were left of the...people who were in there, 
you know...it was really terrible, really terrible.631 
John Majendie, initially questioned about Hill 112, evokes a typical assortment of 
confused images: 
...112, I think my...I think my main memory is noise and the place...well 
even well before that, Normandy stunk, it absolutely stunk, the dead 
animals, dead humans...well in fact funnily enough the worst smell I 
ever smelt in my life was at Eterville when a German...limber...towed by 
two horses in a lane had been...they'd been killed, and I've never ever, 
I wasn't actually sick, but I've never, ever smelt anything like it, 
and...there wasn't really time to do any-, everybody blows up and cattle, 
all turned over on their backs, they did...when we came back initially 
from 112, to, in...just on the edge of Mouen I suppose, I know there 
were some extremely dead cows in the field we were in and, and a 
sapper bulldozer came and tried to bulldoze them...in, but that and 
the...the noise, and the noise was sort of, you had peaceful times, but 
during the actual attack going up...everything was coming behind us in 
every direction, I mean...our gunners were...I think our divisional 
artillery fired forty-three thousand shells in the first day, and...which is 
a lot of shells, and the, the Boche were...doing about the same, and I 
think the incessant noise that went on, and of course...you weren't 
really, I've often tried to sort of think what I could actually see when we 
were trying to dig in initially, and you weren't really very interested in 
looking over there or over there, you were only interested in doing what 
you were doing. Awful lot of smoke around from burning vehicles...632 
 ‘The depths of frustration that were being felt by British soldiers’633 after several 
weeks engaged with the enemy in Normandy form a key feature of the veterans’ 
recollections, as in this extract from Bill Partridge’s interviews, which further suggests 
that the ‘Valley of Death’ near Hill 112, and the nearby villages such as Mouen and 
Maltot, was something of an epicentre of carnage: 
D company were split off from the 4th battalion, went to help out 
another brigade that was putting in an attack...I think it was on Maltot, 
and we were in an orchard above guarding their right flank. You've never 
631 Ekins, 1, 17-18. 
632 Majendie, 1, 49-52. 
633 Allport, Browned Off, pp. 187-8. 
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been in a place like that in all your life, with dead Germans, burnt out 
tanks, dead crews, dead animals, the smell of rotting flesh and cordite. 
I've never been anywhere like it, I never want to go anywhere like it 
again, it was really really terrible […] you can't imagine how soul 
destroying it was to be in that orchard with all those dead bodies of 
animals and people .634 
One veteran, Alan Hitchcock, does describe Normandy as a period of movement, as 
his division redeployed to various sectors of the front; but he does this to emphasise 
the quality of the 43rd (Wessex) compared with the more ‘static’ Germans, has a good 
knowledge of the division’s battles developed after the war, and, crucially, was 
wounded and evacuated in early August, so had no chance to witness the very 
different experience of the breakout.635 The veterans by and large agree with Sydney 
Jary that, ‘In retrospect, Normandy is now a surrealistic dream, totally lacking the 
stark clarity of memories of subsequent battles: a pastiche of heat, dust, the stench 
of bloated cattle, the litter of dead tanks, rusting guns and wildly scattered grenades 
and small arms ammunition’.636 
The claustrophobic and disjointed accounts of Normandy are starkly different from 
what follows: the feeling of freedom and openness which pertained during the 
breakout is evident. Some of the interviewees remark on this directly: 
It was different, it was...fighting in the, in the trenches and under that 
shellfire et cetera. Very demoralising and...a very hard life, and then 
after you came off of 112 it was more fluid, you know, you were five 
miles here and fight a battle, and five miles there and fight another 
battle. And...so you were moving around and, and you weren't living in 
trenches, so much, and...by the time we got out of Normandy all of a 
sudden […] it was very different, the latter stages of fighting.637 
634 Partridge, 1, 58-61. 
635 Hitchcock, 1, 43-44. 
636 Jary, 18 Platoon, p. 6. 
637 Partridge, 3, 3-4. See also Spittles, 5, 54-56. 
232
In other accounts the shift in the pattern of fighting is merely implied, often as much 
by structure as by language: disjointed stories with little sense of time and place give 
way to tightly and precisely narrated chronologies, while the tone shifts from 
downbeat to hopeful. Joe Ekins, although putting a characteristically negative spin on 
events—'What it amounted to, you just advanced until some bugger shot at you, you 
know, and...hoped you got [laughs] away with it’638—nonetheless begins to imply 
movement and action, naming some of the places on the route of advance and even 
remarking that ‘Belgium weren’t too bad’.639 Colin Criddle recalls ‘really having the 
feeling that one was going forward, quicker. And you were seeing that you were, I 
won't say winning, but making progress. Your expectations or your...was a little bit 
higher.’640 This again reflects the memoirs, which make much of how ‘Soldiers who 
had become habituated to a fortnight’s gruelling battle over a couple of hundred yards 
of no-man’s land now drove along country roads for dozens, sometimes hundreds of 
miles a day without encountering a single German’.641 As Tom Dutton remembers, ‘We 
didn't dug anything, 'cos it was wonderful, the people was shouting, it was...it was 
just uncanny that there was a war on, that the war had passed over it so quickly.’642 
Barry Freeman remarks that ‘we'd crossed-, gone through Belgium like nobody's 
business, in no time at all.’643 Whereas the close-quarters fighting in the cramped 
Normandy beachhead was confusing, disorientating and continuously stressful and 
unsafe, the advance after the breakout was a period of relief, with the hardest fighting 
638 Ekins, 1, 44. 
639 Ekins, 1, 44-48. 
640 Criddle, 1, 31-32. 
641 Allport, Browned Off, p. 190. 
642 Dutton, 1, 25-26. 
643 Freeman, 1, 22. 
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over, appreciable daily progress being made, and relatively scant opposition 
encountered—a situation, albeit still dangerous and demanding, that enabled 
participants to properly process events as they took place. 
Later stages of the campaign demonstrate a less evident ‘zeitgeist’, but some themes 
are nonetheless evident, such as the disappointment felt when the front stabilised 
again in Autumn 1944,644 the relentless discomfort of the winter battles,645 and the 
sense of freedom which pertained once the German border was finally crossed.646 
One should be wary of ascribing too complex an explanation to such shifts in imagery. 
One could evoke a popular memory of the Battle of Normandy which has congealed 
in the years since; but, as J. P. Roos points out, it is not necessary to invoke 
subjectivity if the narrative under consideration can be more simply explained as a 
reflection of reality.647 Accounts of Normandy show similarities not because all the 
veterans have been converted to a certain point of view after the fact—there is still 
more than sufficient variety to demonstrate that their accounts are primarily 
individual—but because that was how the Battle of Normandy and the subsequent 
breakout were actually experienced. Oral testimony does therefore appear to be a 
useful source on the experience of campaign and combat, whether information is 
drawn directly from interviewees’ statements or from the patterns of narration in their 
accounts. 
644 Tout, 2, 75-77; Mayman, 2, 10-11. 
645 Ford, 3, 37-38; Mayman, 2, 10, 12; Criddle, 1, 47-48; Procter, 1, 21-22; Askew, 1, 15-16; Laws, 2, 
14; West, 1, 20; Edwardes, 1, 81-82. 
646 West, 1, 20; Mayman, 2, 21-22; Eglington, 1, 17; Procter, 1, 27; Criddle, 1, 56-58. 
647 Roos, ‘“Reality or Nothing”’, in Rogers and Leydesdorff (eds.), Trauma, pp. 215-6. 
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Morale in Veterans’ Testimony 
Oral testimony can also, of course, be used to assess morale, defined as ‘the 
willingness of an individual or group to prepare for or engage in an action required by 
an authority or institution; this willingness may be engendered by a positive desire for 
action and/or by the discipline to accept orders to take such action’.648 Since 
respondents’ concern is to tell a broad narrative of their war with a focus on front-line 
life, oral history is more effective at indicating the kind of factors which could affect 
morale, than highlighting unequivocally all of those which did. For example, the 
interviewees speak little about discipline, man-management, propaganda, Army 
education, entertainment, and views of senior commanders, although arguably this is 
because those factors were unimportant in relation to front-line life. Presumably there 
were a host of ‘local’ factors, such as the command styles of officers, relations with 
peers and the circumstances in which the unit found itself, which were very important 
influences on the morale of particular individuals at particular times, but these tend 
not to be regarded as worthy of much attention and, in any case, are difficult to verify 
and contextualise. The testimony does, however, illuminate several pertinent 
determinants of morale; Jonathan Fennell is probably correct to identify one of the 
problems in the study of morale as an over-dependence on personal sources,649 but 
by the same token ignoring personal sources entirely would also be limiting. 
Rather than restricted scope, the main problem with drawing judgements on morale 
from veterans’ testimony is likely to be their tendency to present a more positive image 
648 Fennell, Combat and Morale, p. 9.  
649 Fennell, Combat and Morale, pp. 3-4, 7. 
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than was really the case. One should not expect interviewees to recount potentially 
embarrassing tales of the dejection and depression which must have been fairly 
common on introduction to Army life; indeed, Stan Procter has written of crying 
himself to sleep on his first night in barracks, but mentions nothing of this when 
interviewed, recalling instead how ‘I seemed to be enjoying myself’.650 Judgements on 
inter-personal relations must be approached warily as respondents are likely to neglect 
to mention, or have forgotten, those they particularly disliked, and remember those 
they had good relations with. Generally time will serve to moderate strongly-felt 
opinions, while in hindsight a sense of solidarity between veterans or respect for the 
dead might cause major resentments to be concealed. There is little evidence for or 
against the morale problems which have been identified in particular British 
formations, such as 43rd (Wessex) Division, in which many of the interviewees 
served.651 Presumably individuals lacked the context to identify morale in their units 
as particularly bad, or perhaps hindsight simply encourages overly positive 
assessments. It is probably no coincidence that Bill Edwardes, who describes at some 
length how morale in the 1st Worcesters was ebbing badly by the later stages of the 
campaign, was a medic, socially distanced to an extent from the rank-and-file 
infantrymen of his battalion and therefore able to make a more objective assessment 
of their attitudes.652 
650 S. C. Procter, A Quiet Little Boy Goes to War, IWM Documents 5636 1996/09/24; Procter, 1, 02. 
See also Allport, Browned Off, pp. 73-4. 
651 Beevor, D-Day, p. 280. 
652 Edwardes, 1, 37-38, 79-80. 
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Nonetheless, many different morale issues are discussed. Fennell has argued that ‘it 
is clear that no one factor can explain the causes of good and poor morale’,653 and 
there is potential for oral history to contribute to building up a well-rounded and 
sufficiently complex picture of morale. In particular the positive consensus on Army 
welfare can hardly be ignored. Such statements may be considered suspiciously rosy, 
but they reflect the literature which argues that British soldiers in Northwest Europe 
were especially well cared for.654 Rations are remembered as plentiful and of good 
quality: ‘Talk about food to feed an army, there was enough food to feed umpteen 
armies, and it was quite good food as well.’655 Soldiers also seem to have been 
impressed by the evident scale and complexity of the logistical system at their 
backs;656 the postal system receives praise from the infantry,657 whereas for ‘tankies’ 
‘the impressive thing was, for us that...the way in which if you lost a tank you simply 
walked a mile or two back down the line and you were directed to a delivery squadron 
where you found a new tank ready for action, and you simply got in and brought it 
back to your rendezvous.’658 Officers stress the responsiveness of the medical system 
and view it as an essential factor in high morale;659 from other ranks’ point of view, 
prompt medical attention seems to have been a fact of army service which requires 
little explanation, which is its own kind of praise.660 Overall the interviews demonstrate 
that British soldiers believed they were well looked after. 
653 Fennell, Combat and Morale, p. 280. 
654 Allport, Browned Off, p. 183; Jary, 18 Platoon, pp. 71, 88; French, Churchill’s Army, p. 143. 
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Recollections of inter-rank relations are worth highlighting in some more detail. 
Unsurprisingly, no officer is in the least bit critical of his men.661 The amount of 
attention officer interviewees devote to the morale and performance of the men they 
commanded, as opposed to their personal concerns, is testament to the strength of 
wartime paternalism and its effect on later recollection.662 Somewhat less predictably, 
the other ranks are also overwhelmingly positive about their officers.663 Although oral 
testimony cannot usually illuminate the fraught relations which must sometimes have 
existed in units, it does demonstrate the senses of loyalty and obligation which defined 
inter-rank relations. It also highlights a neglected aspect of morale, the role played by 
NCOs. Although the British Army is generally thought to have established a relatively 
poor record of nurturing talented NCOs by comparison with the Germans,664 the 
interviews make clear at various points the important contribution made by these men. 
Some examples take the form of potentially self-serving, but probably honest, 
assessments by NCOs themselves. Reg Spittles stresses his paternalistic role as a 
corporal tank commander, for example when it came to selecting a crew: 
…the three boys, having come freshly from a training regiment, having 
done ten weeks' training, almost just come straight from school, 
discipline was instilled in 'em. And there's another factor. I was twenty-
five years old. I was seven years older. I was like a father. I was an old 
man. And so, it's like them being told something by their father. They 
respond to the discipline of an old person. You don't have to discipline 
'em, you tell 'em and they think, you know, 'poor old bugger'. But it gave 
you an advantage, that age gap of seven years.665 
661 Dauncey, 1, 11-12, 15; Hutchinson, 3, 04, 16-17; Wake, 1, 05. 
662 Wake, 1, 08-09, 38; Hutchinson, 3, 62-63; Cox, 1, 22. 
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Spittles maintains that on only one occasion was his authority challenged, in a dispute 
about leave rather than anything as imperative as combat motivation.666 
Positive assessments of NCOs also come from private soldiers—there are numerous 
remarks as to the nurturing roles played by sergeants and corporals, which were 
important enough to motivate fond recollections seventy years on.667 Tom Dutton, for 
instance, discusses a beloved lance-corporal, Freddie Baker, who along with the 
section corporal ‘took me under [his] wing’ and ‘generally nursed me right up to the 
day he got killed’, concluding that ‘I thought the world of him’.668 Such recollections 
are far more common than complaints about irresponsible and negligent NCOs, a 
situation which is unlikely to be entirely the result of the mollifying effects of hindsight. 
Officers also evidently appreciated the competence of many NCOs: as Robert Ford 
attests, when casualties among officers occurred, ‘What was rather remarkable was 
that people like sergeants and corporals could take over. They were so experienced, 
they could take over straight away if an officer was killed or wounded, and perfectly 
capable, do it just as well too...because they were normally hardened and experienced 
people.’669 There is little evidence in the testimony which implies the Army experienced 
any particular problems promoting capable NCOs, but there is much evidence of their 
important leadership role. The positive recollections of the veterans of the role played 
by officers as well as NCOs strongly suggests that inspiring leadership was a vital 
component of good morale. 
666 Spittles, 1, 124-133. 
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Narrating Loss and Desensitisation 
What seems certain is that if good support and leadership could inculcate a high 
willingness to engage in combat, this did not mean combat was ever easy;670 it is 
difficult to overstate how damaging, disillusioning and traumatic the experience could 
be, and oral evidence captures this well. One of the particularly demoralising aspects 
of battle was the indiscriminate nature of the violence; it was easy to feel hard-done-
by because ‘the hazards of battle were infuriatingly uneven’.671 As Tipping remarks, 
‘although I found many many times that it...in the army you're all together, in action 
can be a very individual... individual...thing, and...and it's strange how you could-, 
you'd do an attack and one, one section has a hard battle and yet another one...there's 
hardly anything happening.’672 Edwin Hunt recalls that while his company dug in after 
landing in Normandy, another failed to do so and on 7th June sustained some seventy 
casualties from German artillery, ‘'cos they were in tents and not in weapon slits, so 
they didn't have weapon slits and got killed, we did have and we weren't attacked.’673 
Richard Holmes has suggested that casualties resulting from accidents are likely to be 
especially distressing;674 it is perhaps for this reason that Luis Dimarco highlights one 
particular incident right at the end of his interview: 
…there was an explosion, and a scream, and a sergeant, Scottish 
sergeant he was, he died. How it happened I don't know, 'cause it was 
dark, and it- he wasn't that close to me, but I say, you know, somebody 
said...he was saying 'What the bloody hell's happening?', you know, we 
670 Gary Sheffield, ‘Dead Cows and Tigers: Some Aspects of the British Soldier’s Experience in 
Normandy, 1944’, in John Buckley (ed.), The Normandy Campaign: Sixty Years On (Abingdon, 2006), 
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672 Tipping, 1, 123-124. 
673 Hunt, 1, 131-132. 
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were all supposed to be quiet, but somehow the hand grenade went off 
on him, killed him...[14]675 
The unpredictability of sudden death or wounding left some soldiers with a damaging 
combination of disillusionment and survivor’s guilt. Colin Criddle recalls returning from 
leave in Antwerp only to be told ‘“You lost your section this morning, on the way in, a 
shell pitched amongst 'em”, and...my mate was amongst them, and he was one of 
three killed and all the rest was very badly injured, and...which was very disturbing 
really, and making you think, really “Why am I still...how is it I'm still here?”’676 Several 
valued members of Geoff Young’s battalion were killed on one day as he too was 
returning from leave, prompting a similar reaction: ‘Now that's the luck of the draw, 
isn't it?...[4] Why does that happen? But there you are.’677 For survivors, the distinction 
between dead and wounded comrades was often less meaningful than one might 
assume. Burying killed comrades, even if ‘it breaks your heart’,678 might at least allow 
for a sense of closure, but ironically the efficiency of the medical services meant the 
wounded would simply disappear without warning, never to be seen again, and 
judging by the frequency of statements to this effect in the testimony this could be 
highly demoralising.679 
All the interviewees were questioned about their reactions to casualties among 
comrades. Attempts to dodge this question form one of the curious patterns in the 
testimony; some interviewees discuss the practical rather than emotional effect of 
675 Dimarco, 3, 128. 
676 Criddle, 1, 49-50. 
677 Young, 1, 86-87. 
678 Howson, 1, 05. 
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casualties, which presumably reflects a desire not to dwell on the emotional impact of 
losses. One example appears in the account of Hereward Wake: 
ML: How did losing your men affect you? How did you cope with 
casualties, obviously with the men under you? 
HW: It was all very well organised...We had a medical officer and each 
company had stretcher-bearers, I had two stretcher-bearers under my 
command, and they'd been taught about first aid, and anybody [who] 
got wounded or hurt, my stretcher-bearers would rescue them, from no-
man's-land, very often, and...they went back and were looked after.680 
Another example comes from Ted Howson: ‘…people don't realise that you see them 
there, they're wounded, but...you don't cope with casualties, you go by 'em, and it's 
only when you come back, in them days. You see, we was on the move…’681 Similarly, 
Robert Ford ruminates briefly on the emotional impact of casualties, in evident 
discomfort, before shifting to the safer matter of medical procedures.682 
Most of the interviewees in this study do discuss their feelings quite candidly, however, 
especially the rankers—again there is a difference in openness between officers and 
other ranks. Initial encounters with wounded men and dead bodies incited varying 
reactions. Harry Askew, stationed at the large base hospital at Arromanches, recalls 
that the wounded who arrived ‘affected me a lot...you know, I couldn't sleep for 
thinking about 'em, a couple, three days, you know because they were only young 
lads the same as my age. When we landed the first thing I see was a...a pile of dead 
680 Wake, 1, 40. 
681 Howson, 1, 36-37. 
682 Ford, 3, 12-16. 
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Germans. Now I'd never seen dead people before...[7]’.683 Others, such as Bill 
Partridge, were less affected: 
BP: We supported the Scottish, the Fifteenth Scottish, that was our first 
sort of action. We followed them and I saw my first...dead body...cos I 
wondered how I would react to that. 
ML: And how did that affect you? 
BP: Not so badly as I thought it might have done. It was...obviously 
something I had to accept, and that was that.684 
There is strong agreement on the effect of repeatedly witnessing violence: most report 
not only coming to terms with casualties, but becoming accustomed to death, even 
callous. In Syd West’s recollection, ‘you just think, well, bad luck at him but at least 
I'm still alive, I know it's a hard way to look at it but it was there every day. You'd be 
with a chap one day and the next day you'd buried him [...] you couldn't afford to 
have too many feelings in case you joined them.’685 Criddle displays evident discomfort 
when admitting this:  
I suppose...in the beginning it was, it was hard to lose...a mate or so on 
and...but, although it's difficult to say this...but...seeing so many 
casualties, and knowing of other people in different companies and that 
that have lost...you're...What can I say?...Resigned yourself, to think 
yourself, well, 'I'm thankful to be here', you know...and...it's difficult to 
say you get hardened to it, that's a very crude way, you know, you don't 
get hardened to anybody, to losing anybody, but the...the blow, you 
know, the loss, isn't so difficult to...you know, to overcome, really...686 
Victor Gregg, on the other hand, maintains in a characteristically brash manner that 
‘you...don't make a song and dance about it […] you just mention it as a...probably 
683 Askew, 1, 07-08. 
684 Partridge, 1, 12. 
685 West, 1, 08. See also Hitchcock, 1, 37. 
686 Criddle, 1, 103-105. 
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with a twinge of regret...’687 In the case of his platoon’s first casualty (mentioned also 
in Gregg’s book), ‘I don't remember anybody crying over his bones, treat him with 
respect, yeah, we buried him, stood round and...but...I don't recall any great emotion 
over it.’688 Doug Mayman is also blunt about the desensitisation he experienced: 
DM: You kept hearing of friends who were killed, that was always the 
problem. You know, there was always somebody killed every day. 
ML: And how does that, or did that, or does it affect you? 
DM: Well, you soon got used to it [laughs]. Odd, isn't it, you do, you just 
felt sorry 'cos you knew the guy so well, yeah...689 
Robert Ford concurs:  
…I think the awful thing is that we became more callous. We did, 
undoubtedly, become more callous, and...people being killed, if they 
weren't people who were personal friends, meant less. I cant say more 
than that. […] We became used to it. I mean every night, we learned 
that another four members of the regiment, their tank had been brewed 
up, knocked out, we probably knew them, and it was very sad, but you 
just became attuned to it…690 
Luis Dimarco believes that during the Battle of Arnhem, with no option but to carry 
on, his mind shut out disturbing sights as a self-defence mechanism: on witnessing 
casualties, ‘automatically you...your brain clamps down, you shut down, on it all, you-
, you face it, you don't let it bother you, shut it out of your mind and carry on. I mean 
I'm looking at a bloke dying in front of me, I had nothing I could do for him, I-, but it 
687 Gregg, 2, 74-75. 
688 Gregg, 2, 75-76. 
689 Mayman, 1, 24-25. 
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never went in, it just shuts it out...[6]’. It was only later that ‘the repercussions come, 
it's not at the time.’691 
This desensitisation was certainly exacerbated by the unrelenting pressure of front-
line life, which had clear effects on morale: 
…you knew, as an infantrymen, your job wouldn't stop until the war 
ended, 'cos I mean it was continuous, wasn't it, it was ongoing […] we'd 
have a hard battle, dig in, just settled in, word'd come, 'Ready to move 
in half an hour', what for? 'Another attack', you know...Especially 
when...the pressure was on through the Siegfried line, and I mean there 
was no let up. So...you didn't have time for niceties of friendships and 
that.692 
Robert Purver remembers that in the front line, ‘you're constantly bored, if there's no 
action, not that you want any action, but you're bored…and […] your heart is in your 
mouth constantly, waiting for orders, and when you do get orders, “What the hell are 
we going into this time?”, you know, so “What's up there next?”, you know.’693 The 
result, according to Tom Dutton, was that ‘you'd always be alert, you...it weren't like 
normal, it wasn't, you wasn't normal, let's put it like that, you become an animal, you 
know, it's instinct to survival…’694 
In describing this desensitisation to a modern civilian audience there is a danger of 
appearing insensitive, and most therefore express such feelings with some 
embarrassment and regret. In this way stretcher-bearer Bill Edwardes describes 
seeing his first dead body, during EPSOM:  
691 Dimarco, 3, 125-126. 
692 Tipping, 1, 126-127. 
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…as we were moving up the line, just before the village of Cheux, the 
farmyard that I spoke of on the DVD...was full of vehicles, and I looked 
in as we went by and I saw this six-tonne truck driver over his...steering 
wheel with part of his head gone, and do you know, Matthew...what I 
first thought, my first thought, and I've wondered whether I ought to 
feel ashamed of it, but I looked at that guy and I said, 'Well, I won't 
have to check his breathing', and moved on, and that was-, I suppose 
that's training, that's what you do, you've got a casualty, you assess it, 
you do something or you move on...695 
Jack Eglington, as has been seen, is quite content to discuss violence, but it is telling 
that he points out that he was not the only one who felt so blasé at the time: 
ML: So how, Jack, how did you cope when you see people being killed? 
'Cos obviously you were very close, with the carriers. 
JE: Well you didn't, you accepted it, you accepted it, you got hardened 
to it, you got hardened to it, I mean...I had a bloke there, he had has 
arm blown off, or not blown off, all smashed to...in, to, I mean he turned 
round and said 'Anybody got a big shell bandage', whap a shell bandage 
on, call a stretcher bearer, that's it, you, you, you, you accepted it, I 
expect that's what the other ones said, you, you, you accept these 
things, and you got used to it…696 
Stan Procter reflects on his reaction to casualties that ‘I can't quite figure how I 
thought. I mean I didn't get-, it didn't get me dejected for some reason, I don't know 
why’, just before breaking down in tears.697 Negotiating with popular discourses 
around war experience, which place an emphasis on mourning and remembrance of 
the dead and tend to presume that deep and lasting emotional trauma was ubiquitous 
among survivors, can, ironically, be difficult for those veterans whose reactions were 
more muted.  
695 Edwardes, 1, 15-16. 
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Nonetheless, the way the interviewees are able to articulate so clearly the 
dehumanising effects of witnessing death and violence strongly demonstrates the 
usefulness of oral history for illuminating past attitudes. Once again, it is evident that 
the interviewees do not take on the easiest possible identity of morally unblemished 
victims when telling their stories; instead, they grapple with the difficult, disturbing 
and morally problematic emotions induced by their honest recollections of their 
wartime experiences. 
In spite of the possible problems, it is clear that oral history can make a useful 
contribution to assessing the factors which influence morale. Studies of morale which 
have taken a more quantitative approach struggle to explain the psychological context 
of morale, whereas oral history’s ability to elicit opinions about, for example, the 
reasons active service produced feelings of desensitisation towards death on both 
sides, demonstrate the value of personal evidence for achieving a well-rounded picture 
of morale. Furthermore, it is possible to draw some tentative judgements from the 
testimony about how far the British Army’s morale held up through the campaign. 
British soldiers felt generally well cared for and well led, and this appears to have been 
vital in maintaining a level of morale sufficient to keep them at their tasks. Yet at the 
same time a great many individuals evidently experienced disillusionment and 
dejection due to their combat experiences, and it appears likely that this led fairly 
directly to a situation in many units in which, as Edwardes describes, ‘any opportunity, 
any chance to get out of battle was being mopped up by the blokes’.698 Nonetheless, 
there is no evidence of outright shirking, refusal to fight or anything which could be 
698 Edwardes, 1, 37-8. 
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called a widespread collapse in morale. Ultimately the interviews support previous 
conclusions that while British soldiers showed little outright enthusiasm or zeal for 
combat, this ‘should not be confused with poor morale’,699 and while individuals came 
under major strain the Army avoided serious morale problems.700 The consequences 
of this lack of enthusiasm for the way the Army went about its task of gaining victory 
in the field represent a separate question, to be assessed in the next chapter. 
699 French, Churchill’s Army, p. 122. 
700 Sheffield, ‘Dead Cows and Tigers’, in Buckley (ed.), The Normandy Campaign, p. 125. 
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Chapter 7 
Doctrine and Battlefield Conduct 
 
The final issue to be confronted in this thesis is what veterans’ testimony can tell us 
about doctrine: ‘the understanding of the methods of actual fighting accepted at any 
given time’.701 These shared ideas about how to fight are generally seen as deriving 
fairly directly from the principles according to which troops were instructed. Yet many 
of the conventional sources—training manuals, memoranda or reports on 
manoeuvres—and the studies based on them,702 can be problematic because there is 
little certainty practice ever mirrored the theory: ‘one cannot assume that what the 
manual said was what the soldiers did’.703 Oral history seems to offer a way to assess 
actual battlefield conduct, and indeed suggests that combat behaviour did diverge 
significantly from the ideal methods espoused in training. 
This potential appears especially valuable in relation to the British Army, which offers 
a particular challenge where doctrine is concerned, because it is a matter of continued 
debate whether it had a consistent doctrine at all. At least at the beginning of the war, 
‘Manuals stated general principles but did not provide concrete examples to illustrate 
how those principles should be put into practice’; instead, commanders were allowed 
great latitude to interpret doctrine as they saw fit.704 Although from 1942 Montgomery 
701 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group 
in Northwest Europe, 1944-5 (Warwick, 2015), p. 192. 
702 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day 
(London, 2000), p. 5; Bull, Infantry Tactics. 
703 Place, Military Training, p. 17; de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 
367; Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003), pp. 14-15; Engen, 
Canadians Under Fire, p. 12. 
704 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 22-3, 46-7, 280-3. 
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insisted a common doctrine was applied by army and corps commanders, it is 
debatable whether this had a significant impact at the tactical level.705 The lack of a 
consistent doctrine governing the conduct of troops in the absence of direct 
supervision has long been identified as one of the British Army’s main shortcomings, 
allowing indecision and inflexibility to persist.706 On the other hand, Timothy Harrison 
Place has argued that that doctrine which did exist tended to stifle initiative, not 
nurture it.707 More recent commentators, such as John Buckley, have suggested that 
Montgomery’s failure to institute a consistent doctrine was beneficial, allowing 
commanders the freedom to develop appropriate methods to the problems they faced, 
and ultimately ‘A problem-solving approach to combat…proved to be an effective 
method of dealing with the enemy’.708 Charles Forrester, by contrast, has described a 
complex model according to which both the ‘bubble up’ from the lower levels of 
command of ideas which worked, and institutionalisation of these from the top by 
Montgomery, contributed to an appropriate and consistently enforced British 
combined arms doctrine by early 1945.709 
Oral history seems to hold the potential to cut through such debates, offering the 
ability to consult eyewitnesses to discover how things were really done. One way of 
doing this is through the sort of ‘tactical snippeting’ approach advocated by Paddy 
Griffith, the collection and comparison of many examples of practical tactical 
technique, which, he argued, ‘really forms the essential homework which a serious 
705 Ibid., pp. 249, 252; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p. 36. 
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student must do before he can get to grips with the heart of his subject’. He regarded 
personal accounts as a vital component, as they give ‘a far more immediate impression 
of the battlefield than any number of drill manuals or tactical treatises. What the 
participants retained in their minds strongly enough to wish to tell us is surely precisely 
the sort of thing which we ought to be dissecting most carefully’. Although Griffith had 
written memoirs in mind, oral history can fulfil the same role for more recent conflicts, 
helping to correct the fact ‘too many tactical historians try to get by on airy 
generalisations which are demonstrably false’—a tendency Terry Copp in particular 
has criticised in assessments of the Normandy campaign.710 
Behaviour in Combat 
The testimony can indeed reveal much about what combat looked like at the tactical 
level. Although popular historical and cultural representations tend towards a 
mechanistic and deterministic interpretation of battle tactics in which the attributes of 
the actors involved (with an emphasis on their weapons and vehicles) led to 
predictable outcomes,711 much of the testimony suggests that many behaviours—for 
example, the willingness and enthusiasm of troops to engage in firefights and to 
withdraw or surrender—were governed by a number of unwritten rules which are 
much more difficult to define. Since it was rare indeed for any engagement in 
Northwest Europe to become a fight to the last man (encounters with the Hitler Youth 
were the notable exception)712 conduct in battle must have been governed by certain 
710 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the American Civil War, pp. 194-6; Copp, Fields of Fire, pp. 8-13 
711 Bull, Infantry Tactics, viii-ix; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p. 37; Spiller, ‘S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of 
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712 Copp, Fields of Fire, p. 83. 
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understandings as to how aggressively attacks ought to be pushed, and what level of 
resistance could be regarded as sufficient before a defender could justify withdrawing. 
In other words, battle was ritualised to an extent, with participants moderating their 
actions for a variety of reasons, most commonly self-preservation and a distaste of 
killing.713 Tony Ashworth’s research on the ‘live and let live’ system of mutual non-
aggression in the First World War is well known.714 Parallels exist in the Second World 
War, such as the tactic for Crocodile flamethrower tanks to burn a haystack within 
sight of the enemy in order to demonstrate the consequences if they failed to retreat 
or surrender. As Terry Copp has pointed out, ‘Combat was subject to…rational 
analysis. Orders were negotiated, amended or ignored as individual decision-makers 
engaged in calculations of risk versus gain’.715 James Roberts has demonstrated that 
on the Western Front in 1914-18 ‘surrendering the objective to safety, in the face of 
heavy hostile fire, was commonplace infantry combat behaviour. By such means the 
infantry decided an objective’s worth, and lived to fight another day’. The ‘fog of war’ 
which limited the influence of senior commanders on front line events ensured that by 
the time they could react, the infantry’s decision had become a fait accompli.716 
The oral testimony analysed in this study heavily suggests that this was also 
widespread in the 1944-5 campaign. As a rule, it seems that the overwhelming desire 
was to avoid confrontation with the enemy whenever possible. Such behaviour reflects 
wartime theorising by Lionel Wigram, who developed the battle drill training adopted 
713 For examples in pre-modern warfare see John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, 1993), pp. 
94-115, 131-2, 387. 
714 Ashworth, Trench Warfare. 
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716 James Roberts, Killer Butterflies: Combat, Psychology and Morale in the British 19th (Western) 
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by the British Army in 1941, and S.L.A. Marshall, that most soldiers would take no 
active involvement in combat.717 Combat theorists, somewhat uncritically following 
Marshall, tend to place much emphasis on human beings’ innate resistance to killing,718 
and neglect other factors such as tactical benefits to non-confrontation719 and, 
particularly, self-preservation; even a highly motivated soldier who is willing to kill is 
likely to avoid placing himself in undue peril. Self-preservation was the key factor 
ensuring that for soldiers desiring to survive the first reaction on receiving enemy fire 
was to go to ground or to bypass it. Tipping recalls jumping through a head-height 
shell hole in a wall to escape a road which was under fire: ‘it's surprising what fear-, 
if somebody'd said, 'Jump through that hole', you'd have said 'No way', you know. But 
fear, we went-, well I didn't touch the sides!’.720 
More than just an individual impulse, the desire not to fight transcended the individual 
and meant the risks entire units or sub-units were willing to run often fell substantially 
short of what might conceivably have been attempted according to a mechanistic 
reading of the situation. During the attack on Briquessard, Partridge’s platoon’s leading 
section was held up by a single German firing rifle grenades; rather than attempting 
to eliminate the threat, he decided, ‘so alright well we can't continue this...way’, and 
the obstacle was bypassed instead.721 Later the same day, Partridge recalls: 
717 French, Churchill’s Army, pp. 206-7; Allport, Browned Off, p. 235; Place, Military Training, p. 79; 
Marshall, Men Against Fire, pp. 44-58. 
718 Grossman, On Killing; Roberts, Killer Butterflies, pp. x, 30-3; King, The Combat Soldier, p. 129. 
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Marshall and the Ratio of Fire’, p. 69; Smoler, ‘The Secret of the Soldiers Who Didn’t Shoot’. 
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So there we all were [in Briquessard], and we sent a patrol out, and they 
heard Germans talking, and they came back and reported, they were 
about four hundred yards to our front, right front, and...of course you 
could have put in a fighting patrol, you could have gone in and shot at 
them and they would have shot back and people would have been killed 
and...been all messy, and that...was not the way I liked to fight well. I 
got all the two-inch mortars in the company, and under the direction of 
my own favourite platoon...mortar commander, they fired mortar shells, 
HE and mixed it in with a bit of smoke, just to confuse 'em, into the area 
where these Germans had been located. I think it was twenty-seven that 
came in, with their hands up, and one of us searched 'em. So it was 
bloodless, you see, so that's the best way, in my opinion, of fighting the 
battle.722 
Colin Criddle describes how elsewhere during BLUECOAT, ‘a German counteroffensive 
went right across our front […] We decided they were not going to bother us, so did 
nothing’.723 During EPSOM, Spittles had ‘my first experience of the Germans not 
knowing who we were, who waved to us as we went through, and we waved back, 
and carried on’724; the Northants saw no benefit to starting a fight. Most of the 
interviewees’ accounts of combat are similar, supporting the impression that troops 
operated tentatively and avoided fighting where it was unnecessary to provoke the 
enemy or where he seemed to be too strong.  
When contact was made, infantry combat seems to have essentially been a moral 
matter of persuading the enemy that his position was too hazardous to justify 
maintaining; eventually one side would break off the engagement (or surrender). 
Attacks generally ground to a halt because resistance appeared too strong, not 
because troops actually tested this by pressing forward into enemy fire. The fact that 
high casualties were sustained does not demonstrate that troops were particularly 
722 Partridge, 1, 56-57. 
723 Criddle, 1, 25. 
724 Spittles, 3, 16. 
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aggressive, as high losses could be inflicted by long-range and/or indirect fire even on 
troops operating cautiously; in reality, losses occurred in spite of soldiers taking every 
reasonable measure to avoid becoming casualties. Furthermore, where hazardous 
close-range combat did take place this usually had more to do with the battlefield 
conditions restricting manoeuvre, or a failure by the defenders to discourage the 
attacker from advancing, rather than either side particularly desiring to close with the 
enemy. As the infantry were often bound to operational planning and corps-level 
artillery timetables, their tactical freedom was frequently limited, and it was safer to 
‘lean into’ the barrage than to take a more cautious approach, even though this would 
bring the troops into close contact with the enemy.725 
Perceptions of the enemy’s strength applied equally to defenders’ decision-making. 
Tipping’s recollections of being pinned down in a German ambush were quoted in 
Chapter Five; the conclusion of the story demonstrates such evasive behaviour:  
Well by then the other-, our other companies behind could hear the firing 
and knew we must be in trouble, so of course they came up, and...the 
Germans, although they hit you hard, they were ready, they got 
boltholes to...'cos they, soon as they knew there was too many troops 
coming up they made the boltholes and hopped it. So as quickly as it 
started, it stopped.726 
There are several accounts of infantry happening upon positions which were prepared 
for defence but abandoned, or whose occupiers immediately surrendered without a 
fight.727 It seems to have been typical in this way to induce the enemy to quit the area 
without being ‘physically’ defeated. Where this could not be done, the infantry could 
725 Place, Military Training, pp. 67-8, 79, 85; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p. 118. 
726 Tipping, 1, 92. 
727 Dutton, 1, 20-22; Hitchcock, 1, 36; Tipping, 1, 77-79. 
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resort to loud and indirect weapons such as grenades, mortars and PIATs when 
threatened or pinned down to ‘make it very uncomfortable’728 for the enemy. 
Here there are connections with the ways perception and psychology influence 
soldiers’ conduct in battle. Accounts of using grenades provide a particularly clear 
example of how human psychology manifested itself in combat behaviour, and here it 
is instructive to return to Barry Freeman’s account of hunting snipers: 
Very often...that we'd use grenades, but the unit that I was with, being 
an ordnance unit, we couldn't always get the ammunition we wanted, 
plenty of rifle ammunition, but things like grenades we couldn't often 
get, and very often, if there had been an attack somewhere and we were 
close in, we'd go and have a look and we could usually find grenades. 
And that's what we did, like in those little houses, it was...if we knew 
there was a sniper in the upstairs room and we weren't sure whether 
we'd got him or not, we'd do one of two things, if we...depending on if 
we had grenades or not. But we'd throw one into the downstairs, which 
would clear the ground floor, and then if we'd got enough grenades with 
us we'd go to the bottom of the stairs, and we'd pull the pin, and let the 
lever go, which starts the fuse going, and then throw it upstairs, so that 
they hadn't got time to pick it up and throw it back. We didn't do that 
very often because we hadn't got the grenades.729 
The references here to grenades are intriguing since Freeman resists admitting to 
actually shooting the enemy; subjectively, he seems to find it easier to talk about 
using grenades. Yet this is not necessarily retrospective; during combat itself, the fact 
the user could avoid observing the effects of grenades made them easier to use than 
purposefully targeting and shooting an enemy with one’s rifle, since arguably it was 
the grenade, rather than the thrower, which actually did the killing. Joanna Bourke 
presents testimony which cites this as one virtue of the grenade launchers commonly 
728 Partridge, 1, 70. 
729 Freeman, 2, 05-06. 
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used by American troops in the Vietnam War.730 James Roberts too has argued that it 
was the distance established by the grenade between killer and victim which made 
them an attractive weapon.731 Based on the assumption that most soldiers did not 
fight, he conjectures that the grenade became a weapon specially allocated to those 
‘within the battalion who had already volunteered to specialise in and execute 
interpersonal combat’,732 but it is equally plausible that grenades’ characteristics as an 
indirect weapon made it easier for all soldiers to use. 
This would explain the frequency of references to grenades in the veterans’ 
testimonies. One example is an incident witnessed by Tom Dutton in which a prisoner 
was killed using a grenade;733 another example is seen in Reg Spittles’ account of the 
fighting in Cheux during EPSOM: 
It was pouring with rain, all day, thunderstorm, they'd knocked the water 
tower over so there was mud and water everywhere, and I do honestly 
think there was still as many Germans in Cheux as there were 
Scotchmen. They seemed to be everywhere. The town was a total 
shambles, the tanks were slipping, sliding over debris, there were 
Germans close enough to try to climb on your tank, you were chucking 
hand grenades out, we were using the Sten Gun for close quarters, and 
personally I finished up chucking out what we called phosphor grenades. 
Now phosphorous when it touches the human flesh will burn it all away 
and it cannot be...stopped. It's a terrible thing to do- use or do, and I 
thought, well these Germans are coming that close, they're almost 
reached the point of putting sticky bombs on the tanks, or climbing on 
the tanks, and I don't want them anywhere as near- as far away as 
possible, so I started throw out phosphor grenades. Of course that would 
make it as bad for the Scotchmen as the Germans, because if they got 
in on them, they would suffer the same, but I was only concerned with 
me, my tank, and my crew, so I had no respect for anyone else. It took 
730 Bourke, Killing, pp. 216-7. Fred H. Allison’s interviewee Mike Nation discusses the use of grenade 
launchers, perhaps for similar reasons: Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight’, p. 80. 
731 Roberts, Killer Butterflies, pp 75, 250. 
732 Ibid., p. 72. 
733 Dutton, 1, 90. 
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us about...an hour, at least, to get through this small town. In training 
it would have been five minutes.734 
Like the other interviewees, Spittles phrases his use of weapons in abstracted terms: 
throwing grenades but neglecting to specify their effects, ‘using’ the Sten rather than 
actively shooting Germans with it, and explaining the effects of phosphorous in 
hypothetical terms rather than something that he was using to actually inflict violence; 
he also, typically, justifies his actions in terms of self-preservation. This implied 
distance from killing is also true of Doug Mayman, another ‘tankie’ who, expanding 
upon his curt initial description (quoted in Chapter Six),735 reports using grenades 
during his first time in action: 
Well, as you might expect, you remember it very clearly, the first time, 
because you think, 'God, that might have been me'. We came round a 
corner from some buildings and there was another tank, a German tank, 
clearly, pointing the opposite-, with its gun pointing in the opposite 
direction, slowly swivelling it round towards us. We managed to get our 
shot in first. I remember we used to carry, it was a rule, up the gunpoint-
, up the gun you carried an HE, high-explosive shell, and then, if you 
met tanks, you had to change that for a...an armour-piercing shell, and 
I remember, all our training came to [n]owt because instead of changing 
the bloody shell for an armour-piercing shell we just shot the shell off at 
the tank, and then put the armour-piercing shell in and shot the tank, 
and it stopped the turret coming round towards us...the members in the 
tank got out and we lobbed a grenade at them and hopped it pretty 
quickly. So, you know, you remember everything, it was so close...but 
you got used to it after that.736 
Again, violence is implied but not described, and justified as self-defence: ‘that might 
have been me’. 
734 Spittles, 3, 16-19. 
735 Mayman, 1, 05-06. 
736 Mayman, 1, 06-07. 
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These extracts reflect the usual ways of narrating killing, yet it is questionable how far 
these references to grenades reflect retrospective subjectivity or narrative 
convenience, and how far they describe what actually occurred. It is somewhat 
surprising to hear accounts of tank crew using grenades, since the assumption is that 
the tank itself was their most effective weapon. However, allowance must be made 
for human behaviour and historical subjectivity. Soldiers likely found it easier to use 
grenades because in fast-paced and panicked situations such easily-operated weapons 
allowed them to take some positive action against the enemy with a minimum of 
personal exposure, time, effort, and responsibility for the consequences. This is 
evidenced by a later section of Eric Tipping’s account of the fighting in Elst: 
We were given a task, our platoon was given a task, of clearing the 
houses...You can see on that...whasname of Elst, clear those houses. 
Well, we started to go, and soon as we got into open space we were 
fired on. It seemed as though there was [a] German in every room of 
these houses with [an] automatic weapon. Because every time you tried 
to move, you, you got, if you just put yourself out, brrrr! So we just 
couldn't move, you see. I mean, so the sergeant said, ‘Right let's try 
lobbing some grenades at the windows to see if we can just distract 
them so as we can get...near to 'em and get in amongst 'em, like’. We 
tried that, no...one or two chaps got injured-, got wounded…737 
Eventually, after the company commander was killed attempting to move forwards, 
the platoon received reinforcements, whose firepower finally allowed them to clear 
the enemy out of the village. 
The Tactical Performance of British Troops 
737 Tipping, 1, 36-37. 
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Such matters of combat behaviour must be related to one of the key issues in the 
historiography of the British Army in the Second World War: the performance of the 
front-line troops, especially the infantry. The testimony essentially seems to support 
the less than glowing assessments outlined in Chapter Two.738 The main concerns of 
the infantry were clearly quite prosaic—food, shelter, and kit—which itself is highly 
informative about the experience of the campaign.739 Where training is concerned, 
getting fit and learning the technical and domestic skills required for living in the field 
are considered to have been more important than learning tactics, which are also 
largely absent from accounts of combat.740 Officers and NCOs are naturally more 
cognizant of tactical matters, but still neglect to provide much information, and imply 
that their training fell somewhat short of the standard that would be required.741 
Evidence that other ranks in the infantry were given a picture of what their role would 
be in a larger tactical framework is only rarely to be found in the interviews.742  
It is therefore possible to employ the testimony to buttress the interpretation that the 
British infantry underperformed tactically, devoid of initiative and dependent on 
directive control; both because rankers imply that they were largely impotent and 
passive, and officers and NCOs describe micromanaging their men. For instance, 
Robert Purver describes how during the fighting in Tripsrath, having organised ‘my 
boys who I'd put in a defensive position all round the house’, he personally provided 
738 Beevor, D-Day, pp. 142, 264; D’Este, Decision in Normandy, p. 284; Ellis, Brute Force, p. 382; 
Hastings, Overlord, pp. 211, 371; Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 397. 
739  Partridge, 1, 28; Hutchinson, 3, 14-15, 62-63; Hitchcock, 1, 37-38; Majendie, 1, 32-33; Tipping, 
1, 79-80; Dutton, 1, 16, 50; Purver, 2, 33, 38-40; Howson, 1, 47-49; Young, 1, 63; Eglington, 1, 32. 
740 Spittles, 2, 16-20; Procter, 1, 04; Young, 1, 03-05; Cox, 1, 04, 21; Purver, 1, 01-02; Dimarco, 1, 
00-02; Edwardes, 1, 04-05; Hunt, 1, 01, 15. 
741 Cox, 1, 19-20; Majendie, 1, 78-79, 81; Partridge, 1, 03-04. 
742 Hitchcock, 1, 38-39; Majendie, 1, 83-84. 
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covering fire using the Bren gun to another platoon who were advancing, and on being 
wounded, ‘I nominated one of the blokes to take over and told him what was going 
on’, which invites the question: what would have occurred had Purver been killed 
instead?743 
There are, however, reasons to potentially moderate such criticism. There are several 
possible reasons interviewees may neglect to discuss tactics: because they made no 
special effort to remember them; because they do not consider it a particularly 
interesting subject for discussion; because they were not questioned in the right way; 
or because they prefer not to discuss occasions where they were face-to-face with the 
enemy. Personal accounts tend to downplay individual agency, giving historians an 
impression that British soldiers performed poorly at an individual level. Yet none of 
these factors provides positive evidence that troops were tactically inept.  
Another important factor is the dichotomy which existed in British doctrine between 
tightly orchestrated set-piece attacks, which ‘left little room for traditional platoon and 
section tactics’, and those in which the infantry had the freedom to employ their own 
firepower, initiative and the new battle drill techniques.744 Generally the former loom 
larger in the testimony because they represent the major engagements which formed 
watersheds in veterans’ war experiences; accounts provide little in the way of tactical 
analysis, and participants give the impression that they were simply swept up by 
events. However, the latter allow veterans to analyse their decision-making and 
behaviour in greater depth. For this reason, the quality of British fieldcraft and 
743 Purver, 2, 12. 
744 Copp, Fields of Fire, p. 27; Place, Military Training, pp. 67-8, 76. 
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patrolling skills is better supported.745 Alan Hitchcock opines, ‘When it came down 
to...any rough stuff, then I think we were better in a way than the Germans. They 
were more static. Very very static sometimes. […] When you got through them they 
used to fold away a bit.’746 Nonetheless, it does seem probable that if the average 
infantryman had enjoyed good knowledge of the tactical situation and the way the 
various parts of his unit worked together in combat, and had routinely carried out 
standard tactics designed to outmanoeuvre and kill the enemy, these would be 
discussed more extensively. 
It is important not to overstate the implications of this point. A dependence on the 
tactic of intimidation should not be confused with an absence of tactics entirely; the 
testimony merely brings into question the practical relevance of the neat tactical drills 
found in the training manuals. An inability to enact complex small-unit tactics on the 
chaotic and confusing modern battlefield was likely the norm rather than the exception 
for all sides, and should not necessarily be seen as evidencing any wider deficiencies 
in motivation or cohesion among British forces. It is tempting to view hesitancy among 
front-line troops, and their preference for ‘indirect’ methods of intimidation, as proof 
that the British Army’s operations were indeed hindered by their poor performance, 
as historians such as Stephen A Hart, John Ellis and Carlo D’Este have argued.747 
However, this would be an interpretation the evidence marshalled here cannot sustain. 
It would require evidence that the British were abnormal in their caution, whereas it 
appears that the Germans (and likely the Americans too) showed an equal dislike of 
745 Ibid., pp. 38-9; Kite, Stout Hearts, p. 72; Jary, 18 Platoon, p. 17. 
746 Hitchcock, 1, 44. 
747 Hart, Colossal Cracks; Ellis, Brute Force; D’Este, Decision in Normandy.  
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confrontation. Furthermore, it is by no means apparent that troops proved any less 
effective or slower to win ground even if they preferred to overawe the enemy to force 
his withdrawal rather than confront and kill him. Indeed, the interviewees’ units were 
frequently successful on the offense. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that a high 
operational tempo could be maintained provided the attacking troops were able to 
overawe the enemy effectively enough. This is a question of the relationship between 
front-line tactics and broader operational effectiveness which is outside the scope of 
this thesis.  
What is clear is that the veterans’ testimony can justify a reassessment of combat at 
the very lowest levels, suggesting that mechanistic tactics as commonly visualised, 
not least in the training manuals, were of little practical relevance, and an indirect 
approach based on forbearance in which success or failure was decided by an 
essentially psychological contest between the two sides was much more common. 
Tactical Agency in Accounts of Tank Combat 
Also evident is a distinction between accounts from infantrymen and tank crews in 
terms of their implied tactical agency. It is striking that unlike infantrymen, tank 
veterans proffer multiple coherent and well-explained combat accounts.748 They are 
also more likely to contextualise their actions in relation to other units and sub-units. 
Often the difference is merely that tank crew describe what they did, whereas infantry 
describe what was done to them; nonetheless, the difference is clear and potentially 
748 Ekins, 1, 29-35; Spittles, 1, 133-135; 3, 16-62; 4, 00-04; Mayman, 1, 05-07, 19-24; Hammerton, 
1, 52-58, 121-122; Tout, 2, 54-63. 
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significant, and there are several possible reasons. Interviewees may assume that tank 
combat makes for a more interesting subject than infantry combat, given the image 
of the Second World War as a war of machines.749 Tank crewmen were likely to be 
technically-minded individuals interested in identifying and explaining procedures. This 
tendency was encouraged by wartime training and experience, as tank combat was 
generally a more technical business than infantry work.750 Furthermore, it may 
represent that tank crews felt a higher degree of control and agency than the infantry. 
Having some responsibility for reading and reacting to the tactical situation would 
cause individuals to recall and discuss such things more easily in interview (in the 
same way that officers’ testimony reflects their different concerns in battle compared 
with other ranks). In fact, all of these factors probably play a part in making crews’ 
recollections of doctrine and tactics particularly detailed and informative. 
The latter suggestion would seem to contrast with the historiography, however. Tanks 
have generally been seen as permitting commanders to maintain particularly high 
levels of ‘grip’, as officers and NCOs ‘had much greater control over the manner in 
which their tanks and troops fought any given action’, leading to higher levels of 
aggression and élan among the armour.751 The concerns of crewmen were seemingly 
immaterial,  in contrast to infantry combat which is assumed to have demanded higher 
levels of individual initiative.752 Place suggests that ‘Such evidence as is available 
suggests that only those earmarked for command were actually conscious of receiving 
tactical instruction’, but nonetheless ‘provided each man played his part properly the 
749 Ellis, ‘Reflections on the Sharp End of War’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p. 15;  
750 Place, Military Training, pp. 80, 85. 
751 Buckley, British Armour, p. 197. 
752 Place, Military Training, p. 82. 
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tank could operate effectively even if some of them failed to see the jigsaw beyond 
their own modest piece’.753 
However, the testimony represents additional evidence which can paint a more 
complex picture, again by taking account of subjective human behaviour. It indicates 
that it was not the case that tank commanders maintained a tight grip while crewmen 
were automata, free of any tactical nous, who simply obeyed the commander’s orders. 
Ekins, for example, remembers his crew operating largely by consensus: 
Luckily the crew that I got to, with, were excellent. We, within a very 
short time we were like a family, you know, that’s the only way you can 
survive, I mean you, you relied on each other for your life, 
and…also…rank and that was completely forgotten, and you didn’t, you 
didn’t just obey orders blindly, I mean in fact I soon realised that after 
we got to Normandy, you didn’t take too much notice of what they told 
you to do […] You eventually worked on a, a consensus. I mean we got 
a, we were in the sergeant tank, there were officer tanks, sergeant tank, 
usually a corporal tank and a lan— perhaps a lance corporal tank, in the 
four, you know, and my tank was the sergeant’s tank so we got a 
sergeant, but I mean, we called him Hog, and…if we wanted to do 
anything it was a consensus with the four of us, five of us decided what 
were gonna do, you know…Broadly, we didn’t disobey orders, if we were 
told we were gonna go to a village we went, but if they said ‘go round 
here, go round there’, we went where we…where we knew were best, 
you know, because we knew better than they did.754 
This should not be particularly surprising. Tank combat facilitated—even demanded—
a certain degree of delegation precisely because the crew were confined within the 
vehicle; the commander could allow the driver to drive, the gunner to engage targets, 
and the loader/operator to maintain communications, without micromanaging any of 
these tasks, because there was little opportunity for individuals to abscond. The 
753 Ibid., pp. 82-3; Buckley, British Armour, p. 82. 
754 Ekins, 1, 44-46. 
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physical closeness of crews, and the correspondingly intimate inter-rank relations,755 
also helped to facilitate the delegation of responsibility. By comparison the infantry 
had more opportunity to disperse; rather than facilitating flexibility this forced officers 
to exert more grip and micromanage extensively to ensure the unit retained its 
cohesion. 
Furthermore, the interviews indicate that a perception existed among tank crews that 
they enjoyed substantial tactical influence, especially after they had gained some 
battle experience. Even though it was not technically necessary for those other than 
tank commanders to understand the tactical situation, and if crews’ ‘knowledge of 
what was happening outside was severely restricted’,756 the veterans maintain that 
quite a high level of tactical knowledge existed at all levels. Partly this was because 
tanks were fitted with radios, allowing information to be communicated continuously 
and instantaneously in a way which was impossible for the infantry. Ken Tout of the 
1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry places great stress on the way tank crews enjoyed a 
‘running commentary’ of the action: ‘Thanks to the efficiency of tank wireless the most 
humble tank crew member could eavesdrop on battles near and not so near. The 
infantry were much more confined to their slit trench and narrow field of fire’. 757 This 
depended on the precise system employed; the 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry used 
a ‘total regimental net’, whereby every tank operated on the same frequency, which 
allowed anyone to follow the wider progress of the battle. Reg Spittles was probably 
denied the same level of information from the wireless because the 2nd 
755 Buckley, British Armour, p. 184; Ekins, 1, 54-55. 
756 Place, Military Training, p. 82. 
757 Tout, 2, 40-41; 57; 59; Tout, A Fine Night for Tanks, pp. 1-2, 12, 88. See also Ellis, The Sharp 
End, p. 151. 
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Northamptonshire Yeomanry made use of the more usual ‘squadron net’ system, in 
which the ‘A’ wireless set was used for communication within squadrons and the 
separate ‘B’ set for communication with regimental HQ, with the disadvantage that it 
was more difficult for regimental commanders to follow the progress of the battle if 
hard-pressed squadron commanders were not frequently passing back information.758  
Spittles was, however, privy to the other method of transmitting tactical information, 
daily conferences: 
...you start the day off by having a tank commanders' conference, at 
which you get information relating to you and your position and your 
friends', and as much information as is known about the enemy and their 
positions, which are all marked- you mark on your board […] so, when 
you've had your conference, you've got all this information about your 
people and their people...759 
Robert Ford also recalls, ‘there'd always be a good O Group, you'd be well informed 
normally...very- well what intelligence there was about German positions...’.760 
Furthermore, this information made its way down to the very lowest levels of 
command. From Tout's account, we learn that: 
...you'd got the map, you'd seen a map...one of the things that 
happened, which was very important, was that when we went into 
action, before every action the commander would assemble the crew, 
with the map, and tell us exactly what we were intended to do, so if the 
commander was killed, or wounded, as frequently happened, and 
somebody else took charge, he knew what was...meant to happen, and 
if he was wounded...lost, there would be somebody on the tank who 
survived, even if it's only the driver, he knew where we were and what 
we were supposed to be doing, he could drive the tank...into safety. So 
everybody on the crew knew exactly where we were...on that map and 
would know that to the left we had 1 Troop and 4 Troop, and so on, and 
758 Tout, A Fine Night for Tanks, p. 150. Spittles provides a detailed description of radio procedures: 
see 3, 06-11. 
759 Spittles, 3, 05. 
760 Ford, 3, 47. 
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to the right we had A Squadron, and over there we had 144-...we knew 
all this as basic. So the tank crew was extremely well informed, because 
you would find at times you got out and talked to the infantry lieutenant, 
and he had no idea of the detail that you'd been given. He would be told 
eventually but at that point we might know more than he knew down on 
the ground.761 
Tout suggests that even the lowliest armoured trooper was better informed about the 
tactical situation than many infantry officers. Here it is possible to illustrate the way 
individual subjectivity can be accounted for to reach conclusions about the past. Tout 
is broadly positive about the Army’s performance; his former comrade Joe Ekins is 
much more critical. However, on the point of tactical intelligence, there is telling 
concurrence between Tout’s positively-slanted account and Ekins’ more negative one. 
Ekins states that: 
...we didn't know what were happening at all...Somebody wrote and 
asked me what sort of...[4] information did we get before an attack? 
And I mean I wrote back and said the only information we got were that 
the...troop sergeant come out and said 'We're starting and nine o'clock 
and we're going here', you know, and...so we didn't know anything 
about it...762 
Ekins’ main point here is to complain that the average soldier knew little about the 
larger operations he was involved in, but it is obviously not realistic to have expected 
yeomanry troopers to have been informed about every facet of corps-level planning; 
this extract in fact provides further evidence of the ubiquity of pre-battle briefings. 
The fact that Ekins complains that this level of knowledge was insufficient, whereas 
Tout presents it more positively, is immaterial to the key piece of evidence here: that 
tank crews down to the level of private soldier were regularly and thoroughly briefed 
761 Tout, 2, 60-61. 
762 Ekins, 1, 22. 
268
on their role in operations in a way which compares very favourably with popular 
stereotypes of British armour in Normandy as being tactically unskilled and devoid of 
initiative.  
The testimony does not provide sufficient grounds to dispute the existing literature on 
tank combat. John Buckley, among others, is correct to argue that ‘tank crew endured 
a particular tension during battle, that of being detached from their surroundings. 
Unlike infantrymen, most tank crews were rarely aware of the ebb and flow of 
battle…Even commanders could feel confused and swept up in the chaos of the 
battlefield, unsure as to who was who, and crewmen inside had only a vague notion 
of how the battle was progressing, gleaning snippets of information from the radio of 
by deciphering the battle noises around them.’763 However, if tank crews did suffer 
from limited situational awareness, they evidently did not feel this was the case, and 
their encounters with the apparently clueless infantry only confirmed their view that 
they were much better-informed about the situation thanks to the continuous 
distribution of information to all ranks via radio. 
There therefore appears to be a mismatch between the reality of tank combat and 
how it was perceived by participants; that is, perhaps tank crews regarded themselves 
as more tactically aware and able to exert greater control over the battle than they 
actually were. If this is the case, it would go some way to explaining why morale and 
aggression among armoured units remained high despite the fact that crews were 
forced to put themselves in harm’s way, in many cases during poorly supported attacks 
763 Buckley, British Armour, p. 194; Allport, Browned Off, p. 222; Place, Military Training, p. 82; Ellis, 
The Sharp End, pp. 133-5. 
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which virtually guaranteed high tank losses.764 S.L.A. Marshall perceptively argued, as 
more recently has David French, that communication of knowledge about the tactical 
situation was essential for the maintenance of morale.765 It may be that tank crews 
felt genuinely confident in their ability to act with aggression, rather than merely 
behaving as such because they were held in tight grip by commanders. Certainly, the 
way tank crew discuss being aware of the wider events of the battlefield and imply an 
ability to influence them contrasts very strongly with the infantrymen’s perspective in 
which individuals were at the mercy of events and ‘your...horizon is the rim of your 
steel helmet’.766 Assessing the literature from tank crewmen therefore produces two 
main findings: subjective perceptions of battlefield performance may have diverged 
quite significantly from the practical reality; and, alongside the relatively low casualty 
rates and the greater grip and primary group cohesion achievable in the close confines 
of tanks,767 the confidence of the crews in their own tactical ability was likely an 
important factor in the maintenance of morale in armoured units. 
Assessing Doctrine Using Veterans’ Testimony 
It has been seen that when in contact with the enemy front-line troops usually 
abandoned tactical drills and attempted to dislodge the enemy through intimidation. 
Yet a great deal of soldiers’ time was not spent face-to-face with the enemy, and 
standard procedures must have existed for a broad variety of purposes both in and 
out of combat, determining, for example, how units would form up before launching 
764 Buckley, British Armour, pp. 203, 207-8. 
765 Marshall, Men Against Fire, pp. 85-99, 123-137; French, ‘“Tommy is no Soldier”’, p. 168. 
766 Majendie, 1, 14-15. 
767 Buckley, British Armour, pp. 197, 203. 
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an attack, or the formation a patrol would take up. Although oral evidence can 
successfully reveal the general perceptual and cultural dimensions of soldiers’ 
battlefield conduct, such tactical procedures are quite difficult to illuminate using oral 
testimony. 
It is important to keep in mind that oral history essentially provides the worm’s-eye 
view, whereas many doctrinal issues really concern operational-level planning—for 
example, a major debate in 21st Army Group was over how infantry and armoured 
units should be echeloned during assaults.768 The literature, not least that seeking to 
cast a more positive light on the British Army’s performance, tends to deal with 
doctrine as enacted at the level of battalions, brigades and divisions, whose actions 
are well-recorded in the documentary material.769 At that level, particularly during the 
set-piece operations where any operational doctrine was most clearly enacted, the 
small-unit tactics to be employed by the attacking troops were often immaterial; Place 
suggests that ‘heavy reliance upon extraneous fire-power rendered infantry minor 
tactics superfluous, theoretically at least, for much of the duration of an engagement’ 
(though the armour had more freedom).770  
It is unsurprising that the troops on the ground had little idea of the larger machine 
in which they were only a tiny cog. Impressions of such must be approached with a 
great deal of caution, as they often represent second-hand information gleaned long 
768 Place, Military Training, pp. 147-52; Buckley, British Armour, pp. 78-81; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p. 
130. 
769 Buckley, Monty’s Men; Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine; French, Churchill’s Army, pp. 240-73; 
Patrick Rose, ‘Allies at War: British and US Army Command Culture in the Italian Campaign, 1943-1944’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 36/1 (2013), pp. 42-75. 
770 Place, Military Training, pp. 67-8, 76, 79, 85. 
271
after the event, rather than contemporaneous experience. It is highly unlikely, while 
involved in reducing the Breskens Pocket, that Ian Hammerton was aware what the 
other components of 79th Armoured Division were doing at various places around 
Walcheren, Antwerp and the Scheldt Estuary; or that Reg Spittles predicted the 
appearance of the Falaise Gap.771 As Spittles himself acknowledges, ‘Monty knows 
how it affects that division, that division, that division, there's a map, and we'll send 
them there and them there, that's alright. But when it comes down to me, I'm 
interested in me, and how that's gonna affect me.’772 In this sense the testimony of 
front-line troops is a poor source for illuminating traditional doctrinal debates. The 
success or failure of minor tactical actions could clearly have important ramifications 
on higher operations, but eyewitness testimony cannot easily tell us what they were. 
Therefore, it is more realistic to envision veterans’ testimony as providing additional, 
lower level insight to supplement the literature on operational-level doctrine. 
Even at the lowest levels, it seems that soldiers had limited awareness they were 
involved in carrying out any tactical procedures, making it difficult for them to describe 
them fully. The front-line soldier who is the subject of the keenest interest will have 
much to say about what he witnessed and felt, but is rarely in a position to comment 
on what occurred outside his relatively blinkered field of view. Within this perceptual 
bubble, moreover, the veteran has no way of evaluating whether his experience was 
normal and unremarkable or exceptional and noteworthy, and for this reason much of 
interest presumably goes unsaid. The historian is left with mere snippets of 
771 Hammerton, 1, 99-100; Spittles, 5, 54-56. See also Gregg, 2, 58-60; Young, 1, 62-63; Tipping, 1, 
09-15. 
772 Spittles, 3, 71-72. 
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information, which are difficult to piece together to reconstruct an impression of 
tactical procedures. Through judicious and focussed questioning it may be possible to 
elicit more extensive testimony,773 but this requires foreknowledge of the wartime 
situation dependent mainly on official documentary sources. Factors accessible only 
through first-hand experience and absent from the documentary record may remain 
hidden because interviewees do not know such information is noteworthy and 
interviewers do not know to ask for it. Ironically, then, the mystery of what happens 
in combat might preclude useful comment by the very people who are in a position to 
know. 
Of course, the situation is more complicated and in some respects more positive than 
this. Respondents reveal a great deal indirectly and unintentionally which an attentive 
analyst can pick up on, military theory and official reports can provide clues to guide 
questioning, and veterans’ own research can alert them of aspects of their experience 
which might interest an interviewer. Though the ‘unknowability’ of battle remains 
something of a cliché, the large part of what happens in battle probably is known, to 
the extent that any historical event can be known. Yet it remains the case that 
veterans can rarely comment extensively on matters of doctrine and tactical 
procedure, compared with matters more immediate to their experience.  
The snippets they provide are most valuable in highlighting the centrality of human 
perception and behaviour to events on the battlefield. The testimony contains much 
which confounds popular assumptions about warfare and can deepen understanding 
773 John Buckley has had some success eliciting descriptions of armoured tactics such as ‘snake patrol’: 
Buckley, British Armour, pp. 95-6. 
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about what military operations looked like at the lowest levels. Infantry would rarely 
come face-to-face with the enemy, invariably taking cover and using whatever means 
necessary to persuade the enemy to withdraw, rather than directly attempting to kill 
him; combat was rarely the zero-sum game implied by high aggregate casualty figures 
and portrayed in war films. Tank crews found a degree of security in their armour 
plate and radios, and the cohesion and communal decision-making these facilitated. 
Such subjective factors help to explain the conduct of both arms throughout the 
campaign, and oral history analysed according to a ‘tactical snippeting’ approach 
therefore appears to provide a plausible alternative to the traditional study of small-
unit tactics thorough training manuals which, it seems, are a poor guide to real-world 
practice. 
Summary: Applying the Testimony 
The campaign is remembered according to various themes, common to interviewees 
and therefore presumably common to their wartime experiences. This overview of the 
historical worth of the testimony when exploring combat experience, morale and 
doctrine clearly shows that its use demands a complex juggling of practical, 
psychological, cultural and historically- and retrospectively subjective factors. Rarely 
can a particular judgement be conclusively deemed either factual or subjective; as the 
cultural circuit implies, one should expect drawing this distinction to be difficult (nor 
is oral testimony notably more ambiguous in this respect than memoir or, indeed, 
many archival documents). There is, however, undoubtedly a great deal of genuine 
information about the experiences and conduct of British soldiers in the 1944-5 
campaign to be derived from the testimony. This can be done by considering the likely 
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ways subjectivity might have distorted an account, and accounting for this effect; or 
by contrasting two or more accounts and assessing commonalities which exist in spite 
of different subjective biases. The complexity of interpreting veterans’ testimony is 
ultimately a clear indication of the complexity of human perception and behaviour and, 




This thesis has sought to assess the particular features and historical usefulness of 
veterans’ oral testimony, using the Second World War as a case study of issues 
relevant throughout modern military history. The relation of oral history to military 
history has remained neglected and under-theorised by academics, despite the great 
interest in personal narratives of war and the time and resources which have been 
directed towards amassing oral histories of veterans. Military historians writing for 
both academic and popular audiences have made ample use of oral evidence without 
paying much attention to its particularities, either treating it as an uncomplicated 
source of information or, more commonly, showing sensible caution but little 
expertise, and relegating it to an inferior status compared with supposedly more 
reliable documents. Oral historians have since the 1970s dealt convincingly with many 
of the criticisms directed at their material, staunchly defending the principle that those 
who lived through history have a part to play in recording it. However, over time a 
deeper understanding of subjectivity has led it to become the major concern of 
scholars, whose work more often takes the relativist form of memory studies, dealing 
with the role of history in the identities and beliefs of those living in the present, rather 
than oral history as it was originally envisioned, to contribute to the understanding of 
the past in its own terms. Oral historians’ work on veterans has generally shown far 
more concern with elaborating individual stories and identities, particularly those 
bound up with trauma, than shedding light on military events. This study contends 
that up-to-date analytical methods drawn from oral history can be fruitfully applied to 
more traditional research goals. In bridging the methodological divide between military 
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history and oral history in a way which has not otherwise been attempted, this study 
makes an original contribution to the field. 
While oral sources should be approached critically, with an understanding of the 
specialised methodology they demand, it is evident that they are not fundamentally 
more or less problematic than any other type of source; written sources can also be 
significantly affected by subjective bias. Criticism of oral history tends to fixate on the 
fact—entirely correct—that memory of dates, times, names and places tends to be 
unreliable. But one does not conduct interviews to learn such facts, but rather about 
attitudes and emotions, routine procedures, and particularly impactful events, which 
are remembered well. There can be little doubt that in terms of this sort of information 
oral testimony is reliable, meaning consistent over time. Ample research demonstrates 
that memory of important life events does not decline significantly over time in healthy 
individuals.774 It is a rare interviewee who will change their story in any significant 
way, and most provide a rehearsed account which covers the same issues in the same 
order with extraordinary consistency, often down to the use of particular phrases. 
The facts that the Second World War is among the best-known of all historical events, 
and war stories are a narrative genre valued in British society, encourage this process 
of rehearsal. All respondents should be expected retrospectively to contextualise 
experiences to some extent—Ken Tout states that, ‘It was something that you 
assembled in your mind afterwards’775—and, indeed, this meaning-making is part of 
what makes oral testimony useful. Although this can result in stilted accounts in the 
774 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 90; Schacter, Searching For Memory, p. 291. 
775 Tout, 2, 59; Allison, ‘Remembering a Vietnam War Firefight’, pp. 81-2. 
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uncommon cases where popular and media attention produces ‘professional 
recollectors’,776 it is beneficial more often than not, yielding testimony which is 
coherent, reflective, and relevant to the historical issues and to the meaning the 
veteran invests in the episode they are describing.777 
It is also important, on this point, to note that a rambling and confusing manner of 
narration is no indication of unreliability or forgetfulness. Some interviewees provide 
accounts which are easy to follow but contain little useful information; others accounts 
which are difficult to follow but contain a great deal of valuable information and 
perceptive comment. A distinction between memory and narrative coherence is a new 
and important consideration when considering the testimony of elderly veterans. 
The rest of the thesis has demonstrated the validity of the testimony, its level of 
agreement with other sources, and the connected issue of usefulness, how well it 
illuminates specifically those issues which are of historical interest. The testimony can 
clearly prove informative on a wide range of relevant issues. As a preliminary to 
considering historical interpretation, the first half of the thesis dealt with the stuff of 
memory studies—matters of identity, popular memory, and trauma—which influence 
retrospective remembering and narration according to the theory of composure: ‘In 
one sense we compose or construct memories using the public languages and 
meanings of our culture. In another sense we compose memories that help us to feel 
776 Holmes, Tommy, p. xxiii; Strachan, ‘Into History’, pp. 4-5. 
777 Wallace, ‘“Professional Recollectors”, Rehearsed Memory and its Uses’, pp. 55-66. 
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relatively comfortable with our lives and identities, that give us a feeling of 
composure.’778 
The popular memory of the British Army in the Second World War is broadly positive 
but, at the same time, does not provide a completely unproblematic framework for 
oral history. Factors ranging from the myth of the civilianised ‘People’s War’,779 the 
memory of D-Day as the last gasp of the British Empire,780 historical assessments 
which have questioned the skill and fighting spirit of British soldiers,781 post-Vietnam 
discourses of trauma and veterancy,782 and perhaps a typically British reluctance to 
‘blow one’s own trumpet’, all provide reasons for veterans to downplay their individual 
agency and assume the role of passive spectators or victims of events. Veterans 
generally accede to the received wisdom in this regard, as this does not fundamentally 
threaten their narratives: ‘an official or dominant legend works not by excluding 
contradictory versions but by representing them in ways that fit the legend and flatten 
out the contradictions.’783 The exception is that the interviewees are silent on the ‘all 
in it together’ rhetoric of the People’s War which evokes the image of a united wartime 
nation. Such sentiments are expressed only prior to enlistment, while civilians 
(communications with which were in reality a vitally important element in soldiers’ 
morale) are excluded from the story in order to emphasise that the Army experience 
778 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 8.  
779 Dawson and West, ‘The Popular Memory of World War II’, in Hurd (ed.), National Fictions, pp. 8-
13; Connelly, We Can Take It!; Peniston-Bird, ‘Patriotism and the ‘People’s War’’, pp. 69-80. 
780 Edwards, ‘D-Day in British Memory’, in Dolski, Edwards and Buckley (eds.), D-Day in History and 
Memory. 
781 D’Este, Decision in Normandy, p. 284; Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 
1944 (London, 1984), pp. 211, 371; Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (London, 2009), 
pp. 142, 264; Ellis, Brute Force, pp. 382. 
782 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, pp. 128, 138, 173, 184; Bracken, ‘Post-Modernity and 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, pp. 733-743. 
783 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 12. 
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was distinct from that of the majority of the nation. The veterans therefore subtly 
question and undermine one of the central tenets of the British popular myth of the 
Second World War. 
As this case demonstrates, the chief lesson from assessing popular memory is not that 
it constrains and suppresses all that disputes the dominant interpretation, but that it 
allows substantial latitude for participants to tell their stories in the way they see fit. 
It can therefore be seen that the particular personal circumstances, experiences, 
background, and outlook of each veteran were just as important as popular memory 
in determining the interpretation he put forth. These range from the outraged stance 
of the ‘moral witnesses’784 and those who attempted to do some good in trying 
circumstances, to those who view the war as a time they personally or collectively 
demonstrated skill and achieved success, to narratives like those of non-combatants 
which are conflicted and multifaceted. The veterans clearly do not provide one 
standard interpretation dictated by the official or dominant memory. Popular memory 
should be seen as providing important frameworks for remembering, especially by 
establishing common understanding between the speaker and his audience, but it is 
nonetheless possible for interviewees to provide highly idiosyncratic interpretations 
ranging from positive to negative and drawing on a great range of divergent personal 
experiences and outlooks. As much as the popular memory shapes the testimony, the 
veterans also choose which aspects to make use of and which to disregard. Popular 
memory is ultimately founded on individual experiences and points of view, surviving 
only as long as it provides an interpretation which aligns sufficiently closely with the 
784 Winter, Remembering War, pp. 238-9. 
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beliefs of participants, and always open to contestation. Personal subjectivity is at 
least as important an influence on the oral testimony. Anna Green is correct to insist 
that ‘Human subjectivity is more active, engaged, and critical than contemporary 
theory permits. We must keep space for the resistant, curious, rebellious, thoughtful, 
purposeful human subject’.785 
Another important consideration is trauma. The general assumption is that the 
chances of eliciting an honest account of a traumatic event are highly dubious. In a 
popular context veterans are pictured as silent, brooding and invariably suffering from 
PTSD;786 in an academic context, scholars approach trauma through a ‘discourse of 
the unrepresentable’.787 The testimony directly disputes such notions, as the veterans 
recount violent deaths and woundings of close friends and children, suffering from or 
personally inflicting friendly fire, and numerous instances of mortal danger to their 
person. Lynn Abrams argues that traumatic experiences can be ‘far more difficult to 
translate into narrative and may be impossible to be narrated because they cannot be 
made sense of and then wrapped up in neat discursive structures like stories’.788 
However, the testimony makes evident that for Second World War veterans trauma 
can routinely be made sense of through narrative, most obviously because disturbing 
war stories make good tales which attract positive attention and are validated by 
popular discourses of war. In certain cases, like that of Ray Gordon, the entire 
interview becomes an exercise in sharing trauma, the very opposite of repression. 
785 Green, ‘Can Memory be Collective?’, in Ritchie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Oral History, p. 108. 
786 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 184. 
787 James Berger, ‘Trauma and Literary Theory’, Contemporary Literature, 38/3 (1997), p. 573, 
quoted in Dodd, ‘Childhood “Trauma”’, pp. 39-40. 
788 Abrams, Oral History Theory, p. 121. 
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Accounts of trauma are not, of course, completely unalloyed; but they do not appear 
appreciably less genuine than any other piece of testimony. Respondents give their 
honest recollections, albeit refracted through the lens of popular discourse, which is 
all that can be expected of any oral history. 
This is not to dispute the reality of war trauma. Undoubtedly many veterans cannot 
articulate their disturbing experiences, though there is no real way to measure what 
proportion. However, what is important for the purposes of oral history (whose 
practitioners cannot realistically attempt to interview all but a fraction of veterans in 
any case) is that there are a substantial number who do speak. As oral history 
informants are self-selecting, interviewees are likely to be those who are positively 
enthusiastic to do so. This appears to bring the representativeness of veterans’ oral 
history into question, but if interviewees are likely to be more psychologically resilient 
than average, this does not mean their experiences are similarly exceptional: ‘even 
though individuals may not be representative, their stories might be’.789  
For these men, the violent and disturbing aspects are some of the most important, 
because they grant their accounts an air of authenticity and validate their identities as 
‘real’ soldiers. It is for the same reasons that veterans so often relate stories of ‘near 
misses’, using space to emphasise and perhaps exaggerate their proximity to danger. 
Among those veterans who are happy to talk, it may in fact be those who lack 
sufficiently violent and disturbing war stories who have most trouble narrating their 
789 Dodd, ‘Small Fish, Big Pond’, in Tumblety (ed.), Memory and History, p. 40. 
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wars in a way a modern audience, expecting to hear of hardship, loss and trauma, will 
appreciate—as the few non-combatants interviewed for this study demonstrate.  
There is one important exception to the description of violence, however: the veterans 
consistently avoid acknowledging any personal participation in killing. Many probably 
were never in such a position, due to the highly dispersed nature of modern warfare. 
However, this is highly unlikely to have applied to all thirty-three. Presumably, the 
taboo against killing prevents it being discussed. This may be thought unusual, since 
most people know it is soldiers’ business to kill; in fact, this knowledge may allow the 
fact of killing to safely be left unsaid. Yet at the same time, the characterisation of 
soldiers as victims, a status incompatible with also being a perpetrator of violence, 
provides a plausible explanation for the silence on killing. While emphasising 
witnessing violence can strengthen veteran identity, acknowledging the infliction of 
violence would tend to undermine it. 
Having assessed the various subjective factors which influence the veterans’ 
testimony, it is possible to move on to consider how the testimony can illuminate 
historical debates about the British Army in the Second World War. For the most part, 
this analysis produced little that was unexpected. This is no grounds for criticism, 
however; it should not be surprising that the interviews concur with the substantial 
existing research which has been done on the Second World War. This demonstrates 
the validity of oral evidence. Had the testimony diverged significantly from the 
historiography, it would have been a knotty problem to explain how this could be so; 
the usefulness of the testimony would be in doubt, as the existing literature could 
hardly be disputed on the basis of just thirty-three interviews. However, there is no 
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great divergence: the oral testimony concurs with the documentary record and the 
memoirs because the same events have informed each type of source, and even 
though each has a different focus, information has been passed down through these 
various channels which historians can reconcile to produce broadly applicable 
interpretations.790 In other words, personal accounts sit alongside, but by and large 
do not dispute, the documentary record. It would be inaccurate to suggest that oral 
history can rewrite history by revealing a hidden ‘truth’. Although the increased use of 
personal sources has arguably constituted something of a revolution in historical 
method, in terms of interpretation they usually broaden and complexify, rather than 
overturn, existing historical understandings. 
It follows that oral history can potentially be valuable in a recovery role when 
researching less well-known conflicts, and where official documentary material is 
lacking. Although veterans’ accounts will necessarily have a more specific personal 
focus than official documents, they are unlikely to diverge significantly in the broad 
interpretation they offer, so there is good reason to believe they can provide 
worthwhile information in the absence of other sources. 
This is not to suggest that an interpretation consistently supported by a broad reading 
of the sources is necessarily a simple and straightforward one; in fact, the 1944-5 
campaign was evidently a highly inconsistent and often contradictory experience, as 
the testimony makes abundantly clear. Yet one of the most interesting findings is the 
790 It should be noted that whatever debates over the Second World War remain unresolved, these 
pale into insignificance compared with the near-unanimous agreement on the basic facts and 
chronology, on which all credible researchers concur. This is often not the case in those peripheral 
areas of historical research in which oral history is most commonly employed. 
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way broad patterns in experience can emerge quite separately from recollections of 
specific events. In the clearest instance, the interviewees remember the Normandy 
campaign as a period of immobility, frustration, danger and discomfort; the 
subsequent breakout and pursuit across France and Belgium is described quite 
differently, as a period of movement and optimism. Furthermore, this distinction is 
evidenced not just by the interviewees’ statements to that effect but by the very 
manner in which the two periods are narrated; Normandy is described as a 
monotonous period in which the specifics of time and place counted for little; in the 
breakout, by contrast, dates and locations become meaningful, and engagements 
become distinguishable in a way which was theretofore much more difficult. In this 
way the very manner of narrating the story seems to reflect the way the two periods 
were experienced at the time.791 
Combat experience is generally associated by the interviewees with confusion and 
chaos, which robbed participants of a sense of agency. In Stephen Bull’s words, ‘the 
idea that infantry more often had things done to them, rather than inflicting harm 
themselves, would appear valid’.792 Soldiers were faced with threats they could not 
confront, often from their own side as much as the enemy, and this accounts for the 
fact that the opposition is dehumanised and spoken of in the way of a natural 
phenomenon. The only exception is accounts of being wounded, as it seems attractive 
in these cases to portray oneself as a sporting loser in a contest against a skilful 
opponent, rather than the victim of blind luck. In spite of the suggestions of some 
791 Rosenthal, ‘German War Memories’, pp. 34-41. 
792 Bull, Infantry Tactics, p. ix. 
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researchers793 the opposite circumstance does not apply, as killing is not generally 
discussed. Aside from this (admittedly significant) omission, it seems highly likely the 
testimony reflects the disorientating reality of battle experience. 
The testimony also highlights the myriad factors which influenced morale, particularly 
the reassurance provided by ample logistical support, an effective welfare system and 
good inter-rank relations; the testimony suggests the role played by NCOs requires 
more attention. Ultimately the testimony illustrates how ‘Morale appears to be 
multidimensional’,794 and suggests that morale in the British Army, although it came 
under significant strain, ultimately held up well. 
Assessing soldiers’ reactions to casualties demonstrates again that popular discourses 
are only of limited influence on personal accounts, as the interviewees agree that one 
of the main consequences of casualties was a sense of desensitisation, resulting in 
attitudes which may be seen by a modern audience as disconcertingly callous. This is 
not a particularly attractive fact to acknowledge, and discomposure in these sections 
demonstrates the interviewees’ discomfort. Arguably, maintaining that comrades were 
earnestly mourned would more easily fulfil popular discourses about the eternal bonds 
of comradeship which supposedly prevail in military units. However, the veterans are 
reluctant to resort to obvious clichés where they believe these are inaccurate, and 
there is enough space in the available cultural frameworks—since soldiers can also be 
793 Bourke, Killing. 
794 Fennell, Combat and Morale, p. 280. 
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seen as isolated and jaded figures—to suggest that interpersonal relationships were 
not particularly close and reactions to casualties were often quite muted. 
Particularly encouraging for the prospects of oral history are instances where individual 
testimonies concur in spite of contrasting subjectivities. Where this occurs, one can 
be fairly certain the point of agreement reflects what really took place; the experiences 
of those individuals converged in a way which subjectivity cannot conceal or distort. 
A variety of personalities and strategies of composure are evident among both 
infantrymen and tank crews. These, however, do not obscure the distinction between 
the two in the way they discuss their level of tactical awareness or ability. Without 
disputing the fact that combat was highly chaotic and confusing for all involved, tank 
crewmen imply that they were better informed and able to influence events than 
infantrymen do, primarily because communication and the dissemination of 
intelligence were more common. Often the difference is merely that tank crew describe 
what they did, whereas infantry describe what was done to them. Nonetheless, the 
difference is striking and potentially significant. Since it is well recorded that tanks in 
fact produced highly disorientating conditions for their crews, it seems highly likely 
that this feature of the testimony reflects historical subjectivity rather than operational 
reality. The armour was not exceptionally effective, experiencing significant difficulties 
especially in Normandy, and heavily dependent on support from other arms; but the 
crews seem to have believed otherwise, and this helps to explain their combat 
motivation and tactical behaviour. This is a prime example of the human factors which 
oral history can illuminate. 
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Much information is also available about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of how the 1944-5 
campaign was conducted at the lower levels. Most obviously, there are many practices 
and procedures recorded only in the memories of those who used them. Veterans can 
also give an impression of the mechanics of combat, or rather the fact combat was 
not obviously mechanical. Their testimony confounds the mechanistic assumptions 
about tactics which are endemic in popular writing and remain all too common in 
academia as well. It seems clear that tactical drills learned in training counted for little. 
Stephen Bull states that ‘actions in the real world frequently broke down into a flurry 
of existential confusion that could on occasion make nonsense of drills or theory’.795 
In fact, the veterans’ testimony strongly suggests that such situations were not 
occasional but routine, with success in combat being usually a matter of bluff and 
nerve, in which progress was made by overawing the enemy into withdrawing, rather 
than by enacting tactical stratagems aimed at killing him. Put another way, 
intimidating the enemy to force his withdrawal was the preferred tactic. The testimony 
therefore broadly validates the notion that the British infantryman was tactically naïve, 
tended to lack enthusiasm and required close supervision; however, this should not 
be seen as a failure in training or motivation so much as an inherent reality of modern 
warfare. It is clear that combat was a highly disorientating and disempowering 
situation for all involved, in which fear and self-preservation unsurprisingly trumped 
tactical theories. A failure of front-line soldiers to enact complex tactics should not be 
seen as evidence of any wider shortcomings in cohesion in British Army units. Nor can 
795 Bull, Infantry Tactics, p. xiii. 
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it be assumed on the basis of this evidence that the caution of front-line troops had a 
direct negative effect on the progress of higher operations. 
While a conception of combat as determined by personal ‘calculations of risk versus 
gain’796 is strongly evidenced by the testimony, the validity and usefulness of veterans’ 
testimony in the wider discussion of doctrine appears somewhat doubtful for several 
reasons. Firstly, the literature tends to focus on a higher level of command than that 
which the interviewees, usually concerned only with the company downwards, can 
comment on. Ultimately an interviewee can only relate what they originally 
experienced or perceived; the problem here is not with oral history as a research 
method per se, but with the information that is available to be tapped in the first place. 
Therefore, it is not altogether clear how the oral history and documentary approaches 
to doctrine can be usefully synergised, since they deal with different levels of 
command. In this case, oral history seems to add human detail but limited 
interpretative information. 
Secondly, there must plainly have been common procedures in how troops went about 
their business both in and out of combat, but these are difficult to perceive. It was 
expected that such information would emerge, and indeed some did, but it was 
notably sparse and threadbare compared with the other issues investigated. There is 
no fundamental reason that veterans cannot provide useful information about 
standard procedures, from their personal point of view, but the interviewing process 
in this case is prejudicial to this end, and this is also likely to be the case with most 
796 Copp, Fields of Fire, p. 14. 
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archived interviews. This is because, in order to elicit testimony which can usefully be 
contextualised, a great deal of context must be understood and used to inform the 
questioning, including the particulars of the individual’s unit, the specialist role of the 
individual in the unit, and the precise engagements or operations to be discussed. A 
focussed interviewing programme is also required, but most interviews, concerned 
with capturing an individual’s entire war experiences in around one and a half hours, 
naturally concentrate on more general matters. 
Even if the researcher is well-informed, it may be the case that some interviewees 
simply do not recall the specifics of events and procedures, requiring a larger number 
of interviews to be conducted before a usable amount of evidence is collected. It 
should not be expected that events can be easily located geographically or in terms 
of the understood battles and operations even with diligent research. As Richard 
Holmes noted, ‘it is not merely that men forget. Very often they have no big picture 
to remember…Sometimes it is not until after the war that they discover where they 
were and what they achieved’.797 By contrast, most interviewees will be able to provide 
some answer to generalisable questions such as ‘How did you feel when friends were 
killed?’ or ‘What was your attitude to the enemy?’, while the interviewer will require 
far less specialised knowledge of particular units and events. It is not inconceivable 
that a project designed with a very specific research goal in mind should be able to 
elicit testimony which illuminates it—it is simply the case that the vast majority of 
veteran’s oral histories recorded to date do not suit this purpose in practice. To an 
797 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 154. 
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extent, the historian must approach this material on its own terms, rather than 
expecting it to provide the answer to any question. 
In this way, issues of class and gender are also of interest but not particularly well 
illustrated. Class emerged in the clear distinctions between the accounts of officers 
and other ranks. Officers were as a whole relatively reticent about their own opinions 
and opted to describe events in terms of their entire units. They also demonstrated a 
staunch but perhaps condescending admiration for the stoicism of their working-class 
charges. There was relatively little outright discussion of class issues, however. 
Likewise, masculinity was not a subject which emerged explicitly, although many 
issues such as bravery and fear, physical endurance, and group loyalty can be seen 
as relating to typically masculine traits. It seems that as the Army constituted an 
overwhelmingly masculine environment (unlike the Home Guard)798 there is little 
reason to separate gender issues from the simple fact of being soldiers. This can be 
seen as a logical consequence of the separation the veterans imply from wartime 
society as a whole. Arguably the invisibility of gender in the veterans’ testimony allows 
them to more easily discuss traits such as sensitivity and compassion without their 
masculinity being undermined.799 The main relevance of gender was in the 
intersubjective dynamics of the interview, as the veterans made statements to the 
male interviewer which they may have been more reticent to share with a female 
interviewer. 
798 Summerfield and Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence. 
799 Partridge, 4, 01; Purver, 2, 36; Young, 1, 83-84. 
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The fact remains that there are many issues which such testimony can effectively 
illuminate. In the introduction it was suggested that oral testimony is peculiar in the 
analytical approaches required, but not in its interpretative usage, as the information 
it provides is not inherently different to that contained in any other source. Without 
undermining the fundamental validity of this statement, it is evidently challenging to 
recognise the effect of subjectivity during the analysis.  Some subjectivity constitutes 
a part of historical experience, but some arises later, threatening to dilute the historical 
usefulness of the testimony. Therefore, it is vital to establish a theoretical distinction 
between historical subjectivity, which influenced human behaviour during the event 
itself, and retrospective subjectivity, which arose after the event took place. While 
retrospective subjectivity is unwelcome and potentially problematic, historical 
subjectivity is a fact of history like any other,800 and for the historian a matter of 
interest rather than a problem to be overcome. 
In many cases it is possible to envision historically subjective as well as real-world 
explanations for the testimony which is produced. For instance, veterans may 
downplay killing because in chaotic combat situations they really were quite unaware 
of whether they were killing; but at the same time such uncertainty provided reluctant 
killers sufficient grounds to persuade themselves that they had not killed. Grenades 
may have had their practical uses in dangerous combat situations, but it also seems 
likely that they were favoured as a weapon that permitted soldiers to distance 
themselves from their targets in a way which small arms did not. Infantrymen seriously 
downplay their agency, despite generally performing quite well; it seems likely that a 
800 Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, p. 50. 
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feeling of impotence was part and parcel of the front-line experience of even 
successful units. Meanwhile, tank crewmen may indeed have been better-informed 
and more tactically influential than the infantry, but since their tactical performance 
seems to have been more mixed than the testimony implies, it is likely also to reflect 
an impression of agency encouraged by access to communications networks, high unit 
cohesion and the feeling of security provided by their vehicles. 
Furthermore, there are likely to be continuities between historical and retrospective 
subjectivity, which makes distinguishing between the two difficult. For instance, an 
infantry veteran might downplay his agency because he felt he had little at the time, 
or because he is encouraged to do so by popular discourses to that effect, or most 
likely a combination of the two. If soldiers did not relish killing during the war, they 
also have major retrospectively subjective reasons to avoid talking about killing in the 
present. To return to the example of grenades, historical subjectivity would describe 
how soldiers found them easier to use at the time, while retrospective subjectivity 
would describe how it is easier to talk in the present about using them; but the two 
are likely to be connected. The cultural circuit, in fact, suggests that such overlaps are 
unavoidable, because partly it is historical subjectivity which will produce those 
discourses which go on to provide frameworks for retrospective subjectivity. Historical 
reality and the two types of subjectivity are therefore extremely difficult to distinguish 
from each other.  
Subjectivity as a whole is potentially problematic but also a significant opportunity, 
because it ensures that oral history illuminates those historically subjective factors 
which explain the human behaviour which is vitally important in the outcome of 
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military events. Oral testimony does contain facts, but if it only contained facts, it 
would be far less useful. For example, the difference between officers’ and other ranks’ 
accounts, such as officers’ preference for the second-person rather than first-person 
pronoun, tells something of their contrasting concerns during the war. Again, 
identifying patterns which emerge in spite of subjectivity can indicate that the 
testimony reflects historical reality. Since popular memory gives all British soldiers 
good retrospectively subjective reasons to downplay their agency, then the divergence 
between infantry and armour accounts in this regard indicates there were differences 
in the experience of the war itself. 
It is easy to see why oral historians show a preoccupation with exploring subjectivity, 
as it is so difficult to separate from the reality of what occurred (it should be 
remembered, however, that this applies to all retrospective accounts, not just spoken 
ones). This does not, however, justify wholeheartedly adopting a memory studies 
approach which presumes that understanding the past on its own terms is ultimately 
futile. The past can be interpreted and understood, however imperfectly.801 Given that 
the research aims of oral historians diverge so significantly from conventional historical 
inquiry, it would probably be more productive to solve the problem of combining 
military history and oral history by suggesting better methodologies to military 
historians, rather than expecting oral historians to set aside their political concerns 
and preoccupation with present-day subjectivity and engage productively in the 
historical study of armies and warfare. It is to be hoped that improved understandings 
801 Tilly, ‘People’s History and Social Science History’, pp. 462-3, 472; Portelli, The Death of Luigi 
Trastulli, pp. viii-ix, de Lee, ‘Oral History’, in Addison and Calder, Time to Kill, p. 361. 
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of subjectivity will proliferate among theory-averse military historians, allowing oral 
sources to be analysed more critically than previously and allowing them to be 
employed with more confidence when they do speak to historical subjectivity. In the 
future, there is scope for extending this approach to written memoirs as well,802 
deepening understandings of the place of personal sources in military history, better 
appreciating the subjectivity inherent in all sources, and re-evaluating the privileged 
position of documentary sources. Moreover, there is great potential for research into 
the cultural, institutional and commemorative motivations for the large-scale collection 
and consumption of veterans’ oral testimony which has occurred since the 1970s and 
continues apace today. 
If there is one common feature in all the accounts considered in this study, it is 
modesty. The fact that the British were soldiers, not warriors,803 is evident throughout. 
As has been remarked previously, ‘the recurring theme of British troops’ testimonies 
of Normandy is that of getting the job done and surviving’;804 the rest of the campaign 
is no different. Clearly few enjoyed the war or took any pleasure from combat. All are 
willing to freely admit to this, suggesting that there was no stigma against hoping for 
a legitimate means of escape through wounding or even psychological exhaustion. 
There is, however, also a sense that the task was worth doing; the theme throughout 
is of soldiers doing an undesirable but vitally important job. Their modesty may 
account for the fact their performance has been denigrated by comparison with their 
802 For a welcome contribution to this end see Frances E. Houghton, ‘“Remembering with 
Advantages”: British Military Memoirs of the Second World War, 1950-2010’, PhD Thesis (University of 
Edinburgh, 2015). 
803 French, Churchill’s Army, p. 154.  
804 Buckley, British Armour, p. 183. 
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more vocal German counterparts.805 There is increasing historical consensus that the 
performance of the British Army in Northwest Europe has been underrated; by giving 
veterans the chance to give their side of the story, oral history can contribute to this 
rehabilitation. 
Most soldiers were left with memories of the war which would remain with them for 
the rest of their lives. For some, the war was the most interesting period of their life, 
and their service the most important thing they would ever do; they would forever 
wear the identity of veteran. Oral history is bound to attract those who continue to 
view the war as the defining period of their life, perhaps looking back with nostalgia 
as much as remembrance. Yet it is important to moderate the temptation to view 
veterans as an undifferentiated group defined by the war alone and neglect the 
importance of their varied post-war experiences in their individual lives. These citizen 
soldiers would go on to lead full lives, of which the war was only one part, and for 
many far from the most important. To forget this is to downplay their individuality and 
ignore context vital to the way they tell their stories. Although most interviews deal 
only with wartime experiences, it is preferable to discuss civilian life too, in order to 
capture as full a picture of the individual and their subjectivity as possible. 
A significant number of veterans are confident, enthusiastic and vocal narrators of 
their war experiences. Many are not, preferring to leave the war in the past. Others 
believe it is important to talk about the war, although this does not change the fact 
805 Kite, Stout Hearts, p. 408. 
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that it was an experience they did not relish and were relieved to see the end of. As 
reluctant soldier Barry Freeman recalls: 
I was demobbed from a camp at Hereford, and they gave us a nice 
civilian suit and hat and all the trimmings that go with it, and a train pass 
to get home, and at that time the trains, they ran direct to Birmingham 
through Hagley, where I lived all my life, and I got off the train at Hagley 
and my mother's shop was at the other end of the village, and I was 
walking down the village. I only saw two people, but I noticed from 
about halfway down how quiet it was. Silence. It was lovely. So, I was 
home. That was it.806 
806 Freeman, 1, 47-49. 
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